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Rising energy prices in recent years have renewed interest in the effects of global com-
modity price increases, and energy price shocks in particular, on the U.S. economy. Un-
derstanding how the economy evolves in response to these shocks is important to policy
makers and professional economists. One reason economists and financial market analysts
are interested in commodity prices is that they are thought to be good predictors of infla-
tion. Better predictions of inflation in turn are thought to be useful for understanding the
Fed’s policy decisions. A number of researchers have shown that commodity prices were
good predictors of inflation during the 1970s and early 1980s. However, the predictive
power of commodity prices seems to have disappeared since the mid-1980s. In Chapter II,
I demonstrate that this is not the case. The apparent breakdown in the predictive power
of commodity prices is shown to be the result of using broad commodity price indices that
often assign all commodity prices a fixed and equal weight regardless of their predictive
content. Recent advances in the forecasting literature show that such weights can perform
poorly in out-of-sample forecasting, and that data-based weights are preferable. Using sev-
eral state-of-the-art forecast combination methods, including bagging, Bayesian shrinkage
estimation, static factor models, and Bayesian model averaging, that implicitly chose the
appropriate weights for individual commodity prices, I find that commodity prices are good
predictors of inflation during the 1990s and early 2000s. Furthermore, commodity prices
contain information about future inflation not captured by the leading principal compo-
1
nents of a larger set of macroeconomic and financial variables. These improved inflation
forecasts, however, do not necessarily improve our understanding of Fed policy decisions.
Specifically, inflation forecasts based on commodity prices do not produce more accurate
predictions for short-term interest rates, suggesting that commodity prices contribute little
to a better understanding of monetary policy.
Economists are interested in commodity prices non only as leading indicators for in-
flation, but also because of their real effects on the economy. Rising prices for energy
commodities such as crude oil, gasoline, and natural gas are considered particularly worri-
some because they require households to devote a larger share of their budgets to energy
consumption and a smaller share to non-energy consumption. Though it is widely accepted
that rising energy prices decrease households’ purchasing power for non-energy goods and
services, little is known about the size of these resulting declines in purchasing power, or
about their effects on consumer expenditures, consumer expectations, and aggregate un-
employment. Chapter III (joint with Lutz Kilian), estimates their effects and characterizes
the channels of transmission of energy prices to the economy. Several popular models of
the transmission of energy price shocks suggest that consumption will fall when energy
prices increase but remain unresponsive to energy price declines. The empirical evidence
for such asymmetries provided by the existing literature, however, is not based on formal
statistical tests. Using such tests, we show that there is no compelling evidence that real
consumption, consumer expectations, or aggregate unemployment respond asymmetrically
to unanticipated increases and decreases in energy prices. This result has immediate impli-
cations for models of the transmission of energy price shocks to the economy. Asymmetric
transmission mechanisms are thought to be necessary for explaining why real GDP fell
sharply in 1979 following an increase in energy prices, but was flat in 1986 following a
decrease in energy prices. Using historical decompositions to analyze how consumption
would have evolved in the absence of the 1986 decline in energy prices, we demonstrate
that there actually was a boom in consumption in 1986, and that this boom was similar in
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magnitude to the decline in real consumption in 1979. While there indeed is an asymmetry
in the real GDP growth data for 1979 and 1986, that asymmetry appears to be driven by
a decline in business investment in 1986 that was not related to the fall in energy prices,
but to the 1986 Tax Reform Act and to the response of investment in the petroleum and
natural gas industry to the collapse of OPEC in late 1985.
When we estimate the response of real consumption to an unanticipated increase in
energy prices, we find that real consumption falls by more than the associated decline
in discretionary income. This suggests that other transmission mechanisms, such as an
increase in precautionary savings or an increase in the operating cost of energy-using
durables, are necessary for explaining the overall response. Our analysis allows us to make
predictions about the effects of rising energy prices on household expenditure patterns. For
example, a 25 cent-per-gallon increase in the price of gasoline should cause a household
with $4, 000 to spend per month to cut back its expenditures by $41 one year later.
It has been suggested that energy prices are less important for the economy today
than they were during the 1970s. Our analysis demonstrates that the response of real
consumption to an increase in energy prices is larger for the 1970-1987 period than for
the 1988-2006 period, consistent with this view. We trace the declining importance of
energy price shocks relative to the 1970s to changes in the composition of U.S. automobile
production and to the declining overall importance of the U.S. automobile sector.
Whereas Chapter III studies the effects of energy price shocks on consumption, Chapter
IV (joint with Lutz Kilian) focuses on the effects of energy price shocks on business fixed
investment in structures and equipment. This question is important because if there is
evidence of an asymmetric response of real GDP to energy price shocks it must come from
investment, not from consumption. Moreover, several leading theories that predict asym-
metries in the response of durables consumption, apply to business fixed investment as
well. While we do find that certain types of structures and equipment investment respond
asymmetrically, the pattern of asymmetries that we observe is inconsistent with the pre-
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dictions of these leading theories. Rather this evidence is an artifact (1) of the aggregation
of mining-related expenditures by the petroleum industry and all other expenditures, and
(2) of ignoring an exogenous shift in investment mainly caused by the 1986 Tax Reform
Act. Once we control for these factors, the evidence for asymmetries mostly disappears.
Furthermore, except for investment in mining structures, mining and oilfield machinery,
and transportation equipment, most forms of structures and equipment investment are
unresponsive to unanticipated energy price shocks. Since the 1970s, the contribution of
energy prices to fluctuations in non-mining investment has been negligible.
The findings in this thesis suggest that it is necessary to revise our thinking about
the transmission of energy price shocks to the economy. Researchers typically believe
that frictions associated with sectoral reallocations are important channels through which
energy price shocks are transmitted to the economy. These frictions in turn imply that real
consumption, real investment, and aggregate unemployment will respond asymmetrically
to energy price increases and decreases. We find no compelling evidence for asymmetries in
the response of these variables, suggesting that sectoral reallocations are not a significant
transmission mechanism. This does not mean, however, that the effects of energy price
shocks are necessarily small. In addition to a discretionary income effect, we find that
energy price shocks result in a sizeable precautionary savings effect and a sizeable operating
cost effect on energy-using durable goods. The extent to which each of these channels
is important depends on the type of expenditure in question. Besides mining-related
investment in structures and equipment, the types of expenditure that matter most for the
transmission of energy price shocks to the economy include consumer and firm expenditures
on motor vehicles and residential fixed investment in housing.
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CHAPTER II
Commodity Prices, Inflation Forecasts, and Monetary Policy
2.1 Introduction
This paper examines the usefulness of commodity prices for predicting consumer price
inflation. Inflation forecasts are routinely used by professional economists for predicting
monetary policy and the path of short-term interest rates. A common descriptive model of
monetary policy states that the Federal Reserve increases or decreases short term interest
rates in response to changes in the rate of consumer price inflation and a measure of real
activity such as deviations in unemployment from its natural rate. Though there are many
specifications of this “Taylor rule” one that appears frequently in the empirical literature
postulates that short term interest rates are adjusted linearly in response to forecasts of
future inflation and real activity. Thus, forecasts of inflation are important statistics for
anyone interested in monetary policy. Since higher commodity prices are often thought to
presage higher rates of inflation, the evolution of commodity prices in turn is intensively
scrutinized by professional economists.
The relevance of commodity prices to monetary policymakers is not uniformly accepted.
The debate revolves around the usefulness of commodity prices as a leading indicator for
inflation. Conventional wisdom holds that increases in the prices of certain commodities
such as gold or petroleum are indicators of higher future inflation. For example, a July 15,
2005 article in the New York Times reports that:
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Wholesale prices, an early indicator of inflation in the economy, were unchanged
in June, the government reported today, indicating that most businesses are not
passing on rising energy costs to consumers.
This quote illustrates an important issue. While market participants seem to look
towards intermediate commodity prices as a signal for future consumer price inflation, the
link does not always materialize. The indicator role of commodity prices is also debated by
policymakers. For example, in a speech to the American Economic Association in January
2004, Fed governor Ben Bernanke stated that:
...the direct effects of commodity price inflation on consumer inflation are em-
pirically minuscule, both because raw materials costs are a small portion of total
costs and because part of any increase in the cost of materials tends to be ab-
sorbed in the margins of final goods producers and distributors. Accelerations
in commodity prices comparable to or larger than the most recent one occurred
following the 1981-1982 and 1990-1991 recessions, as well as in 1986-1987 and
1999, with no noticeable impact on inflation at the consumer level.
According to Fed governor Donald Kohn, however:
Commodities and imports are only a small part of what we consume, and changes
in their prices as well as in the price of energy usually do not affect measured
core consumer inflation very much. But the recent situation has been notable
for the size and number of price movements going in the same direction, so that
even with limited pass-through of individual price movements, the total effect
probably has been significant. Judging from the results of statistical models in-
corporating the factors we have been examining, increases in commodity, energy,
and import prices together might have boosted core consumer inflation on the
order of roughly 1/4 to 1/2 percentage point over the past four quarters.
There are several theoretical justifications for using commodity price inflation to predict
future consumer price inflation. Commodities are often purchased in spot markets, so their
prices are flexible, as opposed to final goods prices, which tend to be sticky. A macroe-
conomic shock will affect commodity prices contemporaneously, but will affect consumer
prices only with a lag. For instance, the first signs of an increase in the aggregate demand
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for final goods and services will be found in commodity prices, and only subsequently in
final goods prices. Alternatively, a cost shock might originate in the market for certain
commodities such as oil. To the extent that these commodities are important for the do-
mestic production of final goods, the costs will be passed through to final goods prices.
But since final goods prices are sticky, they will adjust more slowly.1
An empirical link between commodity prices and consumer prices, however, might be
difficult to detect for a number of reasons. First, higher production costs that result from
higher commodity prices might not be passed on to consumers in the form of higher final
goods prices. This could be the case if producers experience increased competition from free
trade. As Bernanke points out in his speech, “...part of any increase in the costs of materials
tend to be absorbed in the margins of final goods producers and distributors.” Second,
the argument for a theoretical link between commodity prices and final consumer goods
prices typically postulates that a specific monetary or supply shock is driving the positive
relationship. If, however, consumer price inflation is subject to several offsetting shocks
at any one time, the unconditional covariance between consumer prices and commodity
prices could be small and insignificant. Commodity prices would then have little predictive
ability, despite the existence of a theoretical link. Thus, commodity prices’ relevance to
forecasters remains an open question.
A natural and conventional metric for judging the performance of a particular fore-
casting model is the recursive prediction mean-squared error (PMSE) in simulated out-of-
sample forecasts. If adding commodity price inflation to the information set of a forecaster
reduces the PMSE of the inflation forecast, then I can conclude that commodity price infla-
tion is a leading indicator of final goods price inflation. However, a more accurate inflation
forecast will not necessarily indicate whether commodity prices are useful for describing
monetary policy. For example, policymakers might put little weight on the rate of com-
modity price inflation when forming there own projections about future consumer price
1See Boughton and Branson (1991) for a model of commodity and industrial prices.
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inflation. This suggests another metric for gauging the usefulness of commodity prices,
namely the fit of a Taylor rule. If adding commodity price inflation to the information set
of the policy rule, via the consumer price inflation forecast, reduces the root mean-squared
error of the model, then I can conclude that commodity price inflation is a useful predictor
of monetary policy.
An early appeal to the forecasting ability of commodity prices is Sims’ (1992) demon-
stration that the inclusion of a commodity price index in a VAR can partially resolve the
often noticed ”price puzzle”, i.e., a short-term rise in the price level following an exoge-
nous monetary tightening. Sims made the case that the consecutive rise in the price level
and short-term interest rate was the result of an endogenous policy response to higher
expected inflation. In order to identify exogenous movements in the interest rate correctly,
the econometrician must control for expectations of future inflation. Sims proposed in-
cluding a commodity price index for this purpose. Since then, a commodity price index
has been included in numerous VAR studies of monetary policy (see, e.g., Bernanke and
Mihov 1998). Subsequent research has examined the link between commodity prices and
consumer price inflation. Hanson (2004), revisiting the price puzzle, demonstrates that
adding certain commodity price indices to a VAR forecasting model can significantly re-
duce the PMSE of a price level forecast, relative to a VAR without commodity prices.
Hanson finds that adding an agricultural raw materials price index to the VAR reduces
the PMSE of a CPI forecast by 35% at a one year horizon. The accuracy gains, however,
are much smaller at shorter horizons.
Other recent studies dispute the usefulness of commodity prices as predictors of future
consumer price inflation. Blomberg and Harris (1995) demonstrate that certain commodity
and producer price indices are good indicators of future inflation during the 1970s and early
1980s, but that they lose their ability to predict changes in core CPI inflation starting in
the mid 1980s. They show that the importance of commodities for U.S. production wanes
around this time and point to the absence of significant food and oil price shocks that could
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affect consumer prices. Cecchetti, Chu, and Steindel (2000) report mixed results for the
forecasting ability of commodity prices. The authors add a series of individual indicators
of future inflation, such as commodity price indices, M1 growth, exchange rates, interest
rates, and unemployment rates, to an autoregression for CPI inflation. They demonstrate
that the model with certain commodity price indices, such as the Journal of Commerce
price index for industrial materials, the NAPM price diffusion index, a gold price index, or
an oil price index, outperforms the autoregression more often than most other indicators
over the 1975-1998 period. An autoregression, however, often outperforms these forecasting
models. Cecchetti et al. also find a negative covariance between certain commodity price
indices and final goods price inflation, leading them to dismiss most of their other results.
Stock and Watson (2003) show that forecasting models with a commodity price index can
increase the accuracy of a forecast for the change in monthly CPI inflation relative to an
autoregressive benchmark for the 1971-1984 period by 21%. Adding the commodity price
index to the model for the 1985-1999 period, however, decreases the forecast accuracy by
26%. Finally, Furlong and Ingenito (1996) find that the ability of a non-oil commodity
price index to Granger cause CPI inflation weakens considerably around 1984.
While this literature constitutes an important first step towards uncovering the leading
indicator role of commodity prices for consumer price inflation, these papers suffer from
several drawbacks. First, all of these papers forecast inflation with broad commodity
price indices. These indices may include some commodity prices that are irrelevant for
predicting future inflation, and thus may increase the variance of the forecast. They might
also aggregate the information from a set of commodity prices in a way that is less than
optimal; for instance, if all commodities are given equal weight in the index. Second,
many of the aforementioned papers do not use state-of-the-art forecasting techniques. For
example, Hanson (2004), and Blomberg and Harris (1995) use unrestricted VAR forecasting
models that are known to perform poorly in out-of-sample forecasting (see, e.g., Stock
2001). Third, a number of these papers do not evaluate commodity prices on a genuine
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out-of-sample basis. For example, Boughton and Branson (1991) and Blomberg and Harris
(1995) estimate model parameters for the first half of their sample and use them to forecast
inflation for the quarters in the second half of their sample. While their forecasts are
out-of-sample, they are based on information sets that do not include the most up-to-
date set of data. Cecchetti, Chu, and Steindel (2000) use a bivariate iterated multi-step
ahead forecasting model, yet they only forecast future values of inflation and use ex-post
realizations of commodity prices instead of their forecasted values. Their forecasts are
based on data that would not have been included in a forecaster’s information set. Finally,
the existing literature evaluates the usefulness of commodity prices based on their ability
to reduce the PMSE of an inflation forecast and largely ignores the question of whether
these forecasts help us understand monetary policy. While quadratic loss is a commonly
used criterion for evaluation, most users of inflation forecasts will be interested in inflation
as it relates to the perceived policy reaction function of the central bank. There is no a
priori reason to believe that a forecasting model that forecasts well by the PMSE criterion,
also is a good predictor for the path of short-term interest rates.
In this paper I use a set of 46 individual commodity prices that allows me to determine
which commodity prices are good predictors of future inflation. I apply state-of-the-art
forecasting methods to combine the information content of this data set. These methods,
including bagging, Bayesian model averaging, shrinkage estimation, and factor models,
implicitly determine the appropriate weights for combining the 46 regressors. The fore-
casting models are evaluated on a recursive out-of-sample basis in order to simulate the
experience of a forecaster who uses all information available to him at a particular point in
time. Recursive out-of-sample forecasting is used in a number of recent papers including
Stock and Watson (1999, 2002, and 2003), Massimiliano, Stock and Watson (2004), Wright
(2003), Bernanke and Boivin (2003), Hanson (2004), and Inoue and Kilian (2005). I also
focus on single equation, direct h-step ahead forecasting methods to avoid the problems
associated with multivariate models.
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Several papers, such as Blomberg and Harris (1995), Furlong and Ingenito (1996) and
Stock and Watson (2003) find a structural break in the relationship between commodity
prices and consumer price inflation during the early 1980s, with the forecasting power of
these predictors weakening around this time. Since there is little argument in the literature
that commodity prices were good leading indicators of consumer price inflation during the
1970s and early 1980s, this paper evaluates this relationship over the 1993-2004 period
for which there is controversy. In the last part of this paper, I assess the usefulness of
commodity prices in improving the predictive power of a monetary policy reaction function.
Assuming that Fed behavior is described by a forward-looking Taylor rule, I compare actual
interest rates to those implied by the model when inflation is forecasted with commodity
prices, and when it is not.
The accuracy of each forecasting method employed in this paper is evaluated relative to
an inflation-only model, which uses lags of inflation to predict future inflation. This basis
for comparison is common to a number of research papers about inflation forecasting.2 Yet
forecasters and policymakers today have access to tremendous amounts of data that are
useful for predicting future inflation, such as wages, industrial production, stock prices, and
exchange rates. With this in mind, I also examine inflation forecasts for which commodity
prices are added to a factor model based on a larger information set containing more than
100 macroeconomic time series.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 examines forecasting
methods based on individual commodity prices, based on individual price indices, and
based on forecast combinations of individual commodity prices. I present rescursive PMSE
results for monthly CPI inflation forecasts. I also present results for quarterly CPI inflation
and GDP deflator inflation forecasts. The latter analysis is motivated by the analysis in
Barsky and Kilian (2002) that shows that under certain conditions, the prices of imported
commodities may have a bigger impact on CPI inflation than on GDP deflator inflation.
2See, for example, Massimiliano, Stock, and Watson (2004); Stock and Watson (2003); Wright (2003); and Bachmeier, Li,
and Liu (2005).
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Section 3 considers the alternative factor model benchmark. I examine factor model fore-
casts of CPI inflation, core CPI inflation, and core Personal Consumption Expenditure
(PCE) price inflation. The latter two measures exclude the more volatile food and energy
prices. Section 4 addresses the ability of commodity prices to describe the behavior of
monetary policymakers. I compare estimated short term interest rates from a Taylor rule
to actual interest rates, when commodity prices are included in the inflation forecast and
when they are not. Section 5 examines the usefulness of alternative forecasting model spec-
ifications based on error correction terms involving the deviation of the logged commodity
price from the logged CPI. Section 6 concludes.
2.2 Forecasting Inflation with Commodity Prices
This section addresses the predictive ability of commodity prices for inflation. Some of
the questions of interest are: Does adding commodity prices to the forecasting model im-
prove the accuracy of inflation forecasts? Which commodity prices are the best predictors?
Are industrial commodity prices more informative than food and beverage prices? Do oil
prices in particular help forecast inflation? Should one rely on individual commodity prices
or commodity price indices? Are there benefits from using state-of-the-art forecast combi-
nation methods rather than equal-weighted indices? If so, which methods work best? Do
the results depend on the definition of inflation? Do the results apply equally to long and
to short horizons? Is there information in commodity prices not captured by the leading
principal components of a broader set of macroeconomic and financial variables?
A commodity or commodity group’s predictive ability is measured as the recursive
PMSE of a forecasting method that includes these commodity prices, relative to a model
without them. I perform a simulated out-of-sample forecasting exercise for different sub-
sets of commodity prices, different h-month forecasting horizons, and various forecasting
methods. The dependent variable in each case is the annualized h-period growth rate of the
monthly or quarterly price series, measured as the first difference of the logarithm of the
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series. The predictors include one or more lags of the annualized 1-month (or in some cases
1-quarter) growth rate of consumer prices, and the corresponding growth rate of commod-
ity prices. The commodity price data are from the IMF’s International Financial Statistics
database. Table 1 lists the different commodity prices and commodity price indices used
in this study. The commodities in the data set are categorized into three groups: food and
beverage commodities (28 commodities), materials commodities (18 commodities), and all
commodities (46 commodities). The commodity prices are monthly averages of world spot
market prices measured in U.S. dollars. Each forecasting method is evaluated relative to
an inflation-only direct-forecasting model. I chose this benchmark based on a comparison
of the forecasting accuracies of a direct-forecasting model, an iterated AR model, and an
iterated AR in first differences. The lag order for the inflation-only model is selected by
minimizing the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC).3
Let h denote the monthly forecast horizon, p the lag order for monthly inflation chosen
by minimizing the AIC, and πht the annualized h-month rate of consumer price inflation
between time t and t+h. Then the inflation-only model used as the benchmark for the
forcast accuracy comparison is given by:
πht = α + ρ1πt−1 + ... + ρpπt−p + εt
In the remainder of this paper, the predictive ability of commodity prices is investi-
gated based on a number of different forecasting methods. My analysis provides a more
comprehensive assessment of the predictive relationship between commodity price inflation
and consumer price inflation than the results based on vector autoregressions or univariate
inflation models augmented with a single commodity price or commodity price index, as in
Hanson (2004), Blomberg and Harris (1995) and Cecchetti, Chu, and Steindel (2000). The
accuracy of each forecasting method is measured by the ratio of its recursive PMSE rela-
3The recursive PMSE of the inflation-only model is smaller when the lag order is selected with the AIC than the Schwarz
Information Criterion (SIC), reflecting the presence of a large moving-average component in inflation (see Inoue and Kilian
(2006) for further discussion).
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tive to that of the inflation-only model. A ratio less than 1 indicates that the model with
commodity price inflation is more accurate, on average, than the inflation-only model.
The initial parameter estimates for each forecasting model are based on data from the
1980-1992 period. Recursive forecast accuracy results are reported for the 1993-2004 pe-
riod. This evaluation window is chosen because it is large enough to obtain reasonably
accurate estimates of the model parameter values, yet it still provides forecasts for about
144 months.
2.2.1 Forecasting Monthly CPI Inflation with Individual Commodity Prices and Price In-
dices
The first set of results assesses the predictive power of each individual commodity
price and of commonly used commodity price indices. For this purpose, I combine lags
of consumer price inflation, with lags of the inflation rate for a single commodity price or
commodity price index in the form of a distributed lag model.4 The lag orders for consumer
price inflation and commodity price inflation are selected jointly by minimizing an AIC,
with an upper bound of 12 lags for each predictor. Letting ∆xi,t denote the commodity
price inflation rate for commodity price i at time t, the distributed lag model is given by:
πht = α + ρ1πt−1 + ... + ρpπt−p + γ1∆xi,t−1 + ... + γq∆xi,t−q + εt
Results for the distributed lag model forecasts of monthly CPI inflation are presented
in Table 2. It is widely believed that industrial commodity prices have predictive power
for monthly CPI inflation. Indeed, certain individual metals prices, such as copper, lead,
nickel, and zinc prices improve the forecast at various horizons, but the gains are not
uniform across horizons or commodities.
Perhaps the series most often singled out for its alleged predictive ability for inflation is
the price of crude oil. Table 2 confirms that crude oil price inflation is particularly useful
for predicting CPI inflation at the 1 and 3 month forecast horizons, although at longer
4A distributed lag model is used in Stock and Watson (2003) to assess the predictive content of different macroeconomic
and financial variables.
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horizons, the accuracy gains are either modest or non-existent. Among other materials
prices, hard sawn wood price inflation is useful at medium and long forecast horizons,
in some cases lowering the PMSE by 12% relative to the inflation-only model, while fine
wool peforms moderately well at short horizons. Food and beverage prices almost always
increase the PMSE of the forecast model. Two notable exceptions are cocoa bean prices
and coconut oil prices.
One of the problems with using individual commodity prices is that individual series
tend to be noisy. This suggests aggregating series into commodity price indices. On the
other hand, a number of existing papers have shown that commodity price indices have
not been useful for forecasting CPI inflation since the mid-1980s.
Table 2 confirms that a broad non-fuel price index will make the forecasting model
less accurate than an inflation-only model at most forecast horizons. These results are
similar to those in Blomberg and Harris (1995) and Stock and Watson (2003). Turning
to the more narrowly defined price indices, I find that the various food and beverage
indices as well increase the PMSE of the forecast at every forecast horizon, sometimes by
more than 40%. On the other hand, the industrial inputs price index works well at most
forecast horizons, typically decreasing the PMSE of the forecast by 4%-9% compared to the
inflation-only model. The agricultural raw materials and metals price indices also generate
some accuracy gains, but they occur at fewer horizons and tend to be more modest than
those from the industrial inputs price index. Table 2 suggests that combining information
from many commodity prices can be effective in reducing noise, but it also highlights
important differences in the predictive ability across different types of commodities. Even
for materials prices, however, the gains in accuracy from using the industrial inputs price
index are at most 10%. One possible reason is that these indices are based on equal weights.
A reasonable conjecture is that methods that choose these weights based on the data may
generate superior forecasts of inflation. I will consider several such methods below. As
forecast combination methods depend on auxiliary parameters such as prior variances and
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critical values, for these methods I report only the best forecasting results after searching
over alternative choices for these parameters.
The IMF data set of commodities does not include precious metals such as gold or silver.
The latter commodities matter not so much because of their importance as industrial
inputs, but because they are often considered a hedge against inflation. This view dates
back to the 1970s. Given the absence of high and sustained inflation rates since the early
1980s, the relevance of gold and silver prices for inflation forecasting is no longer obvious.
In unreported results, I examined the predictive value of gold and silver prices. I found
that neither price is a useful predictor individually. In fact, adding the price of gold to the
inflation only model worsens the forecast accuracy in virtually every case. The performance
of silver prices is only marginally better.
Moreover, when adding the price of gold and silver to the baseline data set of commodity
prices, the forecast accuracy of the forecast combination methods considered below is worse
in most cases and marginally better only in rare cases. This is not surprising since the
main rationale for the predictive power of gold and silver prices does not seem to apply to
the period after the mid-1980s. Thus, I choose not to report these additional results.
2.2.2 Combination Forecasts of Monthly CPI Inflation Using Multiple Commodity Prices
Unrestricted Model Forecasts
A useful benchmark for the forecast combination methods is the performance of forecasts
from unrestricted models that include the most recent lag of all commodity prices in
addition to lags of CPI inflation. This unrestricted model is given by:






The lag length for consumer price inflation is selected via the AIC with an upper bound
of 12 lags. The model is estimated by OLS. I consider the set of materials price inflation
regressors, that of food and beverage price inflation regressors, and the set of all commodity
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price inflation regressors. Table 3 shows that the unrestricted model outperforms the
inflation-only model only when it includes materials price inflation and only at the 1-
month forecast horizon. In all other cases, the inflation-only model is more accurate.
Table 3 illustrates the difficulty in improving on simple equal-weighted commodity price
indices. A partial explanation for these poor results is that estimating the unrestricted
model with 28 or 46 regressors in addition to several lags of inflation leaves the model with
few degrees of freedom. OLS estimation of the model’s parameters with few degrees of
freedom will leads to poor out-of-sample prediction when the number of parameters is too
large.
Bayesian Shrinkage Forecasts
If the poor out-of-sample predictions obtained from the unrestricted combination fore-
cast model are due to OLS estimation of the model, the results might be improved by im-
posing additional structure on the parameters. For the next combination forecast method,
I estimate the unrestricted model parameters with a Bayesian shrinkage estimator. The
prior mean reflects the notion that each commodity price regressor has no predictive power
for the dependent variable (i.e., a coefficient equal to zero). Thus, the parameter estimates
are shrunk towards zero. For the prior standard deviation of these parameters I explore
alternative values λ ∈ {0.01, 0.02, 0.05, 0.1, 0.2, 0.3, 0.4, 0.5, 1, 2, 5, 100}. The smaller the
variance of the prior distribution, the higher the degree of shrinkage, and the more weight
is placed on the prior distribution. So, as λ → ∞, the shrinkage estimator reduces to
the OLS estimator of the unrestricted model. Finally, following Wright (2003) and Inoue
and Kilian (2005), the prior means for the intercept and lags of inflation are based on the
fitted values of a regression of consumer price inflation on its lags and an intercept over
the pre-sample period (1957-1979), with the corresponding prior variance set to infinity.
Table 3 shows that shrinkage estimation of the unrestricted model generates forecasts
that are at least as accurate as the inflation-only model for all forecast horizons and all sets
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of regressors. Furthermore, the shrinkage forecast is more accurate than the unrestricted
model estimated by OLS. For food and beverage prices and for the full set of commodity
prices, using a shrinkage estimator reduces the relative PMSE by 30 to 50 percentage
points compared to the unrestricted model estimated by OLS. The shrinkage forecast with
materials price inflation is preferable for the 1,3, and 12 month horizons, reducing the
PMSE by 10%, 5%, and 4% respectively. In all cases, a high degree of shrinkage (λ ≤ .2)
works best for all sets of predictors, with slightly larger degrees of shrinkage preferable
for food and beverage prices and for the full set of commodity prices. I conclude that
shrinkage estimation strictly dominates OLS estimation of the unrestricted model. In
addition, shrinkage estimation of the unrestricted model performs at least as well, and
typically better than, forecasts based on standard commodity price indices.
Bagging Forecasts
An alternative method for dealing with the over-fitting problem is to use statistical tests
to determine which commodity prices are relevant to the forecasting exercise. For exam-
ple, one may decide whether to include a given predictor based on a 2-sided t-test.5 Small
changes in the data, however, can overturn the results of such tests, leading to an unstable
pre-test decision rule and an inflated out-of-sample forecast variance. Bagging, or bootstrap
aggregation, is a method for reducing this model instability while exploiting the information
content of a large number of predictors (see, e.g., Buhlmann and Yu 2002, Inoue and Kilian
2005). Bagging involves fitting the unrestricted model, creating a large set of bootstrap
samples, applying the pre-test to each bootstrap sample, and generating a forecast for each
bootstrap sample based on the model selected for that sample. The bagging forecast is de-
fined as the average of these bootstrap forecasts.6 Following Inoue and Kilian (2005) I set
the number of bootstrap re-samples to 100. For the pre-test I consider the following critical
values: c ∈ {1.96, 2.1701, 2.5758, 2.807, 2.8782, 3.0233, 3.2905, 4.4172, 4.5648, 4.8916, 5.0263,
5Boughton and Branson (1991) use a t-test to determine which regressors to include in an aggregate commodity price
index. Stock and Watson (2005a) demonstrate that model selection with pretests has a shrinkage interpretation.
6Inoue and Kilian (2005) demonstrate that a bagging model with a large number of macroeconomic time-series predictors
can reduce the PMSE of an inflation forecast relative to an inflation-only model.
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5.3267}. The AIC with an upper bound of 12 lags is used to select the lag order for CPI
inflation. As in the unrestricted model, I include one lag of each ∆xi,t. The bagging ex-
ercise is performed on the original set of commodity price inflation regressors as well as
on two sets of orthogonalized regressors. The first is based on an orthogonalization of the
regressors via a Choleski decomposition. The second transformation replaces the original
regressors by their principal components. For a comparison of these alternative bagging
methods see Inoue and Kilian (2005). In my case, the bagging forecast results are broadly
similar across the three specifications of the predictors. I therefore present results for the
standard bagging forecasts on the original set of commodity price inflation regressors.
Like the Bayesian shrinkage forecast, the bagging method reduces the PMSE of the
forecast relative to the inflation-only model at the 1- and 3-month horizons for all three
sets of predictors. The largest accuracy gains are obtained when using materials prices, in
which case the PMSE falls by 11% and 7% at the 1- and 3-month horizons, respectively.
Bagging loses its predictive accuracy at the 12-month horizon with PMSE ratios greater
than 1 for all sets of predictors. In all cases, bagging is more accurate than the unrestricted
model, suggesting that model selection is beneficial to the forecast. The best critical value
for the 2-sided t-test depends on the regressors included in the model and the forecast
horizon. Bagging with materials price inflation requires a lower critical value (2.807 or
3.2905 work best) than bagging with the set of food and beverage prices or the full set of
commodity price prices (4.8916, 4.5648, or 5.0263 work best).
Static Factor Model Forecasts
The static factor model provides yet another method for forecasting a single time series
with a large number of predictors. The static factor model reduces the dimension of the
model by combining the information content of these predictors into a small number of
principal components.7 Factors are estimated for each set of ∆xi,t regressors; materials
prices, food and beverage prices, and the full set of commodity prices. For each forecast
7For details on the estimation of the factors, see Stock and Watson (1999).
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horizon and initial estimation window, lags of consumer price inflation are augmented
with the first r estimated commodity price inflation factors where r ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4, 5}. I
also estimated dynamic factor models where the lag order for the first r factors is selected
jointly by the AIC or the SIC. These models typically performed worse than the static
factor models in out-of-sample forecasting.
Table 3 shows that the static factor models produce more accurate forecasts than the
inflation-only model for all forecast horizons when materials price regressors are used. On
the other hand, when food and beverage prices or the full set of commodity prices are
used, the inflation-only model is generally at least as accurate as the factor model. For the
1-month and 3-month forecast horizons, including the first three materials price inflation
factors works best, reducing the PMSE by 8% relative to the inflation-only model. For
the 12-month forecast horizon, including only the first materials price inflation factor is
preferrable.
Equal-weighted Forecasts and Bayesian Model Averaging
Stock and Watson (2003) show that forecast accuracy can be improved by taking a
simple average or the median of forecasts generated by adding a single lag of ∆xi,t to the
inflation-only model. Wright (2003) demonstrates that equal-weighted forecasts can be
improved further by taking a weighted average of different forecasts, where the weights
are based on the Bayesian posterior probability of each forecasting model conditional on
assuming that each model is equally likely. As before, the lag order for inflation is selected
by the AIC. The prior mean for each forecasting model is 1
M
, where M is the number of
commodity prices in a given commodity price group. The prior for the model parameters is
analagous to that used for Bayesian shrinkage estimation. The prior standard deviation for
commodity price inflation regressors is φ ∈ {0, 0.01, 0.05, 0.1, 0.2, 0.3, 0.4, 0.5, 1, 2, 5, 100}.8
Table 3 shows that Bayesian model averaging (BMA) and the equal-weighted forecast
8The higher the value of φ, the more weight is put on the data when constructing the posterior probability. When φ = 0,
for instance, the model reduces to an equal-weighted forecast.
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are at least as accurate as the inflation-only model in all cases. Similar to Wright (2003),
I find a number of cases in which the best BMA forecast is superior to the equal-weighted
forecast, particularly when materials price inflation or the full set of commodity price
inflation regressors are included in the model. For food and beverage price inflation,
however, there is no difference between the two methods. Typically, a small degree of
shrinkage (φ ≤ .4) works best.
2.2.2.1 Which Models Work Best?
At this point it is useful to summarize the findings for monthly CPI inflation. At short
horizons, the price of oil is the best single predictor with gains relative to the inflation-
only model of 8% and 7%, respectively, at the 1-month and 3-month horizon. Oil prices
also have better predictive ability than even the best commodity price indices. However,
modern forecast combination methods such as bagging and Bayesian model averaging
tend to perform as well or better than oil prices at short horizons, provided that the set
of potential predictors includes either materials prices only or all commodity prices. For
example, the PMSE reduction from bagging materials prices is 11% and 7%, respectively,
at the 1-month and the 3-month horizon. BMA applied to all commodity prices reduces
the PMSE by 11% at the 1-month horizon. Forecast accuracy gains based on food and
beverage prices alone were modest at best. These findings overturn the consensus that
commodity prices have lost their predictive ability since the 1990s.
Although the forecast accuracy improvements may seem small by the standards of
PMSE reductions reported in the literature for the 1970s and 1980s, it is important to
keep in mind that the latter results were based on a much larger set of predictors rather
than just commodity prices. Moreover, as I will show in Section 3, the large-dimensional
forecasting models of the type that appeared to predict well in the 1970s and 1980s actually
are considerably less accurate than the model based on commodity prices only for 1993-
2004 with gains of at most 5% relative to the inflation-only model.9
9The extent of the forecast accuracy gains also is sentitive to the specification of the inflation-only model. For example, if
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At longer horizons, the performance of forecast combination methods deteriorates. For
example, bagging is actually less accurate than the benchmark model at the 12-month
horizon, and Bayesian model averaging is only marginally superior to the inflation-only
model. Moreover, there is no improvement on an equal-weighted industrial inputs price
index at the 12-month horizon.
A natural question is whether the reductions in the recursive PMSE at short horizons
are statistically significant. There are currently no statistical tests that would allow us
to answer this question. The root of the problem is that I compare forecasting methods
rather than forecasting models. Thus, a given forecasting method will tend to select
different models at each point in time, invalidating the distribution theory for standard
tests of equal predictive ability.
2.2.3 Forecasting Quarterly CPI Inflation and GDP Deflator Inflation
Barsky and Kilian (2002) demonstrate that an increase in the price of imported com-
modities such as oil will unambiguously increase the price of gross output, but could
increase or decrease the price of value added. This suggests that higher oil prices should
presage an increase in measures of the price of gross output, such as the CPI, but not
necessarily in measures of the price of real value added, such as the GDP deflator. Thus,
the relative merits of other commodity prices for forecasting GDP deflator inflation and
CPI inflation are unclear.
To control for the effects of forecasting a quarterly series (GDP deflator) instead of a
monthly series (CPI), I compare the forecasting results for quarterly deflator inflation to
the results for quarterly CPI inflation. The dependent variable in these forecasts is the
annualized, h-quarter growth rate in the GDP deflator or the CPI. ∆xi,t is the annualized,
1-quarter growth rate of commodity price i between time t and t+1. I forecast at horizons
of 1-6 quarters. Because the GDP deflator is available only on a quarterly basis, the time
I replace the specification that appeared most accurate for my dataset by an iterated model of the type used as a benchmark
in other studies or if I replaced the AIC used in lag-order selection by the SIC, the relative gains from using commodity
prices for prediction may appear much larger.
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series is substantially shorter than the monthly CPI series. Estimating many of the models
with low initial estimation windows results in poor parameter estimates and inaccurate out-
of-sample forecasts. For this reason, and to keep the forecast evaluation period consistent
with the evaluation period for the monthly CPI inflation forecasts, I report the quarterly
forecasting results for the 1995-2004 period.
2.2.3.1 Forecasting with Individual Commodity Prices and Price Indices
The results for the distributed lag model are shown in Tables 4a and 4b. Table 4b shows
no evidence that any of the commodity price indices are useful for predicting quarterly
CPI inflation at any horizon. There also is little evidence that food and beverage prices
individually have systematic predictive ability. On the other hand, there is limited evidence
that materials may help in predicting quarterly CPI inflation at the 1-quarter horizon. The
best performers are copper, tin, crude oil, lead, and fine wool. Only crude oil and hard
sawn wood, however, seem to have substantial predictive ability at longer horizons.
Table 4a shows the corresponding results for quarterly GDP deflator inflation. Here
there is evidence that at least the non-fuel price index as well as the industrial inputs price
index and the agricultural raw materials index have limited predictive power at horizons
of 1- and 2-quarters. That predictive ability is also reflected in individual materials and
food and beverage series. Again crude oil and hard sawn wood as well as hard logs stand
out among materials for having predictive power at longer horizons, while the predictive
ability of food and beverage prices, to the extent that there is any, is largely limited to the
first two quarters.
Of particular interest is a comparison of the predictive ability of crude oil prices for the
two inflation series. The accuracy gains from crude oil prices tend to be larger for GDP
deflator inflation at the 2-, 3- and 4-quarter forecast horizons, and larger for quarterly
CPI inflation at the 1-, 5-, and 6-quarter forecast horizons. Thus, I find that the price of
crude oil may be a good leading indicator for both inflation measures, at least for selected
horizons. These results do not contradict the theoretical arguments presented by Barsky
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and Kilian (2002) regarding the link between oil prices and inflation measures following
an exogenous oil supply shock. Barsky and Kilian concluded that, since most U.S. oil is
imported, higher oil prices arising from exogenous oil supply shocks should lead to higher
rates of gross output price inflation, but not to higher rates of value added price inflation,
which seems consistent with their empirical evidence from the 1970s. In contrast, the
evidence in this paper is for a period (1995-2004) that is recognized for high levels of
demand in the oil market. Oil price inflation, GDP deflator inflation, and CPI inflation
are all expected to rise following a demand shock, so there is no apparent ordering of the
accuracy gains across inflation measures.
2.2.3.2 Combination Forecasts with Many Commodity Prices
For the other forecasting methods, I present the results in the same way as for the
monthly CPI inflation forecasts, except that I restrict myself in Table 5 to the 1-, 2-, and
4- quarter horizons. The results in Table 5 show that forecast combination methods based
on materials work best. The most favorable results are obtained for the shrinkage method,
for bagging and for the factor models. The BMA method is more erratic. However,
none of the forecast combination methods dominates a distributed lag forecast based on
crude oil prices or the price of hard sawn wood at the 4-quarter horizon. By implication,
this means that these methods also dominate forecasts based on commodity price indices.
In summary, suitable forecast combination methods, as in the case of monthly inflation,
appear useful for forecasting quarterly inflation. This result holds for both measures of
inflation, although the extent of the gains varies with the inflation measure, the forecast
combination method and the horizon.
2.3 Full Information Set Forecasts
The exercise in the preceding sections demonstrated that combination forecasts of CPI
inflation that include lags of certain commodity price inflation regressors are often superior
to inflation-only forecast models. While inflation-only benchmark models are often used in
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the forecasting literature to evaluate the predictive ability of various modeling techniques,
these types of models are rarely used by professional forecasters. Their most obvious
drawback is a failure to exploit the large number of macroeconomic and financial predictors
that are available for forecasting inflation. Recent advances in computing power allow
economists to analyze scores of data sets and estimate complex models at very low cost.
Yet the loss of degrees of freedom caused by the inclusion of too many regressors in a
model can severely limit our ability to fully exploit these gains. In recent years, factor
models have emerged as a popular method for harnessing the information content of a
large set of predictors, while limiting the dimension of the forecasting models. Stock and
Watson (2002) and Bernanke and Boivin (2003) show that factor model forecasts, with
factors estimated from a set of 215 macroeconomic predictors, outperform AR forecasts
and VAR forecasts of inflation, unemployment, and industrial output. Given the appeal
of these models, professional forecasters might want to know whether adding commodity
prices to the information set of such a factor model forecast will improve its out-of-sample
performance.
In this section, I first evaluate a static factor model forecast, relative to the inflation-
only model, that uses factors estimated from a set of 112 macroeconomic time series used
in Stock and Watson (2005b).10 This data set includes series on real output; income;
employment; hourly earnings; retail, manufacturing, and trade sales; consumption; housing
starts and sales; inventories; stock prices; exchange rates; interest rates; interest rate
spreads; and money stock and credit market conditions, but not commodity prices. I then
add various subsets of the commodity price inflation regressors to the Stock and Watson
data set and re-estimate the factors. In addition to materials prices, food and beverage
prices, and the full set of commodity prices used in the previous exercises, I also add the
price of crude oil and materials prices excluding the price of crude oil to the Stock and
Watson regressors. The relative PMSEs are reported in Table 6. Since all ratios have
10The dataset from Stock and Watson (2005b) included 132 time series. In order to avoid duplicating series, I remove 20
variables that include producer prices or commodity prices.
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the same denominator, the PMSE of the inflation-only model, a direct comparison of the
predictive power of each set of predictors is possible. To conserve space, I report results
for the static factor model when the first lag of the first factor is included. In addition to
forecasts of CPI inflation, I also report results for forecasts of core CPI inflation and core
PCE price inflation.
The first row of Table 6 shows that when only the 112 Stock and Watson predictors
are used, the static factor model improves the accuracy of the CPI inflation and core
CPI inflation forecasts, relative to the inflation-only model, but not the core PCE price
inflation forecasts. Adding materials price to the Stock and Watson data improves the
factor model forecasts of CPI and core CPI inflation. The size of the accuracy gains
increase with the forecast horizon. For instance the factor model with just the 112 Stock
and Watson regressors reduces the PMSE of the CPI inflation forecast by 5% at the one
month horizon, and 3% at the 3-month and 12-month horizons. After adding materials
prices to the information set, the accuracy gains from the factor models increase by 2
percentage points at the 1-month horizon, by 6 percentage points at the 3-month horizons,
and by 8 percentage points at the 12-month horizon. This shows that commodity prices
convey information not captured by the principal components of standard macroeconomic
and financial datasets.
In contrast, relative to the larger set of predictors, oil prices alone are not informative.
Adding the price of oil to the information set does not reduce the PMSE of the factor
model.11 Adding food and beverage prices or adding the full set of commodity prices to
the information set does not improve the accuracy of the factor models either. This result
again underscores the unique role of materials prices in predicting inflation.
11For factor models with two and three factors, adding just the price of oil may raise or lower the forecast accuracy of the
factor model, depending on the horizon.
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2.4 Commodity Prices and Federal Reserve Behavior
In this section, I investigate the usefulness of commodity prices for describing the behav-
ior of monetary policymakers. Commodity prices reduce the PMSE of inflation forecasts,
but it is unclear whether this forecast accuracy gain translates into better predictions of
monetary policy. Ultimately, professional economists are interested in whether commodity
prices employed in conjunction with the various forecasting techniques from the previous
sections produce inflation forecasts that can better predict the time path of short term
interest rates. It is well known that the Fed operates in what Bernanke and Boivin (2003)
refer to as a “data-rich environment ” monitoring perhaps thousands of economic time
series when conducting monetary policy. Any description of Fed policy must incorporate
this vast amount of information. The question examined in this section is whether in-
cluding or excluding commodity prices changes an ex-post description of monetary policy.
Specifically, I examine the implications of adding commodity prices to the information set
of a policy reaction function by estimating a forward-looking Taylor rule with inflation
forecasts and forecasts of real activity that either include or exclude commodity prices
as predictors. I then compare the implied interest rate from the model to the actual
interest rate. If including the commodity price regressors in the information set of the
forward-looking Taylor rule moves the implied interest rate closer to the actual rate, then
commodity prices are valuable for describing Fed behavior.
I take as a benchmark reaction function a forward-looking Taylor rule similar to the
one used in Bernanke and Boivin (2003). The model is given by:
rt = α + βEt(πt+k) + δ[Et(Ut+j)− U∗t+j] + ρ(L)rt + εt
In equation (1), rt is the Fed Funds rate at time t. Et(πt+k) is the forecast of the
inflation rate at time t+k, conditional on information available at time t. Et(Ut+j) is the
forecasted unemployment rate for time t+j conditional on information available at time
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t. U∗t+j is a time varying NAIRU. In order to capture possible interest rate smoothing by
the Fed, the model also includes lags of the Fed Funds rate. εt represents any episode or
variable to which the Fed might respond that is orthogonal to expected future inflation
and unemployment.
The forecasts of inflation used in the Taylor rule are based on the static factor model
forecasts discussed in Section 3. In the baseline case, the factors are estimated as the
first r principal components from the set of 112 macroeconomic time series used in Stock
and Watson (2005b), excluding commodity prices and producer prices. To determine the
relevance of commodity prices, I add the 18 materials price inflation series to the Stock and
Watson data set. Thus this exercise will determine whether commodity prices are useful
for describing monetary policy above and beyond all other relevant data that are available
to policymakers. In addition to these two cases, I also consider adding oil prices and all
materials prices except the price of crude oil to the Stock and Watson regressors. Since
the leading indicator properties of commodity prices for future unemployment are beyond
the scope of this paper, the forecasting model for the unemployment rate includes only the
112 Stock and Watson predictors excluding commodity prices and producer prices. Thus
the Taylor rules differ only in the information set used to forecast inflation.12
The Fed Funds rate data are from the Federal Reserve Economic Data (FRED) website
at the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. The series is a monthly average of the effective
nominal Fed Funds rate. The unemployment rate is the monthly civilian unemployment
rate released by the Bureau of Labor Statistics. The natural rate of unemployment is
measured as a 5-year moving-average for each month. As in the previous sections, the
AIC is used to determine the lag order for inflation and unemployment. To this I add one
lag of each of the first three principal components of the predictors to the model. As in
Bernanke and Boivin (2003), the forecast horizon is set to 12 months for inflation and to
6 months for the unemployment rate. I include two lags of the Fed Funds rate to account
12I also computed all results with commodity prices included in the unemployment rate forecast. The estimated coefficients
were somewhat smaller and the MSEs somewhat larger, but the basic patterns across specifications of the model were the
same as those reported.
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for interest rate smoothing.
Following Bernanke and Boivin (2003), I estimate the Taylor rule by OLS. In Table




1−ρ(L) , with Newey-West standard errors in parentheses. There
is some uncertainty as to the appropriate measure of inflation to include in the Taylor
rule. Based on anecdotal evidence in Meyer (2004), I estimate alternative Taylor rules
using forecasts of CPI inflation, core CPI inflation, as well as core PCE price inflation.
In Table 8, I report the root mean-squared error (RMSE) for each estimate of the Taylor
rule. If adding commodity prices to the forecasting model for inflation and unemployment
reduces the RMSE of the resulting forward-looking Taylor rule, then commodity prices are
useful for describing monetary policy. Since the dimension of the model is constant across
specifications, ranking the models by their RMSEs is equivalent to ranking them according
to a suitable information criterion. Inoue and Kilian (2006) show that this method will
consistently select the best forecasting model among a set of candidate models under weak
conditions. In other words, this exercise ranks the candidate Taylor rules according to their
out-of-sample predictive power. The estimation period covers each month from February
1990 until December 2002, covering most of Alan Greenspan’s chairmanship of the Federal
Reserve Board.
Looking at the results in Table 7, I find that the estimates of the long-run response
of the nominal Fed Funds rate to forecasted CPI inflation is positive in all 4 cases. The
estimated response is largest (1.16) when commodity prices are included in the forecast.
Furthermore, only when materials prices are used does the estimated reaction to forecasted
inflation satisfy the Taylor Principle that the Fed must change interest rates more than
one-for-one with inflation in order to affect the real interest rate and aggregate demand.
Therefore, to the extent that a good description of monetary policy should exhibit the
Taylor Principle, adding commodity prices is beneficial. I find a similar pattern for the
core PCE price Taylor rule. The estimated response to long-run inflation is greater than
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one in all cases for the core CPI Taylor rule, but largest when materials prices are included
in the forecast. The estimated long-run response to forecasted unemployment is negative
in all cases and statistically significant.
The results in Table 8 show that including any subset of materials prices in the infor-
mation set for the forward-looking Taylor rule decreases the RMSE of the model. The
model fits the data best when only the price of crude oil is included, and the overall best
fit of the Taylor rule is obtained when the Fed is assumed to respond to forecasts of CPI
inflation (RMSE=0.1519) as opposed to core CPI inflation or core PCE price inflation.
In practice, Economists who monitor monetary policy and the Fed Funds market are
interested in predicting the direction of change in the Fed Funds rate from month to
month. A model that more accurately predicts the level of the Fed Funds rate, may or
may not more accurately predict the sign of the change in the Fed Funds rate. In Table 9, I
report the probability that the Taylor rule correctly predicts the change in direction of the
monthly Fed Funds rate. All models correctly predict the sign of the change slightly more
than half the time. Adding commodity prices to the inflation forecast only marginally
improves the performance of the Taylor rule in this instance.
To summarize, commodity prices are shown to help describe monetary policy is two
ways. First, when materials prices are included in the forecasting model for inflation,
the estimated response of the interest rate to future inflation satisfies the Taylor Principle.
Second, including materials prices in the forecasting model reduces the RMSE of the Taylor
rule compared to the case when commodity prices are excluded from the forecast. A Taylor
rule with forecasts of CPI inflation and the price of crude oil in the information set provides
the best predictions of the actual monthly Fed Funds rate out of all the models examined
in this paper.
The accuracy gains, however, are quite small and have little economic significance,
obliviating formal tests for the equality of fit. The largest reduction in the RMSE is about
1.5%. Furthermore, adding commodity prices only marginally improves our ability to
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predict the direction of change in the Fed Funds rate from one month to the next. Thus,
the usefulness of commodity prices for improving our understanding of monetary policy
seems negligible.
2.5 Sensitivity Analysis
In this paper, I have followed the convention of focusing on percent changes in commod-
ity prices in assessing the predictive content of these variables. This approach ignores the
fact that commodity prices (Xi,t, i = 1, ..., 46) and consumer prices (Pt) are likely to be coin-
tegrated, in which case one would expect the error correction term (log(Xi,t)− log(Pt), i =
1, ..., 46) to have predictive power for inflation. I explored this possibility in sensitivity
analysis not reported in the paper. I considered (1) forecasting models including only the
error correction terms in addition to lags of inflation, and (2) forecasting models including
both the error correction terms and percentage changes of commodity prices in addition
to lags of inflation.
I find that using the error correction term instead of percentage changes in commodity
prices may substantially improve or substantially worsen forecasting performance. There
is evidence that forecasts based on the error correction term for most industrial commodity
prices perform well, whereas agricultural raw materials do not. The performance of food
and beverages is erratic. Error correction terms for price indices in general do not work
well. A similar pattern emerges when I use the error correction term in addition to percent
changes in commodity prices.
In contrast, when applying forecast combination or shrinkage methods, including both
percentage changes and error correction terms never results in more accurate forecasts than
just including percentage changes. Compared to methods based on percentage changes
only, those based on error correction terms only are inferior in most cases. Moreover,
methods based on percentage changes only, tend to be more robust across forecast horizons.
In particular, for the factor models based on large information sets that form the basis
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of the analysis of Taylor rules in section 5, the model based on percentage changes in
materials prices continues to be more accurate than all other versions.
2.6 Conclusion
Though higher commodity prices are often thought to presage higher rates of inflation
(and hence are intensively scrutinized by professional economists) the existing literature
has found it difficult to establish such a link empirically, at least for the 1990s and 2000s.
In this paper, I provide a comprehensive analysis of the predictive content of 46 commodity
prices and seven commodity price indices for 1993-2004.
The analysis reveals several patterns. Among the individual commodity prices with
the highest predictive power is the price of crude oil, which improves the accuracy of CPI
inflation forecasts mainly for the first three months, and the price of hard sawn wood,
which has predictive ability at longer horizons. In contrast, individual food and beverage
prices typically are not useful for forecasting monthly CPI inflation.
One of the problems with using individual commodity prices is that individual series
tend to be noisy. I show that combining information from many commodity prices into a
price index can be effective in reducing this noise, but there are important differences in
the predictive ability across different types of indices. An index of industrial input prices
generates the largest reduction in the forecast PMSE of all the price indices that I evaluate.
At longer horizons, adding an industrial input price index to lags of inflation will reduce
the PMSE by up to 10%. At shorter forecast horizons, however, the price of crude oil is a
better predictor. Other commodity price indices are typically not informative.
A reasonable conjecture is that statistical methods that choose the weights underlying
these indices based on the data rather than imposing fixed weights may generate superior
forecasts of inflation. Indeed, my analysis shows that suitable forecast combination meth-
ods reduce the PMSE of the CPI inflation forecast by up to 11% relative to an inflation-only
model. These accuracy gains are concentrated mainly at short horizons and are more sys-
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tematic across horizons than those obtained from the industrial materials price index. The
best forecasting technique depends on the forecast horizon, but bagging, shrinkage, and
factor models provide some of the best combination forecast results. While the price of
crude oil is the best single predictor at short forecast horizons, a bagging forecast with
materials prices or a Bayesian model average forecast with the full set of commodity prices
results in even larger accuracy gains.
In addition to examining monthly and quarterly CPI inflation forecasts, I also study
forecasts of GDP deflator inflation. While several individual commodity prices and price
indices have some predictive power at short horizons, only a few commodity prices, notably
the price of crude oil and hard sawn wood, improve forecast accuracy at longer horizons.
As in the case of monthly CPI inflation, suitable forecast combination methods improve
the accuracy of quarterly GDP deflator inflation compared to models using individual
commodity prices or price indices, but systematic gains are limited to the first two quarters.
Forecasting models with commodity prices are superior not only to inflation-only mod-
els. I find that there is information in commodity prices not captured by the leading
principal components of a broader set of macroeconomic and financial variables. In partic-
ular, adding materials prices to a set of 112 macroeconomic and financial variables improves
the accuracy of factor model forecasts of CPI inflation and core CPI inflation. Forecasts of
core PCE price inflation, however, are not improved by the addition of commodity prices.
The PMSE reductions are particularly large at longer forecast horizons. In contrast, the
price of crude oil alone is not informative relative to the larger set of predictors.
Professional economists are interested in accurate forecasts of inflation mainly because
these forecasts are thought to be informative about future monetary policy and the path of
short-term interest rates. I show that including the set of materials prices in the forecasting
model for inflation indeed improves the fit of a forward-looking Taylor rule compared to the
case when materials prices are excluded. However, the RMSE reduction is only about 1%
and thus economically insignificant. Moreover, adding commodity prices to the inflation
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forecast only slightly improves the ability of the Taylor rule to correctly predict the sign
of the monthly change in the Fed Funds rate. I therefore conclude that while commodity
prices are useful predictors of U.S. consumer price inflation, their usefulness for improving
our understanding of the Federal Reserve’s policy decisions is negligible.
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Table 2.1: Series Description 
 
Price Indices Materials Prices Food and Beverage Prices 
   
Non-Fuel Price Index Coal Bananas 
Food and Beverage Price Index Crude Oil (petroleum) Barley 
Food Price Index Uranium Beef 
Beverage Price Index Aluminum Cocoa Beans 
Industrial Inputs Price Index Copper Coffee, other mild arabicas 
Agricultural Raw Materials Price Index Lead Coffee, robusta 
Metals Price Index Nickel Coconut Oil 
 Tin Fishmeal 
 Zinc Groundnuts (peanuts) 
 Cotton Lamb 
 Hides Maize (corn) 
 Soft Logs Olive Oil 
 Hard Logs Oranges 
 Rubber Palm Oil 
 Hard Sawn Wood Swine (pork) 
 Soft Sawn Wood Poultry (chicken) 
 Wool, coarse Rice 
 Wool, fine Fish (salmon) 
  Shrimp 
  Soybean meal 
  Soybean Oil 
  Soybeans 
  Sugar, European import price 
  Sugar, free market 
  Sugar, U.S. import price 
  Sunflower oil 
  Tea  







Table 2.2: Recursive Out-of-Sample PMSE Relative to Inflation-Only Model: Distributed Lag Model -
Monthly CPI Inflation (1993-2004)
horizon 1 3 6 9 12 15 18 
        
Price Indices        
   Non-Fuel 1.03 1.02 0.97 0.96 1.00 1.17 1.19 
   Food and Beverage 1.02 1.02 1.01 1.01 1.02 1.19 1.29 
   Food 1.01 1.05 1.17 1.16 1.16 1.44 1.50 
   Beverage 1.06 1.11 1.06 1.12 1.20 1.08 1.08 
   Industrial Inputs 1.02 0.96 0.91 0.95 0.96 0.96 0.96 
   Agricultural Raw Materials 1.02 1.00 0.99 0.98 1.08 1.14 1.13 
   Metals 1.04 1.00 0.95 0.98 0.99 0.96 0.99 
           
Materials        
   Coal 1.00 0.99 1.00 1.01 0.99 1.01 1.01 
   Crude Oil (Petroleum) 0.92 0.93 0.99 0.99 1.10 1.02 1.02 
   Uranium 1.01 1.01 1.01 1.01 1.00 1.01 1.01 
   Aluminum 1.03 1.01 0.99 0.99 1.00 1.00 0.99 
   Copper 1.06 0.98 0.97 0.96 0.98 0.98 0.99 
   Lead 1.00 0.98 0.91 0.98 1.03 1.00 1.02 
   Nickel 1.01 0.94 0.91 0.95 0.99 0.97 1.00 
   Tin 1.01 1.00 0.99 0.98 1.00 1.00 1.01 
   Zinc 0.99 0.96 0.92 0.97 0.99 1.03 1.05 
   Cotton 0.99 1.05 1.01 0.99 1.05 1.19 1.19 
   Hides 1.00 1.00 0.99 0.98 1.12 1.18 1.02 
   Soft Logs 1.00 1.00 1.01 1.05 1.01 1.02 1.02 
   Hard Logs 1.01 1.04 1.02 1.03 1.03 1.03 1.02 
   Rubber 1.02 1.02 1.00 1.00 1.07 1.05 1.05 
   Hard Sawn Wood 1.02 1.03 1.03 0.95 0.88 0.88 0.95 
   Soft Sawn Wood 1.02 1.11 1.04 1.01 1.03 1.02 1.02 
   Wool, coarse 1.03 1.00 1.01 1.03 1.02 1.02 1.05 
   Wool, fine 1.00 0.99 0.95 0.97 1.11 1.01 1.03 
        
Food and Beverage        
   Bananas 1.00 1.13 1.23 1.02 1.03 1.00 1.00 
   Barley 1.00 1.03 1.16 1.12 1.06 1.00 1.18 
   Beef 0.94 1.04 1.14 1.12 1.26 1.33 1.32 
   Cocoa Beans 1.02 1.02 0.94 0.89 0.94 0.96 1.04 
   Coffee, other mild arabicas 1.07 1.11 1.12 1.22 1.26 1.17 1.14 
   Coffee, robusta 1.17 1.29 1.30 1.33 1.44 1.24 1.16 
   Coconut Oil 1.00 0.98 0.99 0.97 0.99 0.94 0.96 
   Fishmeal 1.00 0.99 1.16 1.18 1.05 1.14 1.17 
   Groundnuts (peanuts) 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.01 1.02 1.02 1.04 
   Lamb 1.01 1.07 1.05 1.05 1.00 1.01 1.02 
   Maize (corn) 1.01 1.01 1.00 1.00 1.04 1.22 1.24 
   Olive Oil 0.99 1.01 1.01 0.96 1.00 1.00 1.01 
   Oranges 1.01 1.00 1.01 1.00 1.00 1.01 1.01 
   Palm Oil 1.00 1.05 1.24 1.05 1.04 1.02 1.01 
   Swine (pork) 0.99 0.99 1.01 1.01 1.02 1.02 1.00 
   Poultry (chicken) 1.01 1.00 1.02 1.03 1.02 1.11 1.25 
   Rice 1.04 1.01 1.00 1.23 1.25 1.30 1.16 
   Fish (salmon) 1.01 1.01 1.00 1.02 1.14 1.15 1.07 
   Shrimp 1.13 1.06 1.02 0.97 0.99 0.99 1.01 
   Soybean meal 1.01 1.00 0.99 0.99 1.28 1.42 1.49 
   Soybean Oil 1.02 1.01 1.03 1.00 1.03 1.02 0.99 
   Soybeans 1.01 1.02 1.00 0.99 1.03 1.03 1.17 
   Sugar, European import price 1.02 1.01 1.04 1.09 1.08 1.08 1.02 
   Sugar, free market 1.06 1.15 1.18 1.23 1.36 1.41 1.41 
   Sugar, U.S. import price 1.04 1.05 1.11 1.10 1.38 1.27 1.18 
   Sunflower oil 1.04 1.04 1.05 1.06 1.07 1.05 1.05 
   Tea  1.03 1.00 1.18 1.30 1.31 1.26 1.21 


























































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 2.4a: Recursive Out-of-Sample PMSE Relative to Inflation-Only Model: Distributed Lag Model -
Quarterly GDP Deflator Inflation (1995-2004)
horizon 1 2 3 4 5 6 
       
Price Indices       
   Non-Fuel 1.08 0.99 0.99 1.12 1.34 1.35 
   Food and Beverage 1.01 1.12 1.05 1.16 1.15 1.04 
   Food 1.19 1.17 1.29 1.42 1.43 1.30 
   Beverage 1.02 1.44 1.38 1.49 1.29 1.21 
   Industrial Inputs 0.98 0.90 1.05 1.16 1.43 1.27 
   Agricultural Raw Materials 0.95 1.35 1.51 1.74 1.01 1.00 
   Metals 1.01 1.00 1.00 1.33 1.87 1.39 
          
Materials       
   Coal 1.21 1.39 1.27 1.41 1.34 1.09 
   Crude Oil (Petroleum) 1.01 0.89 0.77 0.71 0.78 0.79 
   Uranium 1.02 1.19 1.26 1.12 1.04 1.04 
   Aluminum 1.04 1.02 0.96 1.08 1.31 1.27 
   Copper 1.00 1.09 1.39 2.02 2.65 2.35 
   Lead 1.04 0.96 1.28 2.20 3.73 4.56 
   Nickel 1.04 0.93 1.14 1.20 1.43 1.43 
   Tin 1.07 1.06 1.02 1.02 1.06 1.10 
   Zinc 1.04 0.99 0.96 1.08 1.36 1.29 
   Cotton 1.06 1.05 0.98 1.19 1.38 1.19 
   Hides 0.84 0.86 0.85 1.01 1.04 0.96 
   Soft Logs 1.24 1.10 1.00 1.01 1.12 1.00 
   Hard Logs 1.02 0.95 0.98 0.95 0.92 0.98 
   Rubber 1.41 1.54 1.15 0.98 1.23 1.18 
   Hard Sawn Wood 1.02 0.84 0.75 0.78 0.67 0.71 
   Soft Sawn Wood 1.05 1.04 1.01 1.00 0.96 0.94 
   Wool, coarse 1.20 1.44 1.46 1.61 1.97 2.15 
   Wool, fine 1.10 1.15 1.41 1.89 2.43 2.46 
       
Food and Beverage       
   Bananas 1.37 1.50 1.07 1.00 0.98 1.06 
   Barley 1.08 1.15 1.19 1.13 1.14 1.23 
   Beef 1.18 1.26 1.27 1.35 1.33 1.28 
   Cocoa Beans 1.04 1.24 1.17 1.35 1.45 1.46 
   Coffee, other mild arabicas 1.06 1.03 1.05 1.12 1.13 1.11 
   Coffee, robusta 1.40 1.43 1.11 1.17 1.33 1.36 
   Coconut Oil 1.15 1.02 1.01 1.01 0.99 1.02 
   Fishmeal 1.08 1.18 1.18 1.24 1.26 1.22 
   Groundnuts (peanuts) 0.95 0.99 0.99 1.04 1.02 1.00 
   Lamb 1.15 1.55 1.77 1.11 1.03 1.06 
   Maize (corn) 1.17 1.14 1.14 1.33 1.28 1.30 
   Olive Oil 1.04 1.02 1.02 1.03 1.04 1.03 
   Oranges 0.91 0.90 0.97 1.03 1.08 1.02 
   Palm Oil 1.01 1.03 1.01 1.00 0.99 1.03 
   Swine (pork) 1.07 1.05 1.01 1.03 1.07 1.04 
   Poultry (chicken) 1.13 0.95 0.97 1.00 1.02 1.08 
   Rice 1.06 1.16 1.27 1.15 1.19 1.19 
   Fish (salmon) 1.01 1.05 0.98 1.12 1.16 1.10 
   Shrimp 1.32 1.31 1.30 1.56 1.54 1.13 
   Soybean meal 0.94 1.01 1.42 1.71 2.02 1.93 
   Soybean Oil 1.12 1.11 1.21 1.27 1.50 1.58 
   Soybeans 1.11 1.13 1.10 1.08 1.04 1.09 
   Sugar, European import price 1.03 0.97 0.99 1.00 0.94 0.97 
   Sugar, free market 1.19 1.22 1.30 1.28 1.34 1.33 
   Sugar, U.S. import price 1.04 1.32 1.19 1.18 1.38 1.31 
   Sunflower oil 1.06 1.14 1.15 1.24 1.25 1.11 
   Tea  0.95 1.30 1.42 1.74 1.95 2.16 
   Wheat 0.95 1.15 0.98 1.02 0.99 1.02 
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Table 2.4b: Recursive Out-of-Sample PMSE Relative to Inflation-Only Model: Distributed Lag Model -
Quarterly CPI Inflation (1995-2004)
horizon 1 2 3 4 5 6 
       
Price Indices       
   Non-Fuel 1.17 1.51 1.28 1.69 1.96 2.08 
   Food and Beverage 1.13 1.31 1.02 1.04 1.03 1.11 
   Food 1.23 1.37 1.11 1.26 1.35 1.60 
   Beverage 1.10 1.18 1.07 1.07 1.11 1.08 
   Industrial Inputs 1.20 1.25 1.17 1.51 1.53 1.55 
   Agricultural Raw Materials 1.74 1.33 1.45 1.92 2.07 2.33 
   Metals 1.08 1.44 1.40 1.76 1.72 1.68 
          
Materials       
   Coal 1.41 1.23 1.43 1.38 1.41 1.50 
   Crude Oil (Petroleum) 0.80 1.21 0.82 0.74 0.73 0.76 
   Uranium 1.21 1.43 1.15 1.18 1.16 1.21 
   Aluminum 0.98 1.33 1.15 1.31 1.27 1.32 
   Copper 0.91 2.03 1.86 1.97 2.00 1.97 
   Lead 0.96 1.25 1.47 1.98 2.28 2.72 
   Nickel 1.12 1.26 1.18 1.24 1.41 1.35 
   Tin 0.83 1.02 0.98 0.99 1.00 0.96 
   Zinc 1.30 1.51 1.30 1.27 1.31 1.39 
   Cotton 1.00 1.15 0.99 1.17 1.10 1.09 
   Hides 1.28 1.50 1.17 1.22 1.05 0.95 
   Soft Logs 1.11 1.04 1.05 1.02 1.03 1.00 
   Hard Logs 1.46 1.41 1.09 1.13 1.06 1.04 
   Rubber 1.25 1.25 1.03 1.02 1.07 1.10 
   Hard Sawn Wood 1.13 1.12 0.81 0.75 0.78 0.89 
   Soft Sawn Wood 1.08 1.11 1.00 1.00 1.01 0.99 
   Wool, coarse 1.02 1.13 1.12 2.27 2.79 2.95 
   Wool, fine 0.94 1.70 1.74 1.93 2.07 1.83 
       
Food and Beverage       
   Bananas 1.52 2.55 2.21 2.19 1.94 1.87 
   Barley 1.05 1.62 1.43 1.29 1.23 1.24 
   Beef 1.11 1.22 1.65 1.83 1.93 2.02 
   Cocoa Beans 1.09 1.40 1.67 1.87 1.84 1.88 
   Coffee, other mild arabicas 1.09 1.17 1.09 1.14 1.13 1.08 
   Coffee, robusta 1.31 1.37 1.17 1.25 1.21 1.18 
   Coconut Oil 0.99 1.12 0.96 0.95 0.82 0.88 
   Fishmeal 1.06 1.64 1.62 1.57 1.68 2.01 
   Groundnuts (peanuts) 1.00 1.06 1.09 1.03 1.01 1.01 
   Lamb 1.21 1.07 1.08 1.03 1.04 1.06 
   Maize (corn) 1.23 1.21 1.27 1.36 1.40 1.40 
   Olive Oil 1.26 1.35 1.15 1.04 1.08 1.05 
   Oranges 0.87 0.99 1.03 0.99 1.02 1.01 
   Palm Oil 1.38 1.44 1.55 1.29 1.02 1.01 
   Swine (pork) 1.07 1.15 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.03 
   Poultry (chicken) 1.00 1.07 0.99 1.03 1.03 0.97 
   Rice 0.98 1.04 1.07 1.04 1.15 1.06 
   Fish (salmon) 1.01 1.00 1.35 1.57 1.39 1.34 
   Shrimp 1.01 1.01 1.02 1.17 1.31 1.54 
   Soybean meal 1.57 2.08 1.84 1.95 1.90 1.94 
   Soybean Oil 1.06 1.49 1.07 1.02 1.45 1.57 
   Soybeans 1.48 1.12 1.08 1.07 1.05 1.07 
   Sugar, European import price 0.96 1.20 1.11 1.05 1.00 0.90 
   Sugar, free market 1.13 1.79 2.28 2.38 2.25 2.27 
   Sugar, U.S. import price 1.34 2.01 1.87 1.30 0.99 0.97 
   Sunflower oil 1.05 1.34 1.09 1.05 1.03 1.05 
   Tea  1.78 1.84 2.10 1.42 1.89 1.72 














































































































































































































































































   

































   

































   













































































































































































































































   

































   

































   













































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 2.8: RMSE of the Taylor Rule
 CPI Inflation Core CPI Inflation Core PCE Inflation 
No Commodity Prices 0.1541 0.1533 0.1542 
With Materials Prices 0.1526 0.1521 0.1540 
With Oil Prices 0.1519 0.1532 0.1542 
With Materials Prices excluding Oil  0.1529 0.1523 0.1541 
Note: Taylor rule evaluated over the 1990-2004 period. 
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Table 2.9: Probability that the Taylor Rule Correctly Predicts the Direction of Change in the Fed Funds
Rate
 CPI Inflation Core CPI Inflation Core PCE Inflation 
No Commodity Prices 0.51 0.52 0.52 
With Materials Prices 0.52 0.54 0.52 
With Oil Prices 0.52 0.53 0.52 
With Materials Prices excluding Oil  0.52 0.52 0.52 
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CHAPTER III
Retail Energy Prices and Consumer Expenditures
3.1 Introduction
Large fluctuations in energy prices have been a distinguishing characteristic of the U.S.
economy since the 1970s. Between January 2002 and July 2006, for example, the PCE
price index for energy goods increased by 68% in real terms.1 The average price of a gal-
lon of regular grade gasoline in particular increased from $1.11 in January 2002 to $2.98
in July 2006.2 The price of energy is but one of many prices faced by households, yet
they attract a disproportionate amount of attention in the media and from policymakers
and economists.3 A common perception is that energy price increases are fundamentally
different from increases in prices of many other goods (such as higher education, cable
television, refrigerators, or movies) because the demand for energy is comparatively in-
elastic. For example, most workers have to drive to work every day and thus have little
choice but to acquiesce to higher gasoline prices (see, e.g. Douglass 2007). Similarly,
households have little choice but to endure higher natural gas prices, as they cannot afford
to leave their homes unheated. Thus, it is widely accepted that energy prices tend to lower
the purchasing power of households, as consumers devote more of their income to energy
1See http://bea.gov/bea. The PCE price index for energy goods includes gasoline and motor fuels, heating oil, natural
gas, and electricity
2See http://tonto.eia.doe.gov.
3For example, on July 27, 2006 the New York Times in reference to the Fed’s Beige Book reported that “consumers were
spending less in stores and auto showrooms in part because of high gasoline prices” (see Peters 2006). Similarly, a July 15,
2006 New York Times article, quoting Anthony Chan, the chief economist for J.P. Morgan Private Client Services, announced
that “... the effects of rising energy prices are starting to gain some traction on the consumer spending front” (see New York
Times 2006). When energy prices retreated sharply later in 2006, driven primarily by falling gasoline prices, the Wall Street
Journal predicted that “lower gasoline prices should boost the annual growth rate of consumer spending a full percentage
point and could lift fourth-quarter economic growth from a forecast of 3% at an annual rate, to as high as 3.7%” (see Ip
2006).
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consumption, leaving less discretionary income available for the purchases of other goods
and services.4 Despite the attention that such purchasing power losses have received in
the media and in policy discussions, little is known about their magnitude, about their
effect on real consumption and about the extent to which consumption patterns change in
response to energy price fluctuations.5 Answers to these questions are important for un-
derstanding the transmission of global energy price shocks to the U.S. economy. As noted
in a recent survey of the literature on oil and the macroeconomy by Hamilton (2005), the
key mechanism whereby energy price shocks affect the economy is through a disruption
in consumers’ (and firms’) spending on goods and services other than energy. This view
is shared by policymakers. For example, in a recent speech, Bernanke (2006a) stressed
that an increase in energy prices slows economic growth primarily through its effects on
consumer spending.
This paper studies the effects of energy price changes on consumer spending. There
are four mechanisms by which consumer expenditures may be directly affected by energy
price changes. First, higher energy prices are expected to reduce discretionary income,
as consumers have less money to spend after paying their energy bills.6 All else equal,
this discretionary income effect will be the larger, the less elastic the demand for energy,
but even with perfectly inelastic energy demand the magnitude of the effect of a unit
change in energy prices is bounded by the energy share in consumption. Second, chang-
ing energy prices may create uncertainty about the future path of the price of energy,
causing consumers to postpone irreversible purchases of consumer durables (see Bernanke
1983, Pindyck 1991). Unlike the first effect, this uncertainty effect is limited to consumer
durables. Third, even when purchase decisions are reversible, changes in uncertainty may
4For example, Nariman Behravesh, chief economist of Global Insight Inc, in a January 2007 NPR interview on the effect
of falling oil prices expressed the view that consumers whose ”discretionary spending” had been squeezed by high energy
prices, would now increase their discretionary spending (see Behravesh 2007).
5In related work, Mehra and Peterson (2005) concluded that increases in retail oil and gasoline prices significantly decrease
quarterly consumption growth over the 1961-2004 period, while price declines have insignificant effects. Cullen, Friedberg,
and Wolfram (2004) investigated whether households face a ”heat or eat” decision when confronted with rising home heating
costs. The authors use household-level panel data to determine how consumption of nondurable goods and food responds to
anticipated and unanticipated changes in home energy costs.
6Implicit in this view is the assertion that not all of the revenue generated by higher energy prices is recycled in the form
of higher spending, an assumption we will discuss in more detail in section 3.
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have an effect on all forms of consumption, as consumers increase their precautionary
savings in response to higher energy prices. This precautionary savings effect does not
appear to have been discussed in the literature, but will play an important role in our
analysis. Finally, consumption of durables that are complementary in use with energy (in
that their operation requires energy) will decline even more, as households delay or forego
purchases of energy-using durables. This operating cost effect is more limited in scope than
the uncertainty effect in that it only affects specific consumer durables. It should be most
pronounced for motor vehicles (see Hamilton 1988).7
In addition, there may be indirect effects related to the changing patterns of consump-
tion expenditures. A large literature has stressed that shifts in expenditure patterns driven
by the uncertainty effect and operating cost effect amount to allocative disturbances that
are likely to cause sectoral shifts throughout the economy (see, e.g., Davis (1987) and
Hamilton (2005) for a review). For example, it has been argued that reduced expenditures
on energy-intensive durables such as automobiles may cause the reallocation of capital and
labor away from the automobile sector. As the dollar value of such purchases may be large
relative to the value of the energy they use, even relatively small changes in energy prices
(and hence in purchasing power) can have large effects on output and unemployment (see
Hamilton 1988). A similar reallocation may occur within the same sector, as consumers
switch toward more energy-efficient durables (see Hamilton 1988; Bresnahan and Ramey
1993). In the presence of frictions in capital and labor markets, these intersectoral and
intrasectoral reallocations will cause resources to be unemployed, thus causing further cut-
backs in consumption and amplifying the effect of purchasing power losses on the real
economy. This indirect effect could be much larger than the direct effects listed earlier,
and is considered by many economists to be the primary channel through which energy
price shocks affect the economy (see, e.g., Davis and Haltiwanger (2001) and Lee and Ni
7This last effect need not involve a reduction in the number of automobiles sold. It can also take the form of consumers
switching from large energy-inefficient automobiles to small energy-efficient automobiles. If the latter automobiles tend to
be lower priced, aggregate real consumption of automobiles may fall, even when the number of automobiles sold does not
(see Bresnahan and Ramey 1993).
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(2002) and the references therein). Concerns over reallocation effects also help explain the
preoccupation of policymakers with the effects of energy price shocks on the automobile
sector (see, e.g., Bernanke 2006b).
In this paper, we provide a comprehensive look at the evidence for these channels of
transmission based on a detailed analysis of BEA data on personal consumption expen-
ditures (PCE), Michigan Survey of Consumers data on consumer expectations, and the
aggregate unemployment rate reported by the Bureau of Labor Statistics. Our analysis is
complicated by the fact that some of the mechanisms described above affect consumption
symmetrically, whereas other effects are asymmetric in purchasing power losses and gains.
In fact, a testable implication of the leading theoretical models of how energy prices are
transmitted to the economy is that the response to an energy price decrease should differ
from the response to an energy price increase (see, e.g., Bernanke 1983; Hamilton 1988,
2005).8 Thus, evidence of symmetry in the responses to energy price changes would be
inconsistent with the presence of either an uncertainty effect or a reallocation effect.
Our empirical analysis therefore is conducted in two stages. We first assess the evidence
for asymmetries in the data. Having been unable to reject the assumption of symmetry,
we then proceed with a model that imposes symmetry on the responses to unexpected
changes in purchasing power. Having ruled out the uncertainty and reallocation effect, our
empirical strategy is to identify the remaining three effects described above by quantifying
the differential response of major components of real consumption to unpredictable changes
in purchasing power driven by energy price fluctuations. Finally, we demonstrate that the
model is capable of explaining key episodes in the data without introducing asymmetries.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we document how en-
ergy price fluctuations have affected consumers’ purchasing power since 1970. Our analysis
incorporates not only gasoline expenditures, but all forms of energy consumption including
natural gas, electricity and heating oil. We construct time series of the expenditure shares
8Asymmetries also have played a central role in empirical work on the effect of energy price shocks since the late 1980s
(see, e.g., Mork 1989; Hooker 1996a,b; Hamilton 1996; Huntington 1998; Davis and Haltiwanger 2001; Lee and Ni 2002;
Hooker 2002; Balke, Brown, and Yücel 2002).
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for each form of energy and of real energy prices. Using these data, we compute a monthly
time series of the losses and gains in purchasing power associated with changes in energy
prices. The measure indicates the required change in discretionary spending if households
wish to purchase last month’s quantity of energy goods at the current month’s prices.
Section 3 contains an illustrative model of the effect of higher energy prices on con-
sumption. In section 4, we investigate the evidence for asymmetries in the responses of
real consumption and its major components to unanticipated changes in purchasing power
driven by fluctuating energy prices. We show that the null hypothesis cannot be rejected
that the estimated responses are symmetric. Our results are robust to differentiating be-
tween small and large shocks. They also are robust to using net increases and net decreases
in purchasing power in the spirit of work by Hamilton (2003). While the evidence against
asymmetries in real consumption responses is subject to considerable sampling uncertainty
in some cases, we find strong evidence against asymmetries in the responses of expecta-
tions data from the Michigan Survey of Consumers to the same purchasing power shocks.
This evidence suggests that the reallocation effect, the uncertainty effect, and any asym-
metry associated with the precautionary saving effect are not a dominant feature of the
real consumption data, contrary to the prevailing view. It is also consistent with the lack
of statistical evidence against the symmetry hypothesis in the responses of the U.S. unem-
ployment rate. Notwithstanding some important methodological differences, our results are
qualitatively consistent with the plant-level net employment change responses estimated in
Davis and Haltiwanger (2001). Both studies show asymmetric point estimates. The chief
difference is that Davis and Haltiwanger did not investigate whether these asymmetries
are statistically significant, whereas we show that they are not.
Based on this evidence, in section 5 we use a VAR model that imposes symmetry to
investigate how unanticipated changes in purchasing power driven by fluctuating energy
prices affect aggregate real consumption and its major components. We quantify the mag-
nitude of the effect of changes in discretionary income and changes in precautionary savings
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on all forms of consumption based on estimates of the short-run price elasticity of energy
demand. We also quantify the effect of changes in operating costs on the consumption
of energy-using durables. We estimate that a one-time 1% increase in energy prices in
a given month is associated with a decline in real total consumption of -0.15% after one
year. Our results show that the decline in total consumption as well as the decline in
the consumption of nondurables, services and durables excluding vehicles is larger than
would be expected given the energy share in consumption and given plausible estimates
of the short-run elasticity of energy demand, and large enough to reject the hypothesis
that there is no effect on total consumption beyond the reduction in discretionary income.
Given our estimates of the elasticity of energy demand, the discretionary income effect of
a 1% increase in energy prices is at most -0.04%. This implies a marginally statistically
insignificant precautionary savings effect of -0.08% for nondurables and a statistically sig-
nificant effect of -0.07% for services. The corresponding precautionary savings effect of
-0.16% on durables is not statistically significant. The operating cost effect on vehicles
consumption lies between -0.60% and -0.65% and is statistically significant. Expenditures
on vehicles decline about four times as much as expenditures on other consumer durables.
They decline more than seven times as much as expenditures on nondurables and services.
In section 6, we provide a comprehensive analysis, based on more than 130 disaggregate
consumption series, of how consumers adjust their expenditures in response to unantici-
pated losses in purchasing power. This analysis provides several additional insights. First,
we quantify the extent to which consumers substitute small, energy-efficient automobiles
for large, energy-inefficient automobiles. There is compelling quantitative evidence that
expenditures on new domestic automobiles decline disproportionately compared to new
foreign automobiles and that consumers substitute cars for light trucks (such as SUVs,
minivans, or pickup trucks), consistent with the mechanism described in Hamilton (1988)
and Bresnahan and Ramey (1993). The likely reason that the large effect of purchasing
power losses on purchases of new domestically-produced automobiles does not appear to
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cause a strong reallocation effect, as conjectured by Hamilton (1988), is that the share
of the automobile industry in value added and employment is only about 1%. Second,
we document the margins of adjustment used by households in dealing with purchasing
power losses. This allows us to identify the extent to which industries such as tourism or
the airline industry will be affected by higher energy prices. Third, we identify patterns
of substitution that are of interest from a public policy point of view. There is clear evi-
dence of consumers substituting low-cost alternatives for high-priced goods. For example,
rather than dining out, households eat more at home, which in turn is reflected in changing
patterns of food consumption. Similarly, consumers substitute public for private higher
education. Some responses are temporary (such as the increasing use of mass transit in
urban areas), whereas others appear very persistent (such as the decline in personal airline
travel).
In section 7 we summarize our estimates of the direct effects, gauge the overall impor-
tance of energy price shocks for real consumption, and discuss implications of our results
for the way economists think about the transmission of energy price shocks. Our results
differ from commonly held beliefs about how energy price shocks are transmitted to the
economy. In particular, the presence of a strong reallocation effect has been considered
crucial for explaining how energy price shocks may have effects on the economy that are
disproportionate to the expenditure share for energy goods. Theoretical models that incor-
porate this reallocation effect are capable in principle of explaining why rising energy prices
are unambiguously bad news for the economy, whereas falling energy prices may have little
or no effect on the economy. This model feature is thought to be required to explain the
apparent absence of a strong economic expansion following the collapse of OPEC in late
1985. In contrast, we do not find evidence of a reallocation effect in the data. It may seem
that our findings must be wrong because they cannot account for the absence of a strong
economic boom in 1986. This is not the case. Using historical decompositions to analyze
how consumption would have evolved in the absence of the 1986 decline in energy prices,
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we demonstrate in section 7.1. that there actually was a boom in consumption without
which actual economic growth would have been much weaker in 1986, that this boom was
similar in magnitude to the decline in real consumption in 1979, and that this boom is
predicted by standard symmetric models. While there indeed is an asymmetry in the real
GDP growth data for 1979 and 1986 (as opposed to the real consumption growth data),
as shown in section 7.2., that asymmetry appears to be driven by a decline in business
investment in 1986 that was not related to the fall in energy prices, but to the 1986 Tax
Reform Act. This effect was exacerbated by the response of investment by the petroleum
and natural gas industry to the collapse of OPEC in late 1985, which (for reasons detailed
in the paper) is asymmetric, but in the opposite direction from the asymmetries previously
discussed in the literature.
It has been widely observed that energy price shocks do not appear to affect the U.S.
economy as much as we used to think (see, e.g., Herrera and Pesavento 2007). In sec-
tion 7.4., we document the declining importance of energy price shocks for consumption
compared to the 1970s and early 1980s and show that this decline is consistent with the
changing structure of the U.S. automobile industry and its declining weight in aggregate
employment and value added. The conclusions are discussed in Section 8.
3.2 The Effects of Changing Retail Energy Prices on Consumers’ Purchasing
Power
The quantitative importance of changes in energy prices for discretionary income is by
no means self-evident. For one thing, the degree to which rising energy prices affect house-
hold purchasing power depends not only on how much energy prices increase, but also on
the fraction of consumer expenditures devoted to energy. In this section, we construct
a measure of the gains and losses in purchasing power attributable to fluctuating energy
prices. Motivated by the quotes in the introduction, the thought experiment underlying
this measure is that a household, when faced with rising energy prices, is unable to re-
duce its energy consumption in the short run, resulting in higher energy expenditures.
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The resulting loss in “purchasing power” causes households to curtail their discretionary
expenditures on non-energy goods and services.
Let E be the quantity of energy goods consumed, N the quantity of non-energy goods
consumed, PE the price of energy goods, PN the price of non-energy goods, and P PCE
the price index for personal consumption expenditures. Real energy consumption in con-
sumption units at date t is given by:




Real total consumption at date t is the sum of real energy consumption and real non-
energy consumption:







This leaves the household with ct − et to spend on non-energy goods at date t.
Suppose that at date t + 1, the consumer requires the same quantity of energy as at




and he would have ct− et+1 left to spend after paying his energy bill. The implied percent
change in purchasing power between dates t and t + 1 is:
%∆ppt+1 ≡ (ct − et+1)− (ct − et)
ct − et =
et − et+1
ct − et =
Et · PEt /P PCEt − Et · PEt+1/P PCEt+1
Nt · PNt /P PCEt
Multiplying this expression by PEt /P
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The first term in this expression is the ratio of nominal energy expenditures to nominal
non-energy expenditures. Since the fraction of energy expenditures in total expenditures
is small, we can approximate this ratio with the nominal energy expenditure share. The
second term is the monthly percent change in the real price of energy goods. Thus, the
percent change in purchasing power, %∆ppt+1, approximately equals the product of the
nominal expenditure share and the percent rate of change in real energy prices:










Ct · P PCEt
.
To illustrate our approach, consider the following numerical example: Suppose that at
time t, 3% of the average household’s expenditures are devoted to energy consumption. In
other words, the average household’s nominal expenditure share, ηEt , is equal to 3% and
its expenditure share for non-energy goods is 97%. Suppose that at time t + 1 the real
price of energy increases by 10%. If the household wishes to consume the same quantity
of energy as in time t, the energy expenditure share will rise to 3.3%, and the non-energy
expenditure share will fall to 96.7%. In other words, the household’s discretionary income
falls by 0.3 percentage points.
The BEA’s PCE price index for energy goods is comprised of four main components:
gasoline (and other motor fuels), natural gas, electricity and all other energy goods (in-
cluding heating oil, coal and oil lubricants). Figure 1 shows the monthly real price indices
for gasoline, natural gas, and electricity as well as an aggregate energy price index includ-
ing all items. The sample period is January 1970 - July 2006. All four indices rose from
the early 1970s until the early 1980s, declined from the early 1980s until the late 1990s,
and (notwithstanding some temporary reversals) have been on the rise again since 1999.
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Although the four energy price series share the same trend, there are important differ-
ences. For example, natural gas prices rose more gradually in the 1970s than gasoline and
electricity prices because the residential market for natural gas was heavily regulated until
1979. Deregulation of this market was complete only in 1989 (see Davis and Kilian 2007).
There are also price spikes in some energy markets that are not shared by other markets.
For example, gasoline prices rose sharply during the Persian Gulf War of 1990/91, whereas
electricity and natural gas prices did not. Similarly, there was a large spike in natural gas
prices in 2000 that far exceeded changes in other energy prices. Even when the direction
of the price change is the same, the magnitudes may differ. For example, between 1970
and the early 1980s, gasoline prices and natural gas prices almost doubled. In contrast,
electricity prices increased only by about one third.9
Figure 2 shows the monthly nominal expenditure share for gasoline, electricity, and
natural gas as well as the aggregate expenditure share for energy. The discrepancy between
the aggregate share and these three components is the share of other energy goods such
as heating oil and lubricants. Figure 2 illustrates that, despite the importance attached to
energy prices in the press, the energy share in consumption has never been large compared
to the expenditure share of food or housing, for example. The overall energy share was
stable at about 6.5% in the early 1970s. It rose to a peak of 9.6% in 1980, but fell steadily
throughout the 1980s and 1990, reaching a low of 4.1% in 1999, only to rise back to its
initial level of about 6.5% by 2006. The nominal expenditure share for gasoline, which
constitutes the largest individual component of real energy spending, follows a similar
historical pattern as the overall energy share, whereas the shares of natural gas and of
electricity are much more stable.
The three upper panels of Figure 3 show the corresponding changes in purchasing power
associated with gasoline, electricity, and natural gas prices, respectively. The bottom panel
9A striking feature of Figure 1 is that real gasoline prices in 2005 and 2006 reached their highest levels ever. This result
is in sharp contrast to the data for real crude oil prices reported in Kilian (2006). The key difference is the shortage of crude
oil refining capacity following Hurricane Katrina, which sharply drove up U.S. gasoline prices, while slightly lowering world
crude oil prices.
57
shows the corresponding results for the aggregate energy price. A negative value in Figure
3 denotes an increase in prices and thus a decline in purchasing power. It means that
consuming the previous month’s quantity of energy at the current month’s price would
leave households with less money to spend on all other goods. A positive value indicates
that purchasing power has increased.
While gasoline prices tend to occupy the headlines and are foremost on the minds of
consumers, changing prices for other energy goods can affect consumers’ purchasing power
as well. For example, an increase in gasoline prices might be accompanied by a decline
in natural gas or electricity prices, at least partially offsetting the decline in purchasing
power. Figure 3 shows that changes in gasoline prices, nevertheless, tend to have a dispro-
portionate impact on household purchasing power. The contemporaneous correlation of
the purchasing power loss series for energy in the last panel with the corresponding series
for gasoline in the first panel is 97%. This result is consistent with the relatively high
amplitude of changes in gasoline prices in Figure 1 and the relatively high expenditure
share for gasoline in Figure 2. Because natural gas and electricity each comprise a smaller
fraction of total expenditures, and because their prices are more stable, their impact on
purchasing power is much smaller.
In the remainder of the paper, we will focus on changes in purchasing power associated
with energy prices, as shown in the bottom panel. Increases in energy prices left households
with less money to spend on other goods in about 46% of the months in the sample. In the
mid-1990s, most changes in purchasing power were in the range between plus and minus 0.1
percentage points. Since the late 1990s, when rising global demand for oil and constraints
in refining capacity began pushing up gasoline prices, however, the volatility and amplitude
of purchasing power losses has greatly increased. The largest monthly loss in purchasing
power (-0.66 percentage points) is associated with Hurricanes Rita and Katrina in late
2005, and the largest monthly gains in purchasing power were 0.46 percentage points in
March of 1986 (associated with the collapse of OPEC in late 1985) and 0.54 percentage
58
points in November 2005 in the wake of hurricanes Rita and Katrina.
It is useful to put the changes in purchasing power documented in Figure 3 in perspec-
tive. A simple example helps assess the economic significance of these fluctuations. In
February 2003, the average household’s nominal expenditure share for energy was 5.20%.
In March, energy prices rose by 4.89%, reducing households’ purchasing power by about
0.25 percentage points, and the nominal expenditure share fell to 5.17%. As energy prices
fell by 5.64% in April, households’ purchasing power increased by 0.29 percentage points.
Since the average household’s annual expenditure in 2003 was $40,817, or $3,401 per month
(see Bureau of Labor Statistics 2005), in effect, the rise in energy prices left households
with $8.50 less to spend on non-energy goods in March. The subsequent decline in energy
prices in April slightly more than reversed this loss. This exercise demonstrates that an
increase or decrease in monthly energy prices has only a small direct impact on a house-
hold’s resources available for consuming other goods and services. The main reason is that
the relatively low expenditure share for energy (6.32% on average) blunts the impact of
even sharp monthly swings in energy prices.
Our measure of purchasing power losses abstracts from all margins of adjustment that
might reduce the impact effect of energy price changes. In reality, the quantity of energy
demanded is unlikely to be completely inelastic. For example, a household could take one
big trip to the grocery store instead of several small trips, switch to energy-efficient light
bulbs, or simply adjust the thermostat in the house. Furthermore, households have the
option of drawing down their savings (or of borrowing) in order to smooth their consump-
tion when energy prices rise temporarily. Our empirical methodology in the sections below
is designed to incorporate such endogenous responses. Moreover, we will provide direct
estimates of the price elasticity of energy consumption in section 5.
The fact that the purchasing power losses and gains induced by energy price fluctu-
ations are small, even under the extreme assumption of perfectly inelastic demand for
energy, does not necessarily mean that they cannot have large effects on real consump-
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tion. For example, changes in precautionary savings can greatly amplify the response to
an unanticipated purchasing power loss. In addition, changes in uncertainty may trigger
a disproportionate response of durables consumption. Likewise, changes in the operating
cost of energy-using durables such as vehicles may further amplify the overall response
of real consumption. Finally, changing expenditure patterns may trigger a reallocation
effect that further amplifies the response to a purchasing power loss. Sections 4 and 5 will
investigate the empirical support for these effects.
3.3 An Illustrative Model of Energy and Non-Energy Consumption
This section presents a simple framework that illustrates the intuition for why higher
real energy prices affect real consumption. The model abstracts from the fact that the
consumer demand for energy is derived from a household production function. Consider
a representative consumer who consumes energy (e) and a composite non-energy good
(n). Let PN be the real price of the composite non-energy good, PE the real price of
energy, and I real household income. Furthermore, suppose that the consumer’s income is
supplemented with a fraction θ of economy-wide energy revenues PE ·E. The representative
consumer faces the following constrained optimization problem:
max u = [αnρ + βeρ]
1
ρ
s.t. I + θPEE = PN · n + PE · e
where I, PN ,and PE have been expressed in terms of the PCE numeraire good.
The LaGrangian for this constrained maximization problem is:
L = [αnρ + βeρ]
1
ρ + λ[I + θPE · E − PE · e− PN · n]














−1ρβeρ−1 − λPE = 0
I + θPE · E − PE · e− PN · n = 0
e∗ = E∗
The first two first-order conditions do not depend θ because income from energy is treated
as a lump sum transfer, so consumers do not take into account the increase in income
associated with an increase in the price of energy.
Define r = ρ/(ρ− 1). Then the Marshallian demand function for non-energy consump-
tion can be expressed as:
n∗(I, PN , PE) =
I · P r−1N
(1− θ)α
β








P r−1N · (1− θ) · (αβ )r−1 · P r−1E · I
[(1− θ) · (α
β
)r−1 · P rE + P rC ]2
.
The second term in this expression is greater than or equal to zero for all parameter
values. Thus, the sign of ∂n∗/∂PE is determined by −r = ρ/(1− ρ).
The effect of changes in the real price of energy on non-energy consumption depends on
two parameters (see Table 1). The first parameter is θ, which measures the degree to which
revenues from energy consumption are recycled through the economy as income. If θ = 1,
meaning that every dollar of energy revenue is recycled as income, then ∂n∗/∂PE = 0.
Non-energy consumption does not respond to changes in real energy prices at all because
an additional dollar spent on energy becomes an additional dollar of income. For θ ∈ [0, 1),
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the term 1 − θ in the expression for the cross-partial derivative is positive. In this case,
the sign of ∂n∗/∂PE depends on the sign of ρ. There are three cases:
1. ρ = 0 ⇒ −r = 0. In this case, ∂n∗/∂PE = 0. This is the Cobb-Douglas case, in which
utility is separable in energy and non-energy consumption. Non-energy consumption
is independent of the real price of energy.
2. ρ ∈ (0, 1) ⇒ −r > 0. In this case, ∂n∗/∂PE > 0. The limit of this case is ρ = 1, in
which case utility is linear in energy and non-energy consumption.
3. ρ < 0 ⇒ −r < 0. In this case, ∂n∗/∂PE < 0, and consumers reduce their non-energy
expenditures in response to energy price increases.
This analysis demonstrates that the common perception that higher energy prices lower
consumption is based on the implicit view that 0 ≤ θ < 1 and ρ < 0. Policy discussions
sometimes seem to postulate implicitly that θ = 0, which would be true only if there were no
recycling of the revenues generated by higher energy prices. A more plausible assumption is
that θ > 0. For example, higher energy prices driven by higher prices for imported energy
goods will stimulate increased exports of U.S. goods, at least partially offsetting the loss
in consumer income. Similarly, in the case of a purely domestic energy price shock such
as a shock to U.S. refining capacity, the transfer of income to the refiner may be partially
returned to consumers in the form of higher wages or higher stock returns on domestic
energy companies. At the same time, it seems unlikely that θ = 1, because increased
exports are unlikely to offset completely the reduction in income from higher prices for
imported energy goods, and because different income recipients may have different marginal
propensities to consume.
For 0 < θ < 1, the effect of higher energy prices on non-energy consumption depends
on ρ. The negative income effect of an increase in energy prices on n∗ will dominate the
positive substitution effect only if ρ < 0. When ρ > 0, in contrast, n∗ will increase. This
example shows that the response of non-energy consumption to energy price shocks is
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ambiguous a priori. In the next section, we investigate the extent of the empirical support
for the common notion that energy price increases lower real consumption.
3.4 Quantifying the Effects of Purchasing Power Shocks on Real Consumption
In this section, we present estimates of impulse responses based on bivariate vector
autoregressive (VAR) models. Our analysis is intended to shed light on the empirical
relevance of various channels of transmission that play an important role in theoretical
work on energy price shocks. As discussed in the introduction, there are five distinct
channels that might rationalize a response of real consumption to purchasing power shocks.
Our objective in this paper is to assess the evidence for these effects and to quantify them
when possible. Our empirical strategy is to identify the individual effects by estimating the
differential responses of major components of real consumption to unpredictable changes
in purchasing power driven by energy price fluctuations. We are interested in whether
there is compelling statistical evidence for the existence of these effects and in how large
these effects are in the data.
Our main focus in this section is on aggregate real consumption and its major compo-
nents (durables, nondurables, and services). We fit separate VAR models for each con-
sumption aggregate. Durables are further disaggregated into vehicles (defined to include
automobiles, motorcycles, recreational vehicles, aircraft and boats) and other durables.10
This distinction is important for assessing the operating cost effect. While the use of many
durables requires some energy input, our rationale is that vehicles are much more energy
intensive than, say, appliances, and that effectively operating costs will not matter much
for durables other than vehicles. More disaggregated results on vehicles will be presented
in section 6.
We focus on measures of purchasing power changes, as opposed to unweighted changes
in energy prices, because the purchasing power changes incorporate the effects of changes
10In computing real consumption of other durables we make suitable adjustments to account for the fact that the BEA
data are based on chain-weighted price indices.
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in the expenditure share for energy. This allows us to avoid a potential source of structural
instability in the relationship between energy prices and the economy. Each VAR model
includes the purchasing power loss series described in section 2 (or a suitable transformation
of that series) and the percent growth rate of the measure of real consumption of interest.
The sample period is 1970.2-2006.7, unless noted otherwise. The monthly real consumption
data are from the BEA’s National Income and Product Accounts. Throughout the paper,
we impose a VAR lag order of 6. This lag order tends to be larger than the estimates
suggested by the Akaike Information Criterion conditional on an upper bound of 12 lags,
which in some cases produces implausibly low lag order estimates. While our qualitative
results are not sensitive to the lag order choice, given the well-known dangers of underfitting
a VAR model, we adopt a conservative approach (see Kilian 2001, Ivanov and Kilian 2005).
The VAR models are identified recursively with the purchasing power loss series ordered
first, implying that its innovations are not affected contemporaneously by innovations to
real consumption growth.11 The advantage of using a VAR model is that it isolates the
linearly unpredictable component of losses in purchasing power and allows for reverse
causality.12 In the figures below, we show responses of the level of real consumption to
a one-time, one standard-deviation purchasing-power shock. The maximum horizon of
the impulse response functions is 18 months. All figures show point estimates as well as
90% bootstrap confidence intervals based on the bias-corrected method of Kilian (1998).
Since the dominant autoregressive roots of the VAR models are near 0.8 throughout, the
coverage accuracy of these intervals is likely to be very high.13
11Our approach does not allow us to differentiate between energy price changes driven by demand and by supply shocks
in energy markets. The distinction between demand and supply shocks can be important, as these shocks tend to have very
different effects on macroeconomic aggregates (see Kilian 2006). The impulse responses shown below hence are best viewed
as an average reflecting the (unknown) composition of demand and supply shocks over our sample period.
12Our approach differs from that in Mehra and Peterson (2005) who treat the change in energy prices as exogenous. This
assumption is at odds with historical and econometric evidence (see, e.g., Barsky and Kilian 2004, Hamilton 2005, Kilian
2006).
13Under the assumption that purchasing power changes driven by energy price changes are predetermined, there is no loss
in generality in restricting ourselves to bivariate models. Adding more variables to the VAR model would only undermine
the efficiency of the estimates, while creating identification problems, since there is no reason to believe that the remaining
model structure is recursive.
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3.4.1 On the Source of Asymmetries in the Response of Real Consumption
Our empirical analysis is complicated by the fact that some of the effects listed in the
introduction are symmetric in purchasing power losses and gains, whereas other effects are
asymmetric. It is useful to review the main arguments, before discussing the empirical
specification. The effect of changes in discretionary income on real consumption is clearly
symmetric in purchasing power increases and decreases. All else equal, consumers will
tend to lower their discretionary expenditures when energy prices rise, and increase their
expenditures when energy prices fall.
Similarly, the effect of changes in operating costs on the consumption of energy-using
durables is likely to be symmetric. This point deserves some elaboration. Hamilton (2005)
makes a case that consumers may postpone car purchases, when the price of energy rises,
but will not buy a second car, when energy prices go down. This conclusion is not obvious
in that there are likely to be consumers who used to think that purchasing their first (or
second) car was beyond their means, and who may elect to buy a car after all, following
a decline in energy prices. More importantly, even if Hamilton’s conclusion were correct,
it misses the point that consumers will tend to replace their existing car with a new and
less energy-efficient car. For example, they may trade in their Honda Civic for an SUV.
This decision is the direct mirror image of the decision to trade in one’s SUV for a Honda
Civic in response to higher energy prices. Thus, on a priori grounds, there is no reason to
expect an asymmetry in the response of real consumption of motor vehicles.
In contrast, the uncertainty effect on the consumption of durables is asymmetric. In
its strongest form, the uncertainty effect implies that unexpected increases as well as
unexpected decreases of energy prices will cause a decline in real durables consumption,
as households postpone major purchases, while they wait to see whether the energy price
change will persist (see Bernanke 1983). Since this effect reinforces the discretionary income
effect, when energy prices increase, but counteracts the discretionary income effect when
energy prices decrease, it causes the responses of consumer durables to be asymmetric. A
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somewhat weaker form of the uncertainty hypothesis recognizes that consumers may be
more risk averse in the direction of higher energy prices. In that view, when energy prices
unexpectedly increase, households will postpone major purchases of durables that were
already planned. When energy prices decline unexpectedly, however, there is no reason
to postpone those planned purchases and real durables consumption does not respond to
the energy price decline. For our purposes this distinction is immaterial. Either way, the
response to an energy price increase should be larger in magnitude than the response to a
decrease, causing the responses of real durables consumption to be asymmetric.
The precautionary savings effect could be symmetric or asymmetric. One view is that
consumers increase precautionary savings (and hence decrease real consumption) in re-
sponse to all changes in energy prices, simply because changing energy prices create un-
certainty. For example, energy expert Daniel Yergin in a recent interview reported results
of a study that shows that, even though gasoline prices have dropped substantially from
their highs in 2006, there is “a greater sense of insecurity and people don’t want to be
caught emptying their wallet at the gasoline pump” (see Douglass 2007). This contrasts
with the view that consumers in practice view falling energy prices as unambiguously good
news, while energy price increases are considered a reason for concern about the future.
In the latter case, one would expect a reduction in precautionary savings and an increase
in real consumption in response to an unexpected decline in energy prices that mirrors
the response to an unexpected energy price increase. Our empirical analysis will allow for
both of these possibilities.
Finally, the reallocation of resources in response to changing expenditure patterns will
cause an asymmetric response to energy price increases and decreases. This hypothesis is
based on the observation that any change in the price of energy, whether it is an increase
or a decrease, will cause reallocations across industries, which in the presence of frictions
in capital and labor markets will cause falling output and rising unemployment. However,
a fall in energy prices also raises the discretionary income of households and stimulates
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output and employment. Thus, the positive income effects of such a price decline will offset
at least in part the negative reallocation effects. In contrast, when the price of energy
increases, both effects work in the same direction, amplifying the response of output and
unemployment (see, e.g. Davis and Haltiwanger 2001).
It is essential for our empirical analysis to allow for these potential asymmetries in the
response of real consumption to energy price shocks. Clearly, the standard linear regression
framework that treats energy price increases and energy price decreases symmetrically will
only be appropriate, if we can rule out the presence of an allocative channel of transmission
and of the asymmetric effects arising from uncertainty. In the remainder of section 4, we
will show that there is no compelling evidence against the symmetry hypothesis, consistent
with the absence of both the uncertainty effect and the reallocation effect in the real
consumption data. In section 5, we will estimate the effect of changes in discretionary
income, changes in precautionary savings and changes in operating costs, conditional on
having ruled out all asymmetric effects.
3.4.2 Is There Evidence of a Reallocation Effect or an Uncertainty Effect?
The presence of a reallocation effect of energy price changes as well as the presence of
an uncertainty effect in durables consumption may be detected based on the pattern of the
responses of real consumption expenditures and their major components to unanticipated
purchasing power gains and losses.
Hypothesis 1: The fact that the reallocation effect will lower all forms of con-
sumption whether energy prices increase or decrease implies that the response of
real consumption aggregates to an increase in energy prices should be at least as
large in absolute terms as the response to a decrease in energy prices of the same
magnitude. The absence of such an asymmetric effect of energy price changes on
real consumption of nondurables and services is evidence against the presence of
a reallocation effect.
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For the real consumption of durables, the analysis is complicated by the fact that there
potentially is a second asymmetric effect at work.
Hypothesis 2: Uncertainty will increase whether energy prices increase or de-
crease. The effect of increased uncertainty on the consumption of durables is
negative. Thus, the absence of an asymmetric effect of energy price changes
on real consumption of durables is evidence against the existence of both the
reallocation effect and the uncertainty effect.
By implication, an asymmetry of the hypothesized form only in the response of real
consumption of durables, but not in the response of real consumption of nondurables and
services, would be evidence of the presence of an uncertainty effect, but the absence of a
reallocation effect.
In investigating these two hypotheses, a natural starting point is to divide purchasing
power shocks into negative and positive changes, as shown in the upper panel of Figure 4.
Implicit in this specification is the assumption that energy price changes have a propor-
tionate effect on consumption. We will refer to this specification as the baseline model.
The assumption of proportionate effects will be relaxed further below.
3.4.2.1 Baseline Model: All Purchasing Power Changes Matter
For each consumption aggregate of interest, we estimate impulse response functions
based on two bivariate VAR models, one for purchasing power losses and one for purchasing
power gains. The underlying shocks are scaled to be identical in magnitude, so the impulse
response function can be compared across purchasing power losses and gains. Thus, if
symmetry holds, we would expect the response to a purchasing power loss to be the exact
mirror image of the response to a purchasing power gain, except for sampling error.14
14An alternative approach would have been to fit a regression model that involves lags of both increases and decreases
and to test the equality of the coefficients at a given lag by means of a Wald test. In related work, many authors have
included oil-price increases and oil-price decreases as separate variables in a single-equation model for real output growth and
performed a Wald test of the equality of the coefficients (see, e.g., Mork 1989, Dotsey and Reid 1992, Hooker 1996a, Hooker
2002). A drawback of this approach is that such tests only tell us whether the estimates of the regression slope parameters
are different, whereas we really are interested in the extent to which the estimated impulse responses differ. We avoid this
ambiguity by focusing directly on the differences in the impulse response estimates with respect to unexpected increases and
decreases in purchasing power.
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Real Consumption The first two columns of Figure 5 contrast the responses of major real
consumption aggregates to unexpected losses and unexpected gains in purchasing power.
First, for total consumption as well as for each of its three major components (durables,
nondurables, services) the point estimates are negative in response to a purchasing power
loss (or energy price increase) and positive in response to a purchasing power gain (or
energy price decrease). Second, the estimated responses to a purchasing power loss are
systematically larger in absolute terms than the responses to a purchasing power gain.
Third, while the responses to a purchasing power loss are highly statistically significant,
the responses to purchasing power gains are invariably much less precisely estimated. The
90% confidence intervals in most cases include values that would be expected if the response
were symmetric.
The next two rows of Figure 5 show the corresponding responses for durables disaggre-
gated into vehicles (defined as automobiles, pleasure boats, pleasure aircraft, motorcycles,
and recreational vehicles) and other durables. The response of real vehicles consumption
to losses is larger in magnitude and more statistically significant than that of real durables
consumption, but the qualitative results are similar. In the case of other durables, we
find that the estimated response to a purchasing power gain is larger than the response
to a loss, contrary to the implications of theoretical models. Moreover, the response to a
purchasing power loss is small and not statistically significant, whereas the response to a
purchasing power gain is statistically significant at most horizons.
What inspection of these plots does not reveal is whether the differences in the impulse
response point estimates are statistically significant. The first column of Table 2 provides
p-values for Wald tests of symmetry in the response functions for each of these aggregates.
These tests are computed based on a modification of the residual-based bootstrap method
of Kilian (1998) that takes proper account of the fact that the underlying VAR models are
only seemingly unrelated and that preserve the contemporaneous correlations in the data
across models. Table 2 shows that, in no case, do we reject the null of symmetry. All but
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one p-value is above 0.85 and in the one case where the p-value is only 0.61, as discussed
earlier, inspection of Figure 5 reveals departures from the null of symmetry in the wrong
direction in that the response to a purchasing power gain is larger than the response to a
loss, contrary to the implications of standard theoretical models. While a non-rejection of
the symmetry null does not establish that the null is true, Table 2 shows that there is no
compelling reason to depart from the standard model imposing symmetry.
Unemployment An additional plausibility check of the results for real consumption is
provided by the response of the U.S. aggregate unemployment rate to the same purchasing
power shocks. In the presence of a reallocation effect in particular, one would expect a
strong degree of asymmetry in that response. We investigate this conjecture based on the
same VAR framework. As before, purchasing power shocks are treated as predetermined.
The upper panel of Figure 6 shows a statistically significant positive response to purchasing
power losses, whereas the response to a purchasing power gain is flat and surrounded by
very wide confidence bands. While the point estimates are seemingly asymmetric, the first
column of Table 2 shows a p-value of essentially 1 for the null of symmetric responses.
Thus, the unemployment data are even less informative than the real consumption data.
Consumer Expectations The evidence presented so far is open to interpretation. While
there is weak evidence of asymmetries in the impulse response point estimates of real
consumption aggregates, formal statistical tests indicate that the data are essentially un-
informative. We cannot tell whether the nonrejection of the symmetry null hypothesis
occurs because the null is true, or whether the test may have low power to detect depar-
tures from symmetry. Nevertheless, our inability to reject the symmetry null is surprising,
given the consensus in the literature that asymmetries are important. One way of assessing
whether the non-rejections for real consumption and aggregate unemployment are due to
low power, is to compare these results to similar response estimates for consumer expecta-
tions data from the Michigan Survey of Consumers. If the responses of real consumption
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and of unemployment were truly asymmetric, one would expect to see a similar asymmetry
in consumer expectations data.
Our data set includes the overall index of consumer sentiment as well as individual series.
One set of expectations data relates to households’ perceptions about the future evolution
of the economy and includes expected changes in business conditions and expected changes
in unemployment. Another set of measures relates to households’ precautionary savings
motives and includes expected changes in households’ personal financial situation and
expected changes in real family income. A third set of expectations measures relates
directly to households’ decisions about major durables purchases and includes current
buying conditions for large household goods and current buying condition for vehicles.
All series are constructed such that a fall in the index indicates a worsening of conditions
from the consumer’s point of view. The sample period is 1978.1-2006.5. No monthly
expectations data are available prior to 1978. While the scale of the responses is not
comparable, given the way survey responses are represented, the qualitative patterns and
degree of symmetry of the responses are. Our identifying assumption throughout this
paper is that purchasing power innovations are predetermined with respect to innovations
in consumer sentiment within the month.
The use of consumer expectations data provides important additional insights. The first
two columns of Figure 7 show that the responses of overall consumer sentiment are highly
symmetric in purchasing power gains and losses. The overall shape of the response function
as well as the scale of the responses are very similar, and both response functions are highly
significant. The same pattern of results is found for most of the relevant disaggregates in the
Michigan Survey. In most cases, the responses look highly symmetric and are statistically
significant. In some cases, the responses to purchasing power gains actually are larger
in absolute terms than the responses to purchasing power losses rather than smaller, as
predicted by theoretical models (see, e.g., current buying conditions for vehicles). The only
result that might potentially be consistent with an asymmetric reaction is the response
71
of expected changes in interest rates. While households expect interest rates to increase
temporarily in the first few months following a purchasing power loss, the response to
a purchasing power gain after the expected initial decrease of interest rates suggests a
persistent increase. While puzzling, this persistent response is not statistically different
from zero.
The first column of Table 2 provides p-values for Wald tests of the symmetry of the
response functions for each of these expectations measures. In no case, do we reject the
null of symmetry. All but one p-value is above 0.97. Even for the response of expected
changes in interest rates the p-value for the symmetry null is essentially 1.
We conclude that there is no reason to depart from standard linear models that impose
symmetry in the responses to purchasing power losses and gains. There is no compelling
evidence for the reallocation effect (Hypothesis 1) or the uncertainty effect (Hypothesis
2). That conclusion, however, is conditional on the premise that consumers respond to
all changes in the price of energy equally. There are two alternative models of consumer
behavior that suggest that this premise may be unrealistic. Below we will investigate both
of these models and show that our conclusions about the symmetry of the responses are
robust.
3.4.2.2 Alternative Model 1: Only Large Purchasing Power Changes Matter
The baseline model postulated that consumers’ responses are proportionate to the mag-
nitude of the shock. An alternative hypothesis is that consumers only respond to large
purchasing power shocks. For example, Macintyre (2006) suggests that a gas price increase
of 25 cents (an increase of about 10% in gas prices as of 2006) would make consumers an-
gry. It seems plausible that a shock of only 4 cents (an increase of about 1.5%), which
roughly corresponds to the magnitude of the shocks studied in the earlier VAR analysis
in this paper, might not evoke a reaction from consumers. In fact, it might go unno-
ticed by many households. Such behavior might be rationalized by adjustment costs. The
presence of costs to monitoring energy costs and of adjusting consumption patterns might
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make households reluctant to respond to small changes in purchasing power (see Goldberg
1998).
In this subsection, we investigate the possibility that real consumption, the unemploy-
ment rate and consumer expectations may react differently to purchasing power shocks
of different signs and magnitudes. We divide the observations for the purchasing power
loss series into four mutually-exclusive categories: large purchasing power losses, small
purchasing power losses, large purchasing power gains, small purchasing power gains. A
monthly change in purchasing power is considered large if it is greater than 0.11%, which
corresponds to one standard deviation of the purchasing power loss series. We find that
14.2% of the purchasing power losses involve large losses, 31.7% involve small losses, 47.3%
involve small gains and 6.9% large gains. The time series of large purchasing power gains
and large purchasing power losses are plotted in the middle panel of Figure 4.
Columns 3 and 4 of Figure 5 show the estimated impulse responses of each of the
six real consumption categories to large losses and large gains in purchasing power. The
reduced form correlations are similar to those in the baseline model. All shocks have been
normalized in absolute terms to have the same scale, so differences across the estimated
responses are entirely due to differences in slope parameter estimates. With the exception
of services, responses to large gains and large losses are of opposite signs and similar
magnitudes. As in the baseline model, while the point estimates of the responses to large
gains tend to be somewhat smaller than the estimated responses to large losses, they are
less precisely estimated. The corresponding results for the U.S. unemployment rate are
shown in the middle panel of Figure 6. The large and statistically significant increase in
the unemployment rate in response to a large loss contrasts with a small and statistically
insignificant decline in the unemployment rate in response to a large gain in purchasing
power.
Overall, the evidence for this alternative model leaves room for doubt about the pres-
ence of asymmetries in the consumption data, not unlike in the baseline model. A more
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direct measure of the degree of asymmetry is again provided by the responses of consumer
expectations data to the same shocks, as shown in columns 3 and 4 of Figure 7. As in
the baseline model, the estimated responses for the Michigan index of consumer sentiment
show no evidence of the asymmetry one might have expected based on theory. For most
expectations indicators shown in Figure 7 there is a large degree of symmetry between
responses to large losses and to large gains, and to the extent that there are departures
from this pattern, there are as likely to be in the direction of larger responses to large gains
as to large losses.
Formal statistical tests based on these responses allow us to address two distinct ques-
tions. The first question is whether there is evidence against the assumption that the
responses to large purchasing power increases and large purchasing power decreases are
symmetric. Column 2 of Table 2 provide evidence that the symmetry hypothesis cannot
be rejected in any case. The p-values range between 0.68 and 1.00 for real consumption
aggregates (with the exception of other durables, similar to the baseline model) and be-
tween 0.79 and 1.00 for consumer expectations. Similarly, the p-value for the symmetry of
the unemployment responses is 0.98. Hence, the earlier conclusions based on the baseline
model are supported even if we relax the assumption of scale invariance.
The second question we can address is whether there is empirical support for the notion
that only large price changes matter. Since the latter model can be nested in the base-
line model, we can address this question by testing the equality of the impulse response
functions for large and small losses on the one hand and for large and small gains on the
other hand, controlling for the size of the shock. Columns 4 and 5 of Table 2 shows that
we cannot reject the equality null for the responses to large and small losses. The p-values
range from 0.43 to 1.00. For gains, they range from 0.95 to 1.00. Similar results hold for
the unemployment rate and all measures of consumer expectations we considered. It is
not the case that consumers ignore small changes in purchasing power. Thus, there is no
compelling reason not to impose scale invariance as in the baseline model. The evidence
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against the equality null becomes even weaker if we impose symmetry before testing the
equality of large and small changes (see last column of Table 2).
3.4.2.3 Alternative Model 2: Only Net Purchasing Power Changes Matter
We have already considered the possibilities that consumers respond proportionately
to purchasing power shocks or that they respond only to large changes. Yet another
view is that consumers only respond to net changes in purchasing power. The idea is that
consumers will not respond at all to losses in their purchasing power from one month to the
next that simply offset earlier gains in purchasing power; whereas a decline in purchasing
power to levels unprecedented in recent history will change consumption behavior. This
model of consumer behavior can be motivated based on a proposal by Hamilton (1996).
A measure of the net decrease in purchasing power at a given point in time can be
constructed by comparing the current level of purchasing power to its minimum over the
previous year. If the current level is above the benchmark, the net decrease measure is
zero.15 Previous empirical studies based on net increments have focused on net energy
price increases, while ignoring net energy price decreases such as the unprecedented fall
in energy prices in 1986 after the collapse of OPEC or the sharp decline in energy prices
following the Asian crisis of 1997/98. This restriction seems implausible on a priori grounds
(see Hooker 1996b). In this paper we compute measures of both the net purchasing power
loss and the net purchasing power gain. The resulting net change series are plotted in the
bottom panel of Figure 4.
We estimate the VAR models already described in the previous sections. Columns 5
and 6 of Figure 5 show the results. For all real consumption aggregates, responses to
net losses and net gains tend to be of opposite signs. Sometimes, as in the case of real
durables consumption, they even are of similar magnitude. Typically, the response to net
decreases is smoother and more precisely estimated than the response to net increases.
As in the baseline model, the response of durables other than vehicles is inconsistent with
15Alternatively, one could have used a longer window of three years in computing the net purchasing power loss. Our main
findings are robust to the length of the window.
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theory in that net increases have larger and more significant effects. The null of symmetric
responses is not rejected for any consumption aggregate. Abstracting from other durables,
the p-values range from 0.42 to 1.00 (see column 3 of Table 2).
The response of the aggregate U.S. unemployment rate in the bottom panel of Figure 6
is as expected. While the response to a net loss in purchasing power is larger in magnitude
than the response to a net gain, the latter estimate is of the expected negative sign and
the intervals are wide enough to accommodate symmetric responses. Compared to the
baseline model, the point estimates are more symmetric. Table 2 confirms that symmetry
cannot be rejected. The p-value is 0.98.
As in the baseline model, the responses of consumer expectations in the last two columns
of Figure 7 are generally consistent with the symmetry hypothesis. The lowest p-value is
0.75. There is strong evidence of symmetry in the response of current buying conditions
for vehicles in particular, and as much evidence of larger responses to net decreases in
purchasing power as evidence for smaller responses.
3.4.3 Discussion
The previous subsections demonstrated that, regardless of the choice of model spec-
ification, there is no compelling evidence for asymmetries in the response of consumers
to positive and negative purchasing power shocks. While the estimated responses of real
consumption expenditures and of the unemployment rate to net increases in purchasing
power are too imprecise to permit firm conclusions, they are consistent with the sym-
metry hypothesis. In addition, there is striking evidence that the responses of consumer
expectations exhibit a high degree of symmetry.
While the evidence against asymmetries in real consumption responses is subject to
considerable sampling uncertainty in some cases, the tests are not without statistical power,
as indicated by the rejections of symmetry for some investment expenditures reported in
Edelstein and Kilian (2007). Moreover, our results are consistent with an alternative
approach to assessing the evidence for asymmetries that involves two separate tests. The
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first null hypothesis is that purchasing power losses have no effect at any horizon. The
second null hypothesis is that purchasing power gains have no effect at any horizon. If the
first null hypothesis were systematically rejected, but not the second hypothesis, this would
be direct evidence of asymmetry. We conducted such tests and did not find systematic
evidence in favor of asymmetries. While it is not possible to reject either null for the
major consumption aggregates or for unemployment on the full sample, for the expected
change in one’s personal financial situation, for example, or for current buying conditions
for vehicles both null hypotheses are strongly rejected. This occurs despite the shorter
sample for the consumer expectations data. Thus, low power alone is unlikely to explain
our findings in favor of symmetry.
The evidence against asymmetries runs counter to common beliefs and suggests that
several mechanisms that feature prominently in theoretical models of the transmission of
energy price shocks are not quantitatively important. First, we conclude that the realloca-
tion effect modeled in Hamilton (1988) and emphasized by Davis and Haltiwanger (2001)
and Lee and Ni (2002) cannot be detected in aggregate real consumption or consumer
expectations data. Second, there is no apparent effect of rising uncertainty on durables
consumption. This is true whether we focus on vehicles consumption, other durables con-
sumption or total durables consumption. Such effects played a central role in the closely
related analysis of Bernanke (1983). Third, the absence of significant asymmetries across
all consumption aggregates also suggests that the precautionary savings effect, if it exists,
only exists in symmetric form.
Based on these findings, for the remainder of the paper we will impose symmetry in
studying the effects of changes in purchasing power on real consumption and its compo-
nents. Of particular interest is the question of how large the effects of changes in operating
costs, precautionary savings and discretionary income are. Since there is no direct way
of testing the net change model against the baseline model of consumer behavior outlined
above, we will present the results for the baseline model, augmented by selected additional
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results for the net change model.
3.5 How Large are the Effects of Changes in Discretionary Income, Precau-
tionary Savings and Operating Costs?
Having found no compelling evidence of an uncertainty or reallocation effect, in the
remainder of the paper we work with bivariate VAR models that impose symmetry on the
effect of changes in purchasing power. Our objective is to quantify the effects of changes
in discretionary income, precautionary savings and operating costs. Since all these effects
are symmetric in energy price increases and decreases, we quantify them by comparing the
responses of different real consumption aggregates to the same purchasing power shock in
a standard linear VAR framework. Again we focus on testable implications of the effects
outlined in section 4:
Hypothesis 3: The effect of unanticipated changes in discretionary income is
bounded by the loss in purchasing power derived under the assumption of in-
elastic energy demand. This bound may be tightened by taking account of the
short-run price elasticity of energy demand.
Hypothesis 4: Evidence of a disproportionately large response of real consumption
of nondurables, services, and durables other than vehicles to purchasing power
shocks is an indication of a precautionary savings effect.
Hypothesis 5: Suppose that only vehicles are subject to the operating cost effect.
Further suppose that the precautionary savings effect on durables consumption
is the same for vehicles and other durables. Then, in the absence of an operating
cost effect, the response of real vehicles consumption and the response of real
consumption of other durables to energy price changes should be equal. Thus,
the difference between these two responses allows us to quantify the operating
cost effect.
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Figures 8 and 9 displays dynamic responses to a one-time, one standard-deviation unan-
ticipated decline in purchasing power. A one standard-deviation shock corresponds approx-
imately to a 1.5% increase in energy prices, which translates to a 0.096 percentage point
reduction in purchasing power. A 1.5% increase in energy prices may seem small, but
it is not, given that our data are monthly. Historically, the average shock size has been
1.2% in absolute terms. The largest monthly energy price increase in our sample is 11%
and occurred following Hurricane Katrina in September of 2005. This corresponds to a
purchasing power loss of -0.66% evaluated at the 2005 energy share.
Figure 8 shows how consumers’ purchasing power evolves in response to an unantic-
ipated decline in purchasing power. The initial decline in purchasing power is followed
by additional declines in subsequent months. The maximum loss of purchasing power is
reached after eight months. Thereafter, the response becomes flat. Figure 9 shows the
corresponding responses of the level of real consumption aggregates.
3.5.1 Discretionary Income Effect
It is instructive to consider the expected consequences of a one standard deviation
shock to purchasing power based on the discretionary income effect alone. Given that
households may choose to borrow or to dissave as a short-run response to higher energy
prices, it is quite possible for the impact effect of such a shock on consumption to be smaller
than 0.096 percentage points, even when energy demand is inelastic. Such consumption
smoothing is likely to be short-lived, however, and in the long run the response should
be bounded by the magnitude of the purchasing power loss. In practice, the long-run
response could be much smaller than this bound, to the extent that demand for energy
declines over time, as households increasingly utilize extensive and intensive margins of
adjustment in response to purchasing power losses driven by higher energy prices. First
of all, households may attempt to reduce energy consumption. It stands to reason that
such efforts at energy conservation will increase over time. Beyond simple remedies such
as driving less or changing the thermostat, households will gradually upgrade their home
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heating and insulation systems or trade in their gas-guzzling car for a more energy-efficient
vehicle.
These responses may be estimated using regressions analogous to those underlying Fig-
ure 9 for various forms of energy consumption. Figure 10 shows that consumption of all
forms of energy declines, but there are some unexpected patterns. Contrary to conven-
tional wisdom, gasoline consumption responds immediately to unanticipated purchasing
power losses. The impact response is -0.57%. Virtually all of the adjustment takes place
on impact. The response is highly significant at all horizons with a maximum impact of
-0.73%. In contrast, the consumption of heating oil and coal takes somewhat longer to
adjust, but is more elastic in the long run in response to purchasing power losses. After
half a year, the response reaches its maximum impact of -2.28%. The negative response of
electricity and of natural gas is much smaller and statistically insignificant at all horizons
with a long run response of -0.25% and -0.53%, respectively. The strikingly large response
of heating oil and coal is likely to be due to households’ ability to store heating oil in
tanks. This storage feature allows households to delay purchases of new heating oil when
the price of heating oil is high and to fill up the tank completely when prices are low.16
In contrast, electricity and natural gas are inherently unstorable, and gasoline may not be
stored for safety reasons.17
The overall response of energy consumption is -0.43% on impact and -0.70% after 18
months, and is statistically significant at all horizons. The fact that a 1.5% increase
in energy prices (corresponding to a one standard deviation shock to purchasing power)
reduces real energy consumption by -0.43% on impact, suggests that the discretionary
income effect on consumption should be bounded by -0.055% rather than -0.096% (as
discretionary income falls by only 57% of the initial loss in purchasing power that would
16For a discussion of this storable goods feature see Dudine, Hendel, and Lizzeri (2006).
17It is useful to put these estimates into perspective. Using a structural model, Reiss and White (2005) arrive at an
estimate of the short-run price elasticity of electricity demand of -0.39. Our point estimate is -0.24 after seven months. The
90% confidence interval for the elasticity estimate includes -0.39. Dahl and Sterner (1991), in a comprehensive survey, report
estimates of the short-run price elasticity of gasoline demand between -0.08 and -0.41. Our point estimate ranges from -0.38
to -0.48, depending on the horizon. The bounds of the 90% confidence interval for this elasticity estimate are -0.27 and -0.66,
respectively. The short-run elasticity estimate for all energy consumption combined is -0.28 on impact, which does not seem
unreasonably high. The interval estimate is [-0.14, -0.42].
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have occurred under completely inelastic energy demand). Thus, if the response of real
consumption were driven entirely by the loss of discretionary income, the response should
fall between 0% and -0.055%.
How does this prediction compare to the response of total consumption in Figure 9?
Total real consumption falls immediately. The response is highly statistically significant
and stabilizes after about ten months. After one year, a 1.5% increase in energy prices
(which leads to -0.055% decline in discretionary income after accounting for the drop in
energy consumption) causes a -0.23% reduction in the level of real consumption relative to
the original level. The fact that the point estimate is four times as large as the upper bound
on the discretionary income effect suggests that part of the response must be associated
with an increase in precautionary savings or an increase in operating costs of energy-
using durables. We clearly reject the null that the discretionary income effect alone can
explain the response of total real consumption. Moreover, these estimated responses are
economically significant. One way of assessing the economic significance of these estimates
is to consider a shock equal in size to the largest shock observed in our sample. A Katrina-
sized shock in energy prices would imply a fall of -1.58% in real consumption.
It is useful to decompose total real consumption by type of consumption (durables, non-
durables, services). Figure 9 shows that each series experiences a statistically significant
and persistent decline following an unexpected decline in purchasing power due to rising
energy prices. Real durables consumption experiences by far the biggest decline, falling
by -0.73% in the long run. This result suggests that durables play an important role in
the transmission of such shocks.18 Real services consumption and real nondurables con-
sumption decline only by about -0.15% and -0.17%, respectively. The confidence intervals
allow us to reject the notion that the bound of -0.055 percentage points implied by the
discretionary income effect is consistent with the data with the exception of nondurables,
18We would also expect households to reduce their expenditures on home improvements and other forms of household
residential fixed investment, given the durable-goods nature of this form of investment. The latter series is only available
at quarterly frequency. Additional results (not shown) confirm that the response of real residential fixed investment after
six quarters is large and highly significant, not unlike that of consumer durables. As for durables, the estimated response is
significantly larger than the any reasonable bound on the discretionary income effect.
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for which the response is marginally insignificant.
3.5.2 Operating Cost Effect
The disproportionately large responses of real consumption relative to the discretionary
income effect of Hypothesis 3 is puzzling at first sight. How can a fairly small reduction in
purchasing power following an energy price increase generate such large reductions in real
consumption? There are two possible explanations for a response of real consumption that
exceeds the bound set by the discretionary income effect. One possibility is the presence
of an operating cost effect for energy-using durables. This point may be investigated
further by decomposing durables into vehicles and durables other than vehicles. The
size of the operating cost effect corresponds to the difference in the responses of vehicles
relative to other durables. It can be shown that this excess response of real vehicles
consumption reaches its maximum after two months with a statistically significant decline
of -0.99 percentage points at the 10% level, consistent with Hypothesis 5. After 8 months,
it stabilizes at a statistically significant level of about -0.91 percentage points. Thus,
the operating cost effect amounts to a decline of 0.99 percentage points of real vehicles
consumption in the short run and a decline of 0.91 percentage points in the long run.
3.5.3 Precautionary Savings Effect
A second possible reason for a disproportionate response of real consumption is the
presence of a precautionary savings effect. In this view, household consumption responds
to anticipated increases in unemployment (or declines in real income) that are caused
by the initial loss of purchasing power. In other words, households respond not only to
the immediate loss of discretionary income, but they also respond in anticipation of the
delayed effects on unemployment and real household income triggered by such a shock. As
the probability of becoming unemployed increases, households increase their precautionary
savings at the expense of consumption. This effect is not limited to consumer durables.
Households may choose to reduce nonessential consumption of services and nondurables
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as well, and the reductions need not be spread evenly across all forms of consumption, but
depend on how essential a given expenditure item is.
An estimate of this precautionary savings effect can be obtained by comparing the re-
sponse of consumption excluding vehicles to the bound set by the discretionary income
effect. Consider, for example, durables other than vehicles in Figure 9. We cannot re-
ject that this response is bounded by −0.055 percentage points, resulting in a statistically
insignificant bound on the precautionary savings effect of 0.24 percentage points (the differ-
ence between the point estimate and the upper bound on the discretionary income effect).
This compares to a statistically insignificant upper bound of 0.12 percentage points for
nondurables and a statistically significant upper bound of 0.10 percentage points for ser-
vices.
One of the central motivations for a precautionary savings effect is the fear of be-
coming unemployed in the foreseeable future. If precautionary savings are triggered by
fears of unemployment, one would also expect an increase in unemployment in response
to unanticipated losses in purchasing power. Figure 11 shows a positive response of the
U.S. unemployment rate to an unanticipated loss in purchasing power. After 18 months
the unemployment rate rises by 1.36%. The response is marginally statistically signifi-
cant at some horizons. This evidence is weakly consistent with the view that there is a
precautionary savings motive in response to purchasing power shocks.
While the evidence in Figure 11 is not clear-cut, it seems plausible that consumers -
rightly or wrongly - have come to associate unanticipated losses in purchasing power with
increases in unemployment. Thus, it makes sense to investigate the plausibility of this
explanation further based on the response of consumer expectations about changes in un-
employment rather than the response of actual unemployment. In the next subsection, we
will address this point using data from the Michigan Survey of Consumers. We will provide
evidence that a loss in purchasing power due to rising energy prices has a significant and
negative impact on a wide array of consumer expectations and attitudes that can explain
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the excess response of real consumption to unanticipated purchasing power losses. We will
focus not only on expectations of changes in unemployment, but also a number of alterna-
tive indicators of future economic conditions that are relevant to household consumption
decisions. We will show that rising energy prices tend to make consumers pessimistic about
the state of the economy and about their own personal financial situation. They cause con-
sumers to expect worsening future economic conditions, and they heighten concerns about
current buying conditions.
Deteriorating consumer confidence is likely to be an important additional link in the
relationship between energy prices and household consumption. The importance of this
channel has also been recognized by policymakers. For example, Bernanke (2006b) in a
recent speech on the U.S. economic outlook stressed that “recent declines in energy prices
... have boosted household purchasing power and consumer confidence [emphasis added]”.
3.5.4 The Effects of Purchasing Power Shocks on Consumer Sentiment
Rising energy prices are often associated with pessimism and uncertainty about one’s
financial situation and the broader economy. In a report on the February 2006 Surveys
of Consumers at the University of Michigan, Richard Curtin noted that “the February
loss in confidence was due to higher energy costs, higher interest rates, and a heightened
concern about potential future increases in the unemployment rate”. The same report
stated that one-in-five families cited higher prices, mainly for energy, as the cause of their
decreased living standards. Such attitudes could lead to a decline in non-energy consump-
tion, even if the discretionary income effect of the purchasing power loss is miniscule. If
households are fearful of the economic outlook, they may curtail their consumption on a
variety of goods and services driven by a precautionary savings motive. In order to in-
vestigate this conjecture we estimate the impulse response functions for a set of measures
of consumer confidence and consumer expectations to a negative one-time, one standard-
deviation purchasing-power shock. The impulse response functions are estimated in the
same fashion as in the previous sections.
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The indices for consumer sentiment, expected change in one’s personal financial sit-
uation, and expected changes in business conditions measure the difference between the
number of respondents who expect a better situation and the number who expect a worse
situation. A decline in the index suggests that more respondents expect a worsening situ-
ation, fewer expect a better situation, or both. Similarly, a decline in the index for buying
conditions for large household goods and vehicles suggests that an increasing proportion
of respondents think it is currently a bad time to make these purchases. A decline in the
indices for unemployment, interest rate, and real family income expectations suggests that
a greater proportion of survey respondents expect more unemployment, higher interest
rates, and a decline in real family income, respectively.
Figure 12 shows the response of each sentiment series to the purchasing power shock.
A one standard deviation fall in purchasing power decreases the overall index of consumer
sentiment by 1.6 points. The fall in the index is immediate. While the index begins to rise
again a few months after the shock, it remains below its initial level even 18 months after
the shock. The observed decline in consumer sentiment compares to a standard deviation
of 12.3 for this series, suggesting that an unusually large shock such as Hurricane Katrina,
all else equal, could move consumer sentiment nearly one standard deviation away from
its mean.
The indices for expected changes in one’s personal financial situation and for general
business conditions fall by 1.4 and 2.3 points, respectively, suggesting that an increasing
number of people expect general business conditions and their personal financial situation
to deteriorate over the coming year in response to an unanticipated loss in purchasing
power. Whereas the response of the expected change in one’s personal financial situation
is quite persistent and statistically significant even after 18 months, the response of the
expected change in general business conditions, while larger in magnitude, reverts back
to zero more quickly and is statistically insignificant after only four months. Given this
evidence, one would expect households to cut back on nonessential consumption and to
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increase precautionary savings.
Of particular interest in judging the empirical plausibility of an operating cost effect is
the response of expectations about current buying conditions for durables. Figure 12 shows
that the index for buying conditions for large household goods falls by 1.9 points. An even
larger decrease is observed for vehicles. The latter index falls by 2.8 points. This implies
that a shock of the size associated with Hurricane Katrina would move the vehicle index
by nearly one standard deviation. The relatively strong reaction of the index for buying
conditions for vehicles in particular is qualitatively consistent with theories stressing energy
complementarities in use.
The following results in Figure 12 provide additional insight into why rising energy
prices cause households to curb their consumption. Increased pessimism about buying
conditions in response to purchasing power losses is associated with expectations of higher
unemployment, higher interest rates, and lower real family income. First, the index for ex-
pected changes in unemployment falls by 2.1 points, indicating that an increasing number
of people expect higher unemployment. This response in consistent with households per-
ceiving an increased risk of unemployment, as required for the existence of a precautionary
savings effect. Second, the index for expected interest rates falls by 1.1 points, indicating
that an increasing number of people expect higher interest rates in the future. This sug-
gests another channel of transmission. To the extent that consumers (rightly or wrongly)
expect interest rates to rise, following rising energy prices, their expected liabilities would
increase as credit card rates and mortgage rates increase, making it necessary to cut back
on consumption. This second channel, however, is short-lived and the responses are largely
insignificant, suggesting that it is of minor importance. Third, the index for changes in
expected real family income falls by 1.2 points, indicating that a greater number of survey
respondents expects real family income to fall in the future. These results are fully consis-
tent with the view that the effect of purchasing power shocks on real consumption operates
in part through changes in precautionary savings and through changes in the operating
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cost of vehicles.
3.6 How Do Expenditure Patterns Change in Response to Purchasing Power
Shocks?
The previous two sections investigated the response of consumption aggregates and
of consumers’ expectations to unanticipated losses in purchasing power. It is equally
important to understand how individual expenditure items respond to such shocks. Little
is known about the trade-offs consumers face when confronted with purchasing power
shocks and about the choices they make, although there is anecdotal evidence that we will
draw on below. In this section, we document in detail how individual expenditure items
respond to unanticipated losses in purchasing power triggered by higher energy prices. We
estimate impulse response functions of monthly real consumption for about 130 different
goods and services to a negative one-time, one standard deviation purchasing power shock.
The impulse response functions were estimated in the same manner as in previous sections,
and are presented in Figure 13.
The disaggregate analysis of this section is useful for several reasons. First, despite
the preponderance of anecdotal evidence on how energy price shocks affect specific types
of expenditures (such as gasoline consumption, purchases of SUVs, or dining out), to
date there exists virtually no quantitative evidence of these effects. Direct evidence of the
presence or absence of such shifts in expenditure patterns is also important because it plays
a central role in models of the reallocation effect. Second, a detailed analysis of motor
vehicle consumption will shed light on the extent to which consumers buy smaller and
more energy-efficient cars in response to purchasing power losses, a mechanism that plays
an important role in policy discussions of the effect of higher oil prices (see Bresnahan and
Ramey 1993). Third, disaggregate results are of interest to industry analysts. For example,
there is independent interest in assessing the effects of purchasing power shocks on the
tourism industry or the airline industry. Finally, these results are of interest from a public
policy point of view. Energy price shocks may have important effects on expenditures
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on higher education, the use of prescription drugs, or the choice of diets. Our analysis
complements related survey-based results in the literature on public health.19
3.6.1 Motor Vehicle Consumption
We have already shown that declines in real vehicles consumption are one of the main
causes for the disproportionate fall in real total consumption in response to purchasing
power losses. Here we investigate all forms of consumption related to motor vehicles.
Figure 13 shows that a reduction in purchasing power of -0.096% (corresponding to a one-
standard deviation shock) causes a highly significant drop of -1.16% in the consumption
of motor vehicles and parts. It is useful to consider different types of vehicles. Figure
13 shows that consumption of pleasure boats declines by -1.9% in the long run. The
response is persistent and significant. Consumption of pleasure aircraft declines by -1.6%.
The response is persistent, but only marginally significant. Consumption of recreational
vehicles drops sharply and significantly in the short run, reaching a low of -2.4%, but
becomes insignificant in the long run. In contrast, consumption of motorcycles does not
change, nor does the consumption of motor vehicle rentals. While these results are generally
consistent with the overall response of vehicles consumption, the combined consumption
share of all these vehicles of 0.47% is small. Clearly, the bulk of the vehicles response is
driven by automobile consumption.
If we are interested in whether there is an effect from reduced demand for automobiles
on the automobile industry, the relevant metric is the effect of purchasing power losses on
the demand for new automobiles. Figure 13 shows that consumption of new automobiles
declines sharply, reaching -1.08% in the long run, but the response is barely statistically
significant. This translates into a short-run elasticity of demand of about -0.71, which is
close to the fuel cost elasticity of -0.5 reported in Goldberg (1998) based on a structural
model and micro data.
One possible explanation is that the sectoral reallocation is not so much driven by an
19In related work, Cullen et al. (2004) use panel data from the Consumer Expenditure Survey to characterize one specific
trade-off faced by consumers, namely the “heat versus eat ” decision.
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overall reduction in the demand for cars, but by an increase in demand for energy-efficient
small cars at the expense of energy-inefficient large cars. This view seems to fit not just the
1970s, but also the 2000s, as SUVs and pick-up trucks became increasingly unattractive to
consumers. While we do not have data on the consumption of automobiles broken down
by energy efficiency, we can contrast the consumption of new domestic automobiles with
that of new foreign automobiles.20 To the extent that U.S. automobile manufacturers tend
to produce less energy-efficient cars, as was certainly the case in the 1970s, considering the
larger share of pickup trucks and SUVs in U.S. automobile production, a disproportionate
decline in the consumption of domestically-produced new cars would be evidence in favor of
a shift in demand. Figure 13 shows a strong and highly significant decline in new domestic
automobile consumption. In contrast, consumption of new foreign automobiles initially
increases, albeit insignificantly. After four months, consumption of new foreign cars slumps
as well, although the effect is not as persistent, largely insignificant, and smaller in the long
run than for domestic autos. It can be shown that the excess response of the consumption
of domestically-produced automobiles over foreign-produced automobiles is statistically
significant for months 2, 3 and 4. The excess decline reaches its maximum of -1.34%
after two months. The long run response is -0.95% and not statistically significant. An
important question is how economically significant the decline in automobile consumption
is. What the data tell us is that a shock of the magnitude associated with Hurricane
Katrina could wipe out 10.3% of the domestic demand for U.S. automobiles.
The consumption data on new automobiles do not include light trucks or heavy trucks.
A different approach to determining the importance of shifts among different types of
automobiles is to focus on unit sales data reported by the BEA. While these data ignore
the price of a given car (and hence differences in quality), they do allow us to assess
whether consumption of light trucks (including minivans, SUVs or pickup trucks) responds
differently to unanticipated losses in purchasing power than regular automobiles. There
20Domestic cars are defined by the BEA to include cars assembled in the United States, Canada, or Mexico.
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has been much discussion of the softening market for SUVs in recent years.21 Figure 13
shows no significant decline in unit auto sales (consistent with the evidence on new auto
consumption), but a significant decline in both unit light truck sales and unit heavy truck
sales, with long-run responses of -1.6% and -1.3%, respectively. This evidence strengthens
the case for the operating cost channel. Assuming that all producers of light trucks are
equally affected by such a shock, a shock associated with an event such as Hurricane
Katrina would reduce the number of light trucks sold by about 11.2%, making this channel
economically significant for U.S. companies such as Ford, GM and Chrysler, which devote
between 35% and 80% of their production to trucks.22
3.6.2 Other Consumption
Faced with a reduction in purchasing power and an increased probability of becoming
unemployed, there are several margins of adjustment available to households. One possi-
bility is to delay large expenses such as vehicle repairs or major medical treatments that
are not life-threatening. Another possibility is to economize on expenditures that have no
immediate payoff such as vehicle maintenance or preventive health care. A third possi-
bility is to forego nonessential purchases such as luxury or fashion items. For example,
consumers may choose to spend less on jewelry, expensive clothing, vacations, dining out,
lottery tickets, or entertainment. A fourth possibility is to delay major purchases such as
appliances or furniture. A fifth possibility is to search for lower-priced alternatives such
as public instead of private higher education or public transportation instead of private
transportation. In discussing the relevance of these margins of adjustment it makes sense
to group together goods and services as follows:
3.6.2.1 Other Durable Goods
The fact that payment plans for major durables constitute a long-term commitment
suggests that households will cut back on durables purchases in response to unanticipated
21For example, Douglass (2007) discusses the cooling appetite for large sports utility vehicles, as gasoline prices are rising.
22This information was obtained from unit sales and production data on the company websites.
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losses in purchasing power. Thus, we would expect to see declines in durables purchases
such as appliances, computers, furniture, video and audio goods, or household furnishings.
Many of these goods, such as video and audio goods, computers, and even new appliances
and furniture, are luxuries which households might wish to forego when their purchasing
power falls. Our results provide only very limited support for this common view, however.
For example, we find a persistent but marginally statistically insignificant decline of -0.38%
in major appliances, but only a small and statistically insignificant decline of -0.1% in small
electronic appliances. There is no evidence of a decline in expenditures on computers and
software. For video and audio goods we find a marginally significant decline of -0.67%.
Expenditures on both furniture and outdoor equipment show persistent but statisti-
cally insignificant declines with a delay of several months, reaching -0.41% and -0.55%,
respectively, after 18 months. Declines in expenditures on tools, hardware and supplies as
well as china, glassware and utensils are small and not statistically significant. Likewise,
expenditures on bicycles and on sporting equipment as well as expenditures on books and
maps show only insignificant declines, and expenditures on household furnishings show
virtually no response.
Jewelry and watches are typically viewed as luxury items. As such, consumption of
jewelry and watches is likely to be curtailed when purchasing power falls. This is exactly
what we observe. The impulse response function for jewelry and watches shows a persistent
decline in consumption of about -0.67% following the shock that is statistically significant
at all horizons.
Overall, we conclude that the consumption of durables other than motor vehicles is
not nearly as responsive to unanticipated shocks to purchasing power as one might have




While overall food expenditures do not change significantly, there are some interesting
patterns at the disaggregate level. One of the obvious margins of adjustment is for con-
sumers to spend less money dining out. We find that consumption of food in restaurants
very quickly and sharply declines by -0.25%. The decline is highly significant and very per-
sistent. The overall pattern differs from that for meals in limited service restaurants (fast
food). The latter response exhibits an immediate, but purely temporary and insignificant
drop of about -0.19%. That drop is completely reversed after four months and followed by
a flat response.
The counterpart of these responses is a short run increase in expenditures on the con-
sumption of food at home. We find a statistically significant increase in the consumption of
food and beverages at home of 0.15% in the short run and an insignificant increase of 0.09%
in the long run. Even more persistent and statistically significant is the increase in expen-
ditures on alcohol consumption at home which reaches a peak of 0.41% after one month.
This increase suggests that people consume alcohol at home rather than go out for a drink.
There is also a partially statistically significant and persistent decline in expenditures on
school lunches (-0.31%).
A second margin of adjustment involves substituting less expensive foods for high priced
foods. For example, expenditures on fresh fruits and fresh vegetables decline by -0.35% and
-0.49%, respectively, although the decline is not statistically significant. There is also a
smaller and partially statistically significant decline in the consumption of processed fruits
and vegetables (-0.23%). A partially statistically significant decline in the consumption of
fish and seafood (-0.55%) contrasts with a statistically significant increase in the consump-
tion of pork (0.90%) and poultry (0.73%), indicating that consumers substitute pork and
poultry for more expensive fish and seafood. In addition, there is a statistically insignif-
icant decline in expenditures on nonalcoholic drinks in general (-0.45%) and of tea and
coffee in particular (-0.76%). Food items such as cereals, beef and veal, eggs, and dairy
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products increase insignificantly, consistent with increased food consumption at home. The
short-run increase in bakery products by 0.15% is statistically significant. The fact that
overall food expenditures do not decline suggests that ultimately attempts to reduce food
consumption are unsuccessful.
3.6.2.3 Other Nondurables
Seemingly nonessential expenditures on toys, dolls and games show only insignificant
declines. Likewise, expenditures on sports supplies show virtually no response. Expendi-
tures on tobacco decline after a few months and reach -0.20%, but the decline is statistically
insignificant. Similarly, expenditures on cosmetics and perfume show a decline of -0.37%,
but the decline is not statistically significant.
When it comes to clothing, the line between essential and nonessential expenditures
is blurred. Total expenditures on clothing and shoes decline by about -0.25%, but the
decline is statistically significant only for months 3, 4 and 5 after the shock. The decline
in expenditures on women’s clothes is greater in the short run, but smaller in the long
run, compared to that for men’s clothes. The decline in expenditures on infants’ clothing,
while large in magnitude with an estimated peak response of -0.37%, is not statistically
significant at any horizon.
3.6.2.4 Travel, Transportation, and Tourism
It seems natural to expect that consumers will reduce their nonessential travel expen-
ditures in response to unanticipated losses in purchasing power as well as choose more
economical means of transportation. For example, it is widely believed that higher energy
prices are associated with reduced consumer demand for airline travel between cities. Per-
sonal (as opposed to business) airline travel often is a luxury which consumers are likely
to forego when their purchasing power falls. Indeed, we find that consumption of airline
tickets falls by -0.79% with a delay of three months. The reduction is very persistent and
highly statistically significant. This result implies that a Katrina-sized shock would reduce
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personal airline travel by about -5.4%.
Expenditures on intercity railway travel increase persistently by 0.5%, but the response
is not statistically significant. Expenditures on intercity bus travel rise sharply upon im-
pact, reaching a highly statistically significant peak of 1.5% after one month before the
response falls to 0.7% and becomes insignificant. This pattern is clear evidence of a shift
in expenditure patterns away from private transportation.
As far as local transportation is concerned, we find insignificant declines in expenditures
on taxi cabs and in bridge, tunnel, ferry and road tolls. Like in the case of intercity
bus travel, there is a sharp and statistically significant increase in expenditures on mass
transit (local bus, metro, subway) on impact, but that increase is purely temporary and
insignificant after three months. The temporary nature of the response suggests that
consumers switch to mass transit at first, but soon decide that the added inconvenience is
not worth the savings.
Combining local and intercity transportation, we find a highly significant decline in
expenditures on transportation after half a year that reaches -0.52% after 18 months. As
consumers reduce their travel, one would expect expenditures on tourism to be hit hard.
For example, according to The Detroit News, “Michigan’s dismal economy and record
setting gasoline prices are the main culprits in an expected decline in the state’s tourism
industry this year” (see Greenwood 2006). Expenditures on tourism may fall for several
reasons. First, recreation and vacations may be viewed as luxuries, so households will
cut back on this type of consumption before other forms of consumption such as food,
clothing, household supplies, or education. Second, the complementarity with automobile
travel makes recreation and vacation consumption more expensive when energy prices, and
specifically gasoline prices, rise. Consistent with this line of reasoning we find a large and




The decline in total expenditures on higher education of about -0.14% is largely sta-
tistically insignificant. Further disaggregation suggests a shift in expenditure patterns,
however, along the lines conjectured earlier. Whereas expenditures on private higher ed-
ucation decline insignificantly by -0.23%, expenditures on public higher education rise in-
significantly by 0.14%, in line with the view that consumers substitute lower-priced public
universities for higher-priced private universities. Whereas expenditures on elementary
and secondary schools decline only slightly and not significantly, expenditures on nursery
schools show a marginally significant decline of -0.75% in the long run. This pattern is
consistent with the view that an increase in unemployment reduces the need for nursery
schools. Expenditures on vocational schools show a highly significant decline of -0.74% in
the long run. The relatively strong (if insignificant) response of expenditures on higher
education suggests the presence of a precautionary savings motive. We conclude that
households reduce their investment in forms of education that may be considered discre-
tionary such as nursery schools, vocational training, or private higher education.
3.6.2.6 Health Care
The response of household health care expenditures to unanticipated losses in purchas-
ing power may be mitigated by a number factors. First, many forms of health care are
necessities that are unlikely to be reduced in response to purchasing power losses. Second,
households with health insurance face a very low marginal cost to consuming health care
goods and services, and are therefore unlikely to face a trade off between health care and
energy consumption. While some households pay for health insurance out of their own
pocket, and might decide to reduce or eliminate their coverage in order to meet higher
energy costs, many households benefit from employer-sponsored or government-sponsored
coverage and would not be required to do this. Thus, one would expect a loss in purchas-
ing power to reduce only those health care items that are typically not covered by health
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insurance or require a large deductible.
The data show that expenditures on health care typically only react with some delay
to unanticipated losses in purchasing power. There is a clear, but largely insignificant
decline in expenditures on eye exams of -0.47%, consistent with a reduction of expenditures
on preventive health care. Similarly, while expenditures on physicians remain constant,
expenditures on dentists decline by -0.16%, albeit not significantly so. The response of
expenditures on medical care is largely flat. The decline in expenditures on prescription
drugs as well as on nonprescription drugs of up to -0.20% and -0.13%, respectively, is not
statistically significant. Expenditures on home health care do not decline significantly
either. Overall, we find only weak evidence of consumers adjusting their health care
expenditures, consistent with the notion that most of these expenditures are necessities
and largely covered by health insurance.
3.6.2.7 Entertainment and Leisure
Somewhat surprisingly, there is no significant decline in total expenditures on recreation.
The response is largely flat, negligible in magnitude and statistically insignificant. More
specifically, we find no significant effect on the consumption of movies, bowling and billiard,
casino gambling and only insignificant declines for recreational camps, sightseeing, spectator
sports, and spectator amusements. Thus, entertainment expenditures seem remarkably
robust to shocks to purchasing power. We observe statistically significant declines only for
purchases of lottery tickets (-1.2%) and expenditures on theater tickets (-0.62%).
These results contradict common perceptions. For example, we would expect fewer
consumers to go to the movies, both because going to the movies involves driving and
because watching movies in theaters is relatively expensive compared to renting movies
or watching them on television. Similarly, the lack of responsiveness of expenditures on
sightseeing and spectator amusements and sports (known to be expensive in many cases),




An important component of services is telecommunications. While households may
opt not to eliminate cable television service, they can chose to downgrade their service
by eliminating premium channel options. Telephone service is more of a necessity, but
households can save money by foregoing options such as call-waiting and caller-id or by
substituting land lines for cell phones. Furthermore, cell phone subscribers can save money
by eliminating optional service features and reducing their minutes. In contrast to these
hypotheses, our results show no significant decline in cable tv expenditures or local and
cellular telephone service, suggesting that households view these services as essential. Nor
is there a significant change in expenditures on internet service providers.
However, we find a persistent decline in expenditures on personal business that is statis-
tically significant for the first six months. The long-run decline in overall personal business
expenditures is -0.22%. Particularly responsive are expenditures on brokerage charges and
investment counseling which decline by -1.39%. The decline is partially statistically sig-
nificant.
Another service on which households may choose to economize is insurance services.
Households may economize by letting contracts lapse, by switching to less expensive
providers, and by choosing higher deductibles or lower levels of coverage. We find no
statistically significant or large responses of expenditures on auto insurance or household
insurance.
A last group of services relates to maintenance and upkeep. We find a reduction of about
-0.30% in expenditures on vehicle tires and parts that is partially statistically significant.
There is also a highly statistically significant drop of -0.56% in the consumption of vehicle
repair services, consistent with the notion that consumers delay repairs when faced with
an unanticipated loss of purchasing power. We also find a marginally significant decline of
-0.52% of expenditures on personal care such as repair services, dry-cleaning, barbershops,
beauty parlors and health clubs.
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3.7 Summary and Implications
Based on the evidence presented so far, there are three distinct effects of an unan-
ticipated change in purchasing power driven by higher energy prices. Consider a loss of
purchasing power corresponding to an unanticipated 1% increase in energy prices in a given
month. First, taking account of the response of fuel consumption to higher energy prices,
the effect of the resulting changes in discretionary income after one year can be bounded by
-0.04%. In addition, expectations of deteriorating economic conditions are associated with
an increase in precautionary savings that causes real consumption of nondurables to fall
by an additional -0.08%, services by an additional -0.07% and durables by an additional
-0.16% (although only the effect on services is statistically significant). The latter effect
is important in that it explains how the effect of energy price changes may be larger than
would be expected based on small share of energy in consumer expenditures. Finally, rising
operating costs will cause real consumption of vehicles to fall by an additional -0.60% in
the long run. The short-run response of vehicles consumption may be as high as -0.65%.
Combining these effects, our baseline model predicts a reduction of total consumption of
-0.15% after one year.23
3.7.1 Understanding the 1986 Episode: Where is the Boom?
Our results suggest that Hamilton (1988) was correct that expenditures on consumer
durables that are complementary in use to energy (such as cars) are sensitive to even small
energy price fluctuations. We showed that indeed there is a strong decline in the real
consumption of motor vehicles in response to unanticipated purchasing power losses. This
decline accounts for much of the anomalous response of consumer durables and generates
increased aggregate unemployment. However, there is no evidence in the real consumption
23These estimates presume that households respond proportionately to changes in energy prices. As discussed in section 4,
an alternative assumption would be that households respond symmetrically to net changes in purchasing power. In that case,
it is not clear how to bound the discretionary income effect, which in turn makes it impossible to gauge the precautionary
savings effect. Moreover, the estimated responses from this alternative model cannot be compared directly to those from the
baseline model, since the nature of the shocks is different. Nevertheless, we find the same qualitative patterns as in Figure 9.
The responses of total consumption and of all major consumption components are negative and statistically significant. The
estimated response of durables far exceeds that of nondurables and services. When durables are broken down further into
vehicles and other durables, the latter response is relatively small and statistically insignificant, whereas the former response
is large and highly statistically significant.
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or consumer expectations data that changes in the demand for vehicles cause a sectoral
reallocation effect that amplifies the effect of energy price increases and counteracts the
effect of energy price decreases, as postulated in Hamilton’s model. This conclusion may
seem surprising, but it is consistent with the fact that only vehicles consumption expe-
riences a dramatic decline in response to losses in purchasing power and that the U.S.
automobile industry only accounts for about 1% of aggregate U.S. employment and 1% of
real U.S. GDP. Thus, even if there is a drastic decline in the demand for U.S. automobiles,
the effect on other parts of the economy is likely to be small in scale, which may account
for our inability to detect a reallocation effect in the data.
There are other reasons, however, for the popularity of models that embody a realloca-
tion effect. One reason is that there was no noticeable economic expansion after the sharp
fall in crude oil prices in 1986. This evidence seems hard to reconcile with the perception
that rising crude oil prices in 1979 contributed to a sharp economic downturn, unless one
appeals to a model with asymmetric responses to energy price changes (see, e.g., Balke,
Brown, Yücel 2002; Gramlich 2004). The theoretical model of Hamilton (1988) and subse-
quent empirical work by Davis and Haltiwanger (2001) and others, seemed to provide an
explanation for this puzzling asymmetry. A common view is that this asymmetry in the
data simply necessitates the existence of a large reallocation effect. Although this view is
appealing upon casual inspection of the data, it misses important pieces of the puzzle.
It is useful to be explicit about the counterfactual. The implicit premise in this literature
is that it suffices to compare economic performance before and after the collapse of OPEC.
Clearly, however, we need to compare what actually happened in 1986 to what would have
happened without the sharp fall in energy prices (rather than to the status-quo-ante).
This question may be answered based on historical decompositions of the real consumption
data. Historical decompositions measure the cumulative effect of the historically observed
sequence of purchasing power shocks on the level of real consumption at each point in
time. Quantifying this effect is important because it conveys information that cannot
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be gleaned from impulse response estimates. Sometimes, energy price increases come in
clusters, and at other times energy price increases may alternate with decreases. The
cumulative effect on real consumption is a weighted average of the entire history of shocks
up to a given point in time. We compute this effect based on the bivariate VAR model
estimates of section 5. Figure 14 shows the actual (demeaned) real consumption growth
rates and the consumption growth rates predicted based on the cumulative effect of the
purchasing power shocks alone. The difference between the two series measures the extent
to which consumption growth is not explained by purchasing power shocks. To improve
the readability of the plot, we have converted all growth rates to quarterly averages (upper
panel) and annual averages (lower panel). The quarterly series has been annualized.
It is instructive to compare the annual results for 1979 and 1986. In 1979, purchasing
power declined by -1.69% due to energy price increases, whereas in 1986 purchasing power
increased by +1.43% due to energy price decreases. Thus one would expect the effect
on real consumption to be roughly symmetric. As shown in Figure 14, the VAR model
implies that rising energy prices (all else equal) lowered real consumption growth by -1.92%
in 1979, and raised it by +2.02% in 1986, making these effects nearly symmetric. Moreover,
actual real consumption growth in 1979 was −2.20% relative to its mean, whereas in 1986
it was +1.44%. Thus, energy prices alone are capable of explaining a substantial part of
observed real consumption growth in 1979 and 1986.
Figure 14 also provides two additional insights. First, energy price shocks were respon-
sible for substantial declines (defined as an effect on the real consumption growth rate in
excess of -0.65%) in consumption growth in 1974, 1979/80, 1990 and 2004/05, but they
also caused large increases in real consumption growth (defined as an effect on the growth
rate in excess of +0.65%) in 1986, 1991, 1998 and 2001. Second, a substantial part of real
consumption growth is not associated with energy prices. Notably, the pattern of excess
consumption growth in the 1970s is consistent with go-and-stop monetary policies of the
type described in Barsky and Kilian (2002) and the unusually low growth in 1980-82 and
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1990-91 is at best partially explained by energy prices and suggests an important role
for monetary policy under Paul Volcker. Likewise, the unusually high growth of 1984-85,
1996-1999, and 2004 cannot be attributed mainly to energy prices.
3.7.2 Toward an Alternative Explanation of the 1986 Episode
The observed behavior of real consumption growth in 1979 and 1986 contrasts sharply
with that of real GDP growth. Real GDP growth was -1.81% relative to its mean in 1979
and was -0.31% relative to its mean in 1986 (see Table 3). Thus, the asymmetry alluded to
earlier does exist in real GDP growth, but is not reflected in real consumption growth. The
comparison of the 1979 and 1986 growth rates of real GDP and its components in Table
3 reveals that the source of the asymmetry in real GDP growth lies in private investment.
More specifically, real nonresidential investment in equipment and structures are the two
key components that caused real GDP growth in 1986 to be so low. In 1979, they grew
by -2.80% and +7.54% relative to their means, respectively, whereas in 1986 they grew
by -4.65% and -16.35%. The behavior of firms’ investment expenditures in 1986 contrasts
sharply with that of private residential fixed investment and consumption.
There are two potential explanations for this pattern. One explanation is that energy
price shocks have asymmetric effects on firms’ fixed investment expenditures.24 Such an
explanation seems implausible for several reasons. First, while there is some apparent
evidence of asymmetries in the point estimates of the nonresidential fixed investment re-
sponses (not shown), the type of asymmetry found in these responses (and of business
investment in structures in particular) does not conform to what we would expect to see
if these responses were driven by the uncertainty effect of Bernanke (1983). Specifically,
the response to purchasing power losses is near zero, whereas the response to gains is
strongly negative. Second, there is no statistically significant evidence against symmetry
in the nonresidential fixed investment responses. For all specifications already considered
in section 4, we fail to reject the null of symmetric responses to positive and negative
24Some industry-level evidence of the effect of energy price shocks on inventory investment has been presented in recent
work by Herrera (2006). The overall importance of such channels at the aggregate level remains an active area of research.
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shocks with p-values in the range from 0.66 to 0.91.25 Third, the mechanisms commonly
discussed in support of an asymmetric response of nonresidential fixed investment (such
as the Bernanke (1983) uncertainty effect on durables) should apply equally to consumer
durables and to firms’ purchases of durables. If firms’ fixed investment responds much
more asymmetrically to energy price changes than durables consumption and real residen-
tial fixed investment, then it must do so for unrelated reasons. It is unclear what economic
mechanism would explain such an asymmetry in the responses of firms’ fixed investment
expenditures. Finally, one would expect an asymmetric effect on nonresidential fixed in-
vestment to be reflected in similarly asymmetric responses of aggregate unemployment and
therefore consumer expectations, consumer expenditures and residential fixed investment.
We have already shown that there is no compelling evidence to support this conjecture.
An alternative and more plausible explanation is that a drop in firms’ investment ex-
penditures not related to the preceding fall in energy prices caused the 1986 boom to fizzle.
That explanation is consistent with the fact that the growth rate of firms’ real investment
expenditures fell much more in 1986 than in 1979 (see Table 3). Such a pattern is incon-
sistent with conventional explanations of asymmetric investment responses. As we pointed
out in section 4, the response to purchasing power gains cannot be larger in absolute terms
than the response to purchasing power losses and typically will be smaller. Even in the
complete absence of direct effects on investment expenditures, the effect of an increase
in energy prices and a decrease in energy prices of the same size should be of the same
magnitude in absolute terms. In contrast, the data show that firms’ real investment in
structures actually increased by 7.54% relative to trend in 1979 (which is completely at
odds with the uncertainty effect), but fell by -16.35% relative to trend in 1986. Investment
expenditures on equipment declined in both years, but they declined much more in 1986
than in 1979, which again casts doubt on the presence of an asymmetric effect.
25For the quarterly VAR models, our default choice is a lag order of 2. Our analysis is based on the premise that innovations
to purchasing power changes (or their transformations) can be treated as predetermined with respect to the quarterly
macroeconomic aggregates. For a more detailed analysis of the response of nonresidential fixed investment expenditures to
energy price shocks see Edelstein and Kilian (2007).
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A natural candidate for such an exogenous shift in investment expenditures is the 1986
Tax Reform Act, which sharply raised the effective tax rate for many corporations by
severely curtailing deductions for capital expenditures and by eliminating the investment
tax credit. For most types of equipment, the repeal of the investment tax credit, which
became effective in the first quarter of 1986, amounted to the elimination of a 10% subsidy
on investment. This fact helps explain the sharp drop in nonresidential fixed investment
expenditures on equipment in 1986.26
The even larger drop in nonresidential fixed investment in structures is unlikely to be
explained by the repeal of the investment tax credit alone because it was offset by other
changes in the tax code and because business investment dropped even in sectors that were
not subject to the investment tax credit prior to 1986 (see, e.g., Auerbach 1987). Further
disaggregation of the BEA data reveals that the decline in nonresidential investment in
structures is concentrated in two components. The first component is commercial space
(including office space) and manufacturing structures, which account for 21 percent and 6
percent of total real nonresidential investment in structures, respectively A likely explana-
tion is that the elimination of real estate tax shelters as part of the 1986 Tax Reform Act
contributed to the observed 17 percent drop (relative to the average growth rate) in these
two components in 1986 (see Survey of Current Business 1987, p. 4).
The second component is nonresidential investment in mining exploration, shafts and
wells. That component accounts for about 11 percent of all nonresidential investment in
structures and mainly comprises investments in the petroleum, natural gas and coal mining
industry. In fact, one third of the total decline in real business investment in structures
can be accounted for by the dramatic 65 percent drop of this component in 1986 (relative
to the average growth rate). While one would expect some decline in investment in these
industries in response to falling energy prices, this particular drop was swifter and larger
than the corresponding increase in investment in the domestic petroleum and natural gas
26For details of the timing of the 1986 Tax Reform Act see Wakefield (1987). We thank Chris House for providing us
with the detailed investment tax credit data used in House and Shapiro (2006) and constructed by Jorgenson using methods
detailed in Jorgenson and Yun (1991).
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industry observed after 1979. This asymmetric reaction is consistent with the view that the
market treated the breakdown of OPEC in late 1985 as an exogenous shock and responded
more strongly than it would have based on the fall of energy prices alone. The evidence
is also consistent with the view that there were limited investment opportunities in the
domestic petroleum, natural gas and coal mining industry after 1979, making the response
of this component of real GDP growth inherently asymmetric (but in the opposite direction
of the asymmetries previously discussed in the literature on oil and the macroeconomy).
Thus, there are good reasons for the existence of an asymmetry between 1979 and 1986
in the real GDP growth data. The Tax Reform Act of 1986 and the unprecedented fall in
investment in the oil and gas industry also help explain why real consumption did not grow
quite as much in 1986 as predicted by the econometric model on the basis of falling energy
prices alone and why unemployment remained higher than it would have been otherwise.
3.7.3 Discussion
The evidence presented in this section implies that the standard view in the literature
of how energy price shocks affect the U.S. economy has to be reconsidered. The conven-
tional wisdom is that a fall in energy prices will have only weak effects on output and
employment, as the increase in aggregate demand will be offset by the reallocation effect
of changing expenditure patterns. In contrast, when the price of energy increases, both
effects work in the same direction, amplifying the response of output and unemployment.
This explanation rationalized both a sharp contraction following energy price increases,
and the absence of an economic expansion following energy price decreases. Without an
allocative channel, however, one of the chief mechanisms whereby energy price increases
in theory can create large economic downturns is inoperative, making it more difficult to
rationalize the economic downturns of 1974 and 1979/80 based on adverse energy price
shocks. Despite the absence of an allocative channel, the cumulative effect of energy price
shocks on real consumption can be important. As we have shown, both the precautionary
savings effect and the operating cost effect help elevate the level of the responses of real
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consumption beyond the limits sets by the energy share in consumption and the elastic-
ity of energy demand. Nevertheless, energy price shocks are by no means the dominant
explanation of real consumption growth in 1974, 1979-81, 1990, or for that matter since
2003.
3.7.4 Has Real Consumption Become Less Responsive to Purchasing Power Shocks?
It has been widely observed that energy price shocks do not appear to affect the U.S.
economy as much as we used to think.27 Figure 15 quantifies this phenomenon by compar-
ing responses of consumption aggregates estimated on the first half (1970.2-1987.12) and
the second half of our sample (1988.1-2006.7). Otherwise, the models are identical to the
models used in section 5. The scale of the impulses has been normalized to be the same
across the two samples as for the full sample. Figure 15 shows that, compared to the first
half of the sample, in the second half the long-run response of total real consumption drops
from -0.46% to -0.12%. The corresponding decline for durables is from -1.27% to -0.37%.
Vehicles consumption declines by -1.99% in the first half of the sample and by -0.74% in the
second half of the sample. The decline in durables consumption excluding vehicles shrinks
from -0.67% in the first half of the sample to -0.02% in the second half. The response of
nondurables shrinks from -0.44% to -0.03% and that of services from -0.28% to -0.10%.
These responses are in general consistent with reductions in consumption that one would
expect from the discretionary income effect. A similar reduction occurs in the response
of quarterly real residential fixed investment (not shown). The long-run response drops
from -7.1% to -2.0%. Finally, the rise in unemployment associated with an unanticipated
purchasing power loss drops from 2.32% to 0.55%.
There are several possible explanations for the declining importance of energy price
shocks. One conjecture is that this result is related to the declining share of energy in
consumption in the late 1980s and 1990s that we have documented in section 2. This
27A weakening of the statistical relationship between oil prices and the U.S. economy in the mid-1980s has been noted,
for example, by Hooker (1996b, p. 222) and Davis and Haltiwanger (2001, p. 482). There is also a widely held view among
policymakers that the surges in oil prices in the 1970s and 1980s had much more prononced economic effects than the more
recent increases (see, e.g., Bernanke 2004).
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conjecture is not obvious since the share of energy has been rising recently, as shown in
Figure 2. More importantly, since our results are based on innovations in purchasing power
changes rather than innovations in energy price changes, they already control for changes
in the expenditure share of energy.
A second conjecture is that the variability of purchasing power shocks may have declined
in the second half of the sample. Our analysis shows that actually the variability of both
total changes and linearly unpredictable changes in purchasing power has increased in the
second half of the sample. The innovation standard deviation increased from 0.08 to 0.11.
The average size of positive innovations increased from 0.056 to 0.076, and the average size
of negative innovations increased from -0.049 to -0.073. Moreover, both the maximum and
the minimum of the innovations increased.
A third and more plausible explanation is that the structure of the U.S. automobile
industry has changed. In the 1970s, U.S. auto manufacturers were simply not producing
any small, energy-efficient cars, leaving consumers with no choice but to buy small cars from
abroad. Thus, the U.S. auto industry was hit particularly hard by rising energy prices and
falling demand for large cars (see, e.g., Bresnahan and Ramey 1993, Davis and Haltiwanger
2001). In contrast, by the late 1980s and 1990s the differences between domestic and foreign
auto producers had been greatly reduced, as domestic auto manufacturers offered small and
energy efficient cars of their own, while foreign manufacturers were beginning to branch
out into the market for jeeps, SUVs, vans and pickup trucks. Thus, the U.S. auto industry
became relatively less vulnerable to energy price increases than in the 1970s.
This point is illustrated by comparing the responses of new domestic and foreign auto-
mobiles in each subsample (see Figure 16). Whereas in the first subsample expenditures on
new domestic automobiles drop by -4.2% after two months and by -2.6% in the long run, in
the second half the short-run response drops to -1.1% and the long-run response to -0.5%.
The strongly significant short-run decline in the first sample is only marginally significant
in the second sample. In contrast, in the first half of the sample, after one month expen-
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ditures on new foreign automobiles rise significantly by 2.0%, followed by an insignificant
decline of -1.5% after five months and a long-run response of -0.5%. In the second half
of the sample, the initial increase in the response has become small and insignificant, the
decline after 5 months has shrunk to -0.6% and the long-run response to -0.2%. While it
is still true that the consumption of new domestic autos is more responsive to energy price
shocks than the consumption of new foreign autos, the differences are much smaller than
they used to be.
There is also a fourth and complementary explanation. As the U.S. automobile industry
restructured itself after the energy price increases of the 1970s, the share of domestically
produced automobiles in total U.S. real expenditures on new cars declined (from 88% in
1970 to 60% in 1988 and 57% in 2006), as did the employment share of the industry (from a
peak of 1.3% in 1973 to 0.9% in 1988 and 2005).28 Thus, the relative importance of the auto
industry for the U.S. economy and the potential for spillovers from the automobile industry
to other sectors has declined relative to the 1970s, further reducing the precautionary
savings effect.
3.8 Conclusion
There is an ongoing interest in understanding the effects of energy price shocks on
the economy. Some of the most compelling evidence on this question has come from
documenting the adjustments of output and employment at the industry and plant level
to energy price shocks (see, e.g., Davis and Haltiwanger 2001, Lee and Ni 2002). This
type of work was motivated by the view that unexpected energy price changes result in
allocative disturbances because of their effects on expenditure patterns of households and
firms. Such shocks in principle can have dynamic effects that far exceed the importance
of energy for the economy as measured by the energy share in expenditures.
It is widely accepted that in the absence of a major disruption in spending by consumers
28See http://bea.gov/bea. There are no data on the share of the automobile industry in real value added prior to 1987.
The current share of 1.1% is only slightly lower than in 1987.
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and firms, the effects of energy price shocks on the economy will be small. In this paper
we studied in detail the response of personal consumption expenditures to unanticipated
purchasing power shocks triggered by fluctuating energy prices. On the basis of the evi-
dence presented in this paper, we concluded that the standard view of how energy price
shocks affect the U.S. economy has to be reconsidered.
First, whereas asymmetric responses play a central role in theoretical models of the
transmission of energy price shocks, we found no compelling statistical evidence of asym-
metries. Specifically, we found no evidence for an uncertainty effect on the consumption of
durables of the type discussed by Bernanke (1983) in the context of investment problems
nor did we find evidence of the reallocation effect stressed in Hamilton (1988) and Bres-
nahan and Ramey (1993). While we did find evidence of changing expenditure patterns
based on a detailed analysis of more than 130 expenditure items, which is a necessary
condition for an reallocation effect, we showed that aggregate consumer spending and its
major components as well as consumer expectations data do not respond in the directions
one would expect if the allocative channel of transmission were quantitatively important.
The apparent absence of a reallocation effect on real consumption, despite comparatively
large effects of purchasing power shocks on the consumption of new domestically produced
automobiles in particular, is consistent with the small share of the U.S. automobile industry
in domestic real GDP and employment.
Second, we showed that despite the absence of the uncertainty and reallocation effects,
the responses of real consumption aggregates are larger than suggested by the effects
of unanticipated changes in discretionary income alone. The excess responses can be
attributed to shifts in precautionary savings and to changes in the operating cost of energy-
using durables. We quantified each of these effects. The combined effect of a one-time 1%
increase in energy prices in a given month is a statistically significant decline in real total
consumption of -0.15% one year later.
Third, energy price shocks were shown to have contributed substantially both to the
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decline in consumption in 1979, amidst sharply rising energy prices, and to its recovery in
1986 after the collapse of OPEC. This result runs counter to the conventional wisdom that
the U.S. economy’s response to the decline in energy prices in 1986 was muted, whereas its
response to the 1979 energy price increases was strong. We showed that this perception is
at odds with the largely symmetric pattern of real consumption growth in 1979 and 1986.
This pattern contrasts sharply with the asymmetric pattern of real GDP growth in 1979
and 1986. Further data analysis suggested that an exogenous drop in nonresidential fixed
investment expenditures related to the 1986 Tax Reform Act was mainly responsible for
the low rate of real GDP growth in 1986. This effect was exacerbated by the response of
investment in the petroleum and natural gas industry to the collapse of OPEC in late 1985,
which (for reasons detailed in the paper) appears asymmetric in the opposite direction from
the asymmetries previously discussed in the literature on oil and the macroeconomy.
Fourth, our analysis sheds light on the declining importance of energy price shocks
for the U.S. economy. We documented the extent to which consumption aggregates have
become less responsive to energy price shocks since the mid-1980s. The effect of an unan-
ticipated 1% increase in energy prices on total real consumption one year later drops from
-0.30% in the first half of the sample to only -0.08% in the second half. We traced the
declining importance of energy price shocks relative to the 1970s to changes in the compo-
sition of U.S. automobile production and to the declining overall importance of the U.S.
automobile sector.
The sharp rise in gasoline prices in recent years has renewed interest in the question
of how much higher energy prices affect consumer expenditures. Our analysis allows us
to assess the overall effect of such a price increase on household consumption. Suppose,
for example, that gasoline prices unexpectedly and permanently increase by 25 cents per
gallon (which translates into a 6.85% increase in the overall price of energy, assuming all
other energy prices remain unchanged). If a typical household spends $200 a month on
gasoline at the January 2007 price of $2.29 per gallon, this would raise the household’s
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gasoline bill by almost $22 a month, if the household continued to consume the same
amount of gasoline. In response to such a shock, a typical household with about $4000 to
spend per month will have cut back its expenditures one year later by $35 based on the
full-sample estimates (or by $17 based on the post-1987 estimates). Most of the adjustment
will take place in the first six months following the gasoline price increase. Given a share
of consumption in GDP of about 72%, this implies that, all else equal, real GDP will have
fallen by 0.63% one year after the shock. This example illustrates that it takes repeated
surprise increases in gasoline prices to generate large effects on household consumption.
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Table 3.1: Predicted Response of Non-Energy Consumption
to an Increase in Energy Prices
θ = 1 θ ∈ [0, 1)
ρ = 0 No Response No Response
ρ ∈ (0, 1) No Response Positive Response
ρ < 0 No Response Negative Response
In the model of section 3, θ is the fraction of aggregate energy rev-
enues that is transferred to U.S. consumers as supplemental income.
ρ is the elasticity of substitution between energy and non-energy





























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































   
   



























   
   
   
   













   
   
   
   














   
   
















































































































Figure 3.2: Monthly Nominal Expenditure Share: 1970.1-2006.7
 



















Figure 3.3: Monthly Loss in Purchasing Power: 1970.2-2006.7 





































Figure 3.4: Alternative Measures of Purchasing Power Gains and Losses: 1970.2-2006.7 
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Figure 3.6: Response of Unemployment Rate to Purchasing Power Shocks: 1970.2-2006.7 
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Figure 3.7: Response of Consumer Expectations to Purchasing Power Shocks: 1978.1 -2006.5 
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Figure 3.8: Response of Purchasing Power to an Unanticipated Purchasing Power Shock: 1970.2-2006.7 






















































































































































































































































































































































Figure 3.12: Response of Consumer Expectations to a Purchasing Power Shock: 1978.1-2006.5 
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Figure 3.16: Response of New Auto Consumption to a Purchasing Power Shock 
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The Response of Business Fixed Investment to Changes in
Energy Prices: A Test of Some Hypotheses About the
Transmission of Energy Price Shocks
4.1 Introduction
It is widely accepted that in the absence of a major disruption in consumers’ and firms’
expenditures, the effects of energy price shocks on the U.S. economy are bound to be small
(see Hamilton 2005). In related work, Edelstein and Kilian (2007) have investigated the
response of consumers’ expenditures to changes in energy prices, including the response
of residential fixed investment. Little is known, however, about the response of firms’
investment expenditures with the notable exception of Herrera’s (2006) work on inventory
adjustments in response to energy price shocks. This paper will investigate in detail how
nonresidential fixed investment in structures and in equipment responds to changes in
energy prices.
There are two main channels by which energy price shocks may affect nonresidential
fixed investment. One channel is the increase in the marginal cost of production associated
with an increase in energy prices. This cost channel depends on the cost share of energy.
A second channel operates through reduced demand for the firm’s output, as consumer
expenditures fall in response to rising energy prices (see Edelstein and Kilian 2007).
The response of nonresidential fixed investment need not be symmetric in energy price
changes. For example, changes in energy prices are thought to create uncertainty about fu-
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ture energy prices, causing firms to postpone irreversible investment decisions (see Bernanke
1983 and Pindyck 1991). This uncertainty effect has implications for both supply-side and
demand-side accounts of the transmission of energy price shocks. Specifically, firms may
respond to uncertainty about future production costs or to uncertainty about future sales
and revenue. In either case, when energy prices rise, the uncertainty effect will reinforce
the decline in firms’ investment expenditures due to reduced consumer demand and higher
energy costs. When energy prices fall, in contrast, the uncertainty effect counteracts the
increase in investment expenditures driven by lower costs and increased consumer demand,
dampening the increase in investment spending.
Models of asymmetric transmission mechanisms such as the uncertainty effect have been
widely used in the empirical literature on oil prices to explain the apparent breakdown of
the linear relationship between real GDP growth and oil prices in the mid-1980s (see, e.g.,
Mork 1989, Hooker 1996). This breakdown became apparent after the collapse of OPEC
in late 1985, when crude oil prices plummeted, yet the U.S. economy failed to boom. As
Edelstein and Kilian (2007) show, the weak economic growth of 1986 was not caused by
weak growth in household consumption or residential fixed investment. Rather it can be
traced to an unprecedented drop in the growth rate of firms’ fixed investment. Thus, it
is natural to investigate the possibility that nonresidential fixed investment may respond
asymmetrically to energy price shocks.
In this paper, we allow for a variety of different measures of energy price shocks includ-
ing percent changes in energy prices, large percent changes and net percent changes. We
perform formal statistical tests for the presence of asymmetry in the response of nonresi-
dential fixed investment to energy price shocks of different sign, but the same magnitude.
Symmetry in this context means that the sum of the impulse response function to energy
price increases and of the impulse response function to energy price decreases is jointly
equal to zero at all horizons. The existing literature has not assessed the evidence for asym-
metries by formal statistical tests of the symmetry assumption. One common approach
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is to include oil price increases and decreases as separate variables in a single-equation
model for output growth, and to perform a Wald test for the equality of the coefficients on
the lags of these variables (see, e.g., Mork 1989, Dotsey and Reid 1992, Hooker 1996, and
Hooker 2002). A drawback of this approach is that this test only alerts us to differences
in the slope coefficients, whereas we are really interested in whether the impulse responses
to positive and negative energy price shocks are different. Another common approach has
been simply to inspect the point estimates of the impulse response functions without for-
mal testing (see, e.g., Davis and Haltiwanger 2001). That comparison, however, tells us
nothing about the statistical significance of the difference. Nor do tests for pointwise sta-
tistical significance of the differences in the impulse response function constitute a formal
test of the symmetry assumption.
The question of whether nonresidential fixed investment responds symmetrically to
energy prices increases and decreases has not been addressed in the literature. Our study
is the first to provide a detailed examination of the components of nonresidential fixed
investment in structures and equipment. Using the BEA’s National Income and Product
Account data, we study the responses of nonresidential investment in structures (including
commercial and health care, manufacturing, power and communication, mining, and other
structures) and in equipment (including information processing, industrial,transportation,
mining and oil field machinery, and all other equipment). Special attention is given to
mining and oil field machinery and to mining structures devoted to petroleum, coal and
natural gas exploration and extraction.
We show that the apparent asymmetry in the estimated responses of business fixed
investment in equipment and structures cannot be reconciled with standard theoretical
explanations of asymmetric responses. Rather this evidence is an artifact (1) of the ag-
gregation of mining-related expenditures by the petroleum industry and all other expen-
ditures, and (2) of ignoring an exogenous shift in investment mainly caused by the 1986
Tax Reform Act. After controlling for these factors, formal statistical tests are unable to
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reject the hypothesis of symmetric responses to energy price shocks for all components of
investment in structures. For equipment there is weak statistical evidence of asymmetries
in some components, but not in total investment in equipment. Thus, there is no empirical
support for theoretical models of the uncertainty effect on business fixed investment expen-
ditures such as Bernanke (1983) or Pindyck (1991) nor is there support for the reallocation
effect emphasized in Hamilton (1988).
Once symmetry is imposed and petroleum-industry related expenditures are excluded,
the estimated response of business fixed investment in equipment and structures is small
and statistically insignificant. Our conclusions are in most cases robust to defining energy
price shocks in terms of percent changes, large percent changes or net percent changes
in energy prices; they are also robust to using alternative measures of energy prices and
to weighting energy prices by the energy share in value added. Historical decompositions
show that for most forms of investment in structures and equipment, the contribution of
energy price shocks historically has been negligible. For mining and oil field machinery the
cumulative contribution of energy price shocks has been somewhat larger. An even larger
cumulative effect is obtained for mining structures (which consist mainly of structures
devoted to the exploration and extraction of petroleum, natural gas and coal).
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we propose a measure
of intermediate energy prices that forms the basis of our analysis. We further document the
evolution of the share of energy inputs in U.S. value added, and we summarize the results
of various sensitivity analyses we conducted. In section 3 we investigate the evidence for
asymmetric responses of business fixed investment to energy price shocks. Building on
the results of sections 3, in section 4 we impose symmetry in estimating the response of
nonresidential fixed investment in structures and in equipment. That same model is also
used to quantify the cumulative contribution of energy price shocks to fluctuations in real
nonresidential fixed investment. We conclude in section 5.
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4.2 Specification of the Energy Price Series
Since there is no evidence for an asymmetric effect of energy price changes on con-
sumption, as shown in Edelstein and Kilian (2007), if business investment does respond
asymmetrically to changes in energy prices, then it must be due to uncertainty about fu-
ture energy costs. This point has implications for the specification of energy price shocks
in the context of this paper. There is reason to believe that crude oil prices do not reflect
the energy costs faced by firms. Few firms use crude oil as an input to production. Rather
firms tend to purchase refined petroleum products such as gasoline or heating oil, or they
rely on electricity and natural gas. Hence, we focus on a broad measure of energy prices
in the form of the BLS producer price of processed fuels and lubricants. The choice of this
index is not innocuous. Indeed, it is plausible that a given change in energy prices may
affect firms differently from households. Whereas the latter’s purchasing power depends
primarily on the price of motor fuels such as gasoline, as documented in Edelstein and Kil-
ian (2007), firms depend to a much greater extent on electric power and natural gas. Our
approach differs from much of the earlier literature which has focused on shocks to crude
oil prices (see, e.g., Davis and Haltiwanger 2001; Hamilton 2003; Lee and Ni 2002). By
focusing on crude oil prices, these studies potentially omit important price shocks caused
in the process of refining crude oil. For example, following Hurricanes Rita and Katrina
in late 2005 crude oil prices declined, whereas gasoline prices skyrocketed, as refineries in
the Gulf area were shut down. They also may dramatically overstate the magnitude of the
energy price shocks faced by firms, as illustrated below.
4.2.1 The Baseline Energy Price Series
As the energy input price, we use the Bureau of Labor Statistic’s Processed Fuels and
Lubricants producer price index (PPI) which is available on a monthly basis for the 1973.1
- 2006.12 period. This price index includes the prices of all energy goods purchased by
firms as inputs in production. Table 1 lists the components of this price series and each
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component’s weight in the construction of the index in 2002. The largest component
is electric power (40.3%), followed by natural gas (14.5%) and unleaded gasoline (14%).
Given the lack of suitable data prior to January 1973, we extrapolate this price series back
to January 1970 using the Fuels and Related Products and Power PPI published by the
BLS. The latter PPI includes crude energy and residential energy prices in addition to
intermediate energy inputs prices. Given the high correlation of the two series after 1973,
the error is likely to be small. We obtain a measure of real energy prices by deflating the
resulting index by the PPI for all commodities.
The upper panel of Figure 1 plots the real price of intermediate energy inputs for
1970.1 - 2006.12. It shows that the real price of energy in late 2005 briefly exceeded its
1981 peak and at the end of the sample is similar to its level in 1985, before the collapse
of OPEC. Thus, the real energy prices faced by firms are considerably higher by historical
standards than the corresponding real price of crude oil (see Figure 1 in Kilian 2007).
Moreover, the magnitude of real energy price shocks faced by firms is much smaller in
general than the corresponding shocks to crude oil prices, owing to the large share of
electric power available at stable prices. For example, in 1974, crude oil prices rose twice
as much as intermediate energy prices. Even more strikingly, in 1990, crude oil prices rose
by 83%, whereas intermediate energy prices only rose by 12%. This evidence confirms the
importance of distinguishing between crude oil prices and the energy prices faced by firms.
The panel below shows the quarterly growth rate in real energy prices faced by firms
for 1970.II - 2006.IV. The latter series will form the basis of the empirical analysis in the
sections below. As expected, the series shows marked spikes in 1974, 1979/1980, 1981,
1986, 1990/91, and 2003, during times of major disturbances in crude oil markets, and in
2005, when U.S. refining capacity was sharply reduced in the wake of Hurricanes Rita and
Katrina. In the sections below, we will treat innovations to the (suitably defined) percent
change in real intermediate energy prices as predetermined with respect to nonresidential
fixed investment. This assumption will allow us to estimate the response of investment
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expenditures to energy price shocks, while controlling for reverse causality.
4.2.2 To Weight or Not to Weight
It is a commonly held view that the share of energy in value added has declined over
time, making changes in energy prices less important for the U.S. economy (see, e.g.,
Bernanke 2006). Such changes in the economy-wide energy share are important for em-
pirical work since they may invalidate standard regression analysis based on unweighted
energy price innovations. While estimates of this share have been constructed, for example,
by Rotemberg and Woodford (1996), the evolution of this share over time does not appear
to have been documented. Following Rotemberg and Woodford (1996), the share of energy
inputs in GDP is taken to be the sum of nominal value added in oil and gas extraction and
imports of petroleum and petroleum products, divided by nominal GDP. This definition
is natural in our context since we are interested in economy-wide expenditures on fixed
investment and are unable to break down the aggregates by industry.
Notwithstanding the common view that the energy share has declined since the first
oil shock of 1973, there do not appear to be data available on this energy share prior to
1977.1 The annual energy share in value added for 1977-2005 is plotted in the lower panel
of Figure 1. The average share over our sample period is 2.3%. Starting at 3.3% in 1977,
the energy share rises through the late 1970s, briefly reaching a maximum of 5% in 1981.
The share then falls throughout the 1980s and 1990s, reaching a minimum of 1% in 1998
following the Asian crisis. Since this time, it has risen back to its 1977 level of 3.3% in
2005. Thus, the common view that the share of energy in GDP has fallen since the 1970s
must be partially revised.
An important question is whether these changes in the energy share affect the main con-
clusions of this paper. In sensitivity analysis (not reported in this paper) we verified that
1Nominal value added in oil and gas extraction is reported by the BEA on an annual basis from 1977 through 2005.
Nominal imports of petroleum and petroleum products are also available from the BEA for 1978-2005. We extrapolate the
latter series back to 1977 using the percent change in the dollar value of imported barrels of crude oil (defined as the number
of barrels of crude oil imported into the U.S. times the refiner acquisition cost for imported crude oil per barrel of crude oil).
Since year-over-year changes in nominal imports of petroleum and petroleum products and in nominal imports of crude oil
are highly correlated over the 1977-2005 period, this is likely to be a good approximation.
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this is not the case for the 1977-2005 period. In fact, weighting the change in intermediate
energy prices by the energy share makes little difference.2 As the weighted and unweighted
quarterly energy price changes have a correlation of 99%, the estimated responses of dif-
ferent types of structures and equipment investment to weighted price shocks (properly
scaled) are virtually identical to the responses to unweighted price shocks. We therefore
abstract from the weighting issue altogether, which allows us to extend the sample back
to 1970.II. This increase in sample size not only improves the accuracy and power of the
statistical tests at the center of our analysis, but it also allows us to assess the role of
energy during the two oil price shocks of the 1970s, which would not be possible using
weighted energy price changes.
4.2.3 Other Energy Price Measures
While there are good reasons to treat intermediate energy prices as the relevant measure
of energy prices for firms, as discussed above, other choices are possible and different mea-
sures of energy prices might produce different results. Firms may adjust their investment
spending in response to changes in energy costs as well as to changes in revenues. If firms
react primarily to production costs, then a measure of intermediate energy prices is most
appropriate. On the other hand, if firms respond primarily to changes in consumer demand
for their goods and services, then a measure of consumer energy prices is more appropriate.
While all empirical results reported in the sections below are based on real energy input
prices, we verified that our main conclusions are robust to alternative measures of energy
prices. Notably, we experimented with the BEA’s PCE price index for energy goods and
services, which includes gasoline (and other motor fuels), natural gas, electricity, and all
other energy goods (including heating oil, coal, and oil lubricants). This price index was
deflated by the overall PCE price index. The primary difference between the real con-
sumer energy price and the real intermediate energy inputs price is the weight devoted
to different components of each index. The correlation between the two indices is quite
2Since the data used in computing the energy share are only available at annual frequency, we use linear interpolation to
generate quarterly weights for 1977.IV-2005.IV.
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high (ρ = 0.97). In sensitivity analysis (not reported in this paper), we found that our
qualitative conclusions are unaffected whether we use the baseline measure of intermediate
energy price changes, unweighted real consumer energy price changes or consumer price
changes weighted by the energy share in consumption (see Edelstein and Kilian 2007).
4.3 Does Nonresidential Fixed Investment Respond Asymmetrically to En-
ergy Price Increases and Decreases?
In this section, we study impulse response estimates based on a series of bivariate
VAR models. Each VAR model includes a suitably defined transformation of the quarterly
change in energy prices defined in section 2. It also includes the quarterly percent change of
the component of real nonresidential fixed investment that is of interest, as reported by the
BEA. The sample period is 1970.II - 2006.IV. The VAR models are identified recursively
with energy prices ordered first, indicating that energy price innovations are not affected
contemporaneously by innovations to real nonresidential fixed investment.3 The advantage
of using a VAR model is that it isolates the linearly unpredictable component of energy
price changes and allows for reverse causality.4
Throughout this paper, we impose a VAR lag order of 4 quarters. This lag order tends
to be larger than the lag order selected by the Akaike Information Criterion conditional
on an upper bound of 12 quarterly lags, which in most cases selected an implausibly low
lag order. We present point estimates of the cumulative response of real investment to a
one-time, one standard deviation energy price shock. The maximum horizon of the impulse
response function is six quarters. The 95% bootstrap confidence intervals are based on the
bias-corrected method of Kilian (1998).
We investigate the evidence for asymmetries as follows: Our baseline approach is to split
percent changes in the real price of energy into positive and negative changes. We then run
3Under the assumption that energy price changes are predetermined, there is no loss in generality in restricting ourselves
to bivariate models. Adding more variables to the VAR model would only undermine the efficiency of the estimates, while
creating identification problems, since there is no reason to believe that the remaining model structure is recursive.
4Our approach does not allow us to differentiate between energy price changes driven by demand and by supply shocks
in energy markets. The distinction between demand and supply shocks can be important, as these shocks tend to have very
different effects on macroeconomic aggregates (see Kilian 2007). Identifying these shocks is not straightforward when dealing
with refined products. The impulse responses shown below hence are best viewed as an average reflecting the (unknown)
composition of demand and supply shocks over our sample period.
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one bivariate model in energy price increases and the percent change in investment, and
a second model in energy price decreases and the percent change in investment. Then we
compare the response of investment while controlling for the magnitude of the shock. This
allows us to characterize the nature of the asymmetry, if any, as described further below.
In addition, we conduct a formal Wald test for symmetry in the response functions. This
test is based on a modification of the residual-based bootstrap method of Kilian (1998)
that takes proper account of the fact that the underlying VAR models are only seemingly
unrelated and that preserves the contemporaneous correlations in the data across models.
The baseline approach assumes that firms respond proportionately to the magnitude of
the shock. Alternatively, it is possible that firms only respond to large shocks. We allow
for that possibility by alternatively defining energy price shocks as increases or decreases
that exceed 4.04%, which corresponds to one standard deviation of the percent change in
energy prices. A third possibility is that firms respond only to changes in energy prices that
are unprecedented in recent history (see Hamilton 1996, 2003). We address this possibility
by using a measure of the net energy price increase, defined as the difference between the
current price and the maximum price over the previous year if the current price is larger
than the previous maximum, and zero otherwise. Edelstein and Kilian (2007) extend this
measure to include net energy price declines that are constructed in a similar fashion.5
All three measures of energy price shocks are shown in Figure 2. For each specification,
increases in prices are represented by positive values and decreases by negative values,
allowing both series to be shown in the same plot. Since increases and decreases are
mutually exclusive, the respective series for increases and for decreases are shown in the
same plot.
A natural starting point for the analysis is the full-sample impulse response estimates for
1970.II-2006.IV. Full-sample estimates are potentially misleading, however. As discussed
in Edelstein and Kilian (2007), a complicating factor in testing for asymmetric responses
5Our results are qualitatively robust to considering the net change relative to the preceding three years.
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is the existence of exogenous shifts of nonresidential fixed investment spending during this
sample period. The most prominent of these shifts is associated with the 1986 Tax Reform
Act, which had a negative effect on investment spending at a time of rapidly falling energy
prices precipitated by the collapse of the OPEC cartel in late 1985. Real nonresidential
investment in equipment fell by 4.65% that year, while real investment in structures fell
by 16.35% (relative to their respective means), as the investment tax credit was repealed
in the first quarter of 1986 and real estate tax shelters were eliminated. Failing to account
for this exogenous shift at a time of sharply declining energy prices will tend to bias the
test results in favor of asymmetry.
We attempt to account for the effects of the 1986 Tax Reform Act in two alternative
ways. The first approach is to split the sample and to focus on the 1988.I-2006.IV period.
The break date of 1987.IV was chosen to exclude all short-run effects of the 1986 Tax
Reform Act from the second part of the sample.6 A drawback to this approach is that
splitting the sample in half may undermine the power of the symmetry tests. On the other
hand, this approach does not constrain any of the model parameters and, by eliminating
all confounding influences that are associated with the 1970s and early 1980s, may provide
the most accurate representation of the effects of energy price shocks on investment at
the end of the sample. The second approach involves regressing the growth rate of real
investment on a constant and a dummy for each of the four quarters of 1986 and using
the residuals from this regression as the second variable in the recursively identified VAR
model. This approach implicitly assumes that the 1986 Tax Reform Act only affected the
mean growth rate of real investment and that the effects of the 1986 Tax Reform Act on
investment were concentrated in 1986. This approach allows us to make use of the full
sample, increasing the power of statistical tests of symmetry, but it abstracts from other
forms of structural change.
6The results are similar if the sample is split at the 1987.I quarter.
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4.3.1 Testing for Asymmetries in the Response of Nonresidential Fixed Investment
Tables 2a-2e summarize the pattern of impulse response estimates for various compo-
nents of nonresidential fixed investment for the 1970.II-2006.IV period, the 1988.I-2006.IV
period, the 1970.II-1987.IV period, the 1970.II-1987.IV period (including 1986 dummies),
and the 1970.II-2006.IV period (including 1986 dummies), respectively. We show separate
results for three specifications of energy price shocks: percent changes in energy prices
(C), large percent changes in energy prices (LC) and net percent changes in energy prices
relative to the preceding year (NC), as defined earlier. To conserve space the plots of
the underlying impulse response estimates are collected in the Appendix.7 Rather than
present each of the 168 impulse response functions and the corresponding 168 Wald tests
of the symmetry hypothesis, we summarize our findings succinctly in tables. We begin
by classifying the response patterns. For a typical investment expenditure item such as
manufacturing structures, one would expect one of the following response patterns:
No response: The responses of investment to positive and negative energy price
shocks are not statistically significant at the 95% confidence level.
Symmetry : The negative response to positive energy price shocks and the positive
response to negative price shocks are approximately equal in magnitude and at
least one of the responses is statistically significant.
Classical asymmetry : There is a statistically significant negative response of
investment to positive energy price shocks and a response of investment to neg-
ative energy price shocks that is bounded above by the absolute magnitude of
the response to a positive shock.
Perverse asymmetry : Any asymmetry in the responses that departs from the
classical asymmetry predicted by commonly used economic models of the trans-
mission of energy price shocks.
7Each row in Figures A.1a-A.1e shows the impulse response for a specific component of structures investment to a positive
and negative energy price shock under each of the three energy price shock specifications.
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As it turns out, these four patterns exhaust the possibilities encountered in our impulse
response function estimates with one important exception. That exception is investment
in mining structures and investment in mining and oil field equipment. Since crude oil,
coal and natural gas producers account for 92.2% of all capital expenditures of the mining
sector, energy price increases tend to stimulate investment in mining activities.8 Hence,
the notion of symmetry (or of classical asymmetry) for these mining-related expenditures
is the mirror image of how these terms are defined for all other investment expenditures:
No response: The responses of investment to positive and to negative energy
price shocks are not statistically significant at the 95% significance level.
Symmetry : The positive response to positive energy price shocks and the negative
response to negative energy price shocks are approximately equal in magnitude
and at least one of the responses is statistically significant.
Classical asymmetry : There is a statistically significant negative response of
investment to negative energy price shocks and a response of investment to posi-
tive energy price shocks that is bounded above by the absolute magnitude of the
response to a negative shock.
Perverse asymmetry : Any asymmetry in the responses that departs from the
classical asymmetry predicted by commonly used economic models of the trans-
mission of energy price shocks.
We use X ’s in Tables 2a-2e in the appropriate columns to identify which responses follow
which pattern. In addition, we use ∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗, to indicate rejections of the symmetry
hypothesis at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. It is possible for a response to
be asymmetric in the sense that the Wald test rejects symmetry, yet be classified as No
response, if the impulse response coefficients themselves are not statistically different from
zero.
8See U.S. Census Bureau 2005, Table 1. Industry Statistics: 2002. We added capital expenditures for coal mining (5%)
and for oil and gas extraction (78%), and the respective support activities (10%) including drilling.
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Under the null hypothesis of symmetry the response of investment to a positive energy
price shock at each horizon is exactly the mirror image of the response to a negative energy
price shock of the same magnitude. This hypothesis may be expressed as a Wald test
statistic with an asymptotic χ27-distribution, given our choice of impulse response horizon.
We estimate the variance of the estimator based on a modification of the residual-based
bootstrap method of Kilian (1998) that takes proper account of the fact that the underlying
VAR models are only seemingly unrelated. The bootstrap algorithm is designed to preserve
the contemporaneous correlations in the data across regression models.9
It is useful to analyze separately the responses of nonresidential investment in structures
and in equipment, which account for 32% and 68%, respectively, of total nonresidential
fixed investment. We begin with nonresidential structures.
4.3.1.1 Asymmetries in Nonresidential Investment in Structures
A natural conjecture is that total nonresidential fixed investment in structures should
decline, as energy prices rise, and increase, as energy prices fall. The results for structures
are shown in the upper panel of Tables 2a-2e. We further differentiate between mining
structures, commercial and health care structures, manufacturing structures, power and
communication structures and other structures.
Full-Sample Analysis for 1970.II-2006.IV: The full-sample results in Table 2a show a
perverse asymmetry for total nonresidential investment in structures reflecting the fact that
these expenditures do not fall significantly in response to positive energy price shocks, but
fall significantly in response to negative energy price shocks. This seemingly paradoxical
result holds regardless of the specification of the energy price shocks. While not statistically
9Our approach to testing symmetry is more stringent than previous approaches. One common approach in the literature
has been to fit a single-equation regression model that includes lags of both increases and decreases in oil prices and to test
the equality of the coefficients at a given lag by means of a Wald test (see, e.g., Mork 1989, Dotsey and Reid 1992, Hooker
1996a, Hooker 2002). Such tests only tell us whether the estimates of the regression slope parameters are different, whereas
we really are interested in the extent to which the estimated impulse responses differ. We avoid this ambiguity by focusing
directly on the differences in the impulse response estimates with respect to unexpected increases and decreases in energy
prices. Rather than simply inspecting the point estimates as in Davis and Haltiwanger (2001) or testing for symmetry at
selected horizons (ignoring the dependence of response coefficients across horizons), we test for the symmetry of the entire
response function.
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significant at conventional significance levels, this evidence of asymmetry is clearly at odds
with conventional explanations of asymmetries in the response of nonresidential investment
expenditures.
It is useful to decompose structures investment further. The second row of Table 2a
suggests that mining structures are characterized by highly significant classical asymme-
tries of the type anticipated based on conventional economic theories. Thus, one possible
explanation of the perverse asymmetry in total structures investment is a simple compo-
sition effect. Total structures is the sum of investment in industries that use energy as
an input (and that depend on consumer demand) and of investment by mining industries
that produce energy in the form of crude oil, coal or natural gas. Thus, if the response of
mining expenditures exhibits a classical asymmetry, as shown in Table 2a, and if nonres-
idential structures excluding mining do not, then aggregating these two components will
by construction, produce a perverse asymmetry.
This point is illustrated in Figure 3 using a hypothetical example. For expository pur-
poses, we postulated a small symmetric response of nonresidential structures excluding
mining (upper panel). The panel below shows a classical asymmetry in the response of
expenditures on mining structures. Such an asymmetry could arise for any number of rea-
sons, including an uncertainty effect that dampens the positive response to higher energy
prices and strengthens the negative response to falling energy prices. An alternative expla-
nation could be that there were few domestic investment opportunities in response to rising
energy prices in the United States during our sample period, making it difficult to invest
in energy production domestically, while the option of cutting investment in mining in
response to falling energy prices always has been available. For our purposes, the source of
this classical asymmetry is immaterial. Assuming equal weights for expositional purposes
and summing the symmetric response in the first panel and the hypothesized asymmetric
response of mining in the second panel, produces a response for total nonresidential struc-
tures that looks perverse from the point of view of conventional economic theories of the
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transmission of energy price shocks in that total investment rises somewhat in response to
positive energy price shocks and falls strongly in response to negative energy price shocks.
This composition effect is quantitatively important in the data despite the relatively
small share of mining structures in total structures, which ranges from under 10% to 30%,
depending on the sample period. It can be shown that under the C specification, for
example, the p-value of the symmetry test after excluding mining rises sharply from 0.20
to 0.48, indicating weakening evidence of perverse asymmetries. Similar results hold for
the other two specifications of energy price shocks. Nevertheless, Table 2a suggests that
the composition effect is not the only source of the perverse asymmetry in the responses
of total nonresidential structures. In fact, total nonresidential structures excluding mining
also exhibit a perverse asymmetry.
What then is the source of the perverse asymmetry in total structures excluding min-
ing? Table 2a shows that all but one component of structures investment do not respond
significantly to energy price shocks. Only for other structures is there some statistically
insignificant evidence of a classical asymmetry.10 The latter asymmetry is not the cause of
the perverse asymmetry in total structures excluding mining, however, which is unmatched
by any of the disaggregates and indeed is not statistically significant. We conclude that
in no case is there evidence of statistically significant asymmetries outside the mining
industry.
Split-sample Analysis for 1970.II-1987.IV and 1988.I-2006.IV: There has been much dis-
cussion of the proposition that the effect of energy price shocks has declined since the
1970s and early 1980s. It is therefore instructive to split our sample in half. We choose to
break the sample in 1987.IV, for reasons discussed below. Table 2b focuses on the second
half of the sample: 1988.I-2006.IV. Compared to the full sample, we see that none of the
asymmetries remain statistically significant, and that the qualitative patterns of the re-
10Other structures include religious structures, educational and vocational structures, lodging, amusement and recreation
structures, farm structures, transportation structures, and other infrastructure.
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sponses change. Except under specification C, there is no evidence at all of an asymmetry
in the response of total structures. The perverse asymmetry encountered under the first
specification can be traced to the weak evidence of classical asymmetries in the response
of mining. Excluding mining, there is no longer any evidence of perverse asymmetries in
nonresidential structures investment. Under the C specification, for example, the p-value
of the symmetry test rises slightly from 0.85 to 0.88 after excluding mining, consistent with
the weak evidence of classical asymmetries in mining. None of the components of struc-
tures exhibits statistically significant asymmetry in the second half of the sample. Thus,
for 1988.I-2006.II, there seems to be little support for the classical asymmetries discussed
in the literature.
In contrast, the results for the first half of the sample in Table 2c are far less clear-cut.
Table 2c shows a clear pattern of classical asymmetries in mining structures. The only
difference from the full sample is the lack of statistical significance. Using the percent
change specification of energy price shocks (C), there is some evidence of a perverse asym-
metry in total nonresidential structures (whether mining is excluded or not), but there
is no such evidence for the other two specifications. Excluding mining sharply raises the
p-value of the symmetry test from 0.51 to 0.84, again under the C specification. There
also is systematic, if statistically insignificant, evidence of classical asymmetries in other
structures and under the LC specification for total structures.
1970.II-1987.IV and 1988.I-2006.IV Revisited: Why are the results for the two subsam-
ples so different? As discussed in Edelstein and Kilian (2007), there is reason to believe
that the results for the first half of the sample are distorted. The distortion arises because
we do not control for exogenous shifts in investment that occurred at the same time as the
sharp decline in energy prices in the mid-1980s. Perhaps the most important candidate for
such an exogenous shift in nonresidential investment is the 1986 Tax Reform Act. Invest-
ment in commercial structures including office buildings often served as a tax shelter prior
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to 1986. By removing the real estate tax shelter, the 1986 Tax Reform Act caused a sharp
exogenous drop in investment in commercial and office space in 1986 that may easily be
mistaken for an asymmetry (see Survey of Current Business 1987, p.4). The fact that the
only evidence for perverse asymmetries in Table 2c arises for commercial and health care
structures is consistent with this view.11
In addition, Edelstein and Kilian (2007) have suggested that the seemingly asymmetric
response of investment in the mining sector in 1986 may have been driven by the mining
industry’s reaction to the collapse of OPEC in late 1985. That response far transcended
the response that one would have expected based on the decline in energy prices in 1986
alone, suggesting that the sudden collapse of OPEC was viewed as an exogenous shock by
the mining industry over and above the decline in energy prices.
In Table 2d we control for both of these effects by specifying four intercept dummies
in the VAR model, one for each quarter of 1986. Table 2d shows that this modification
eliminates all evidence of perverse asymmetries in structures for the 1970.II-1987.IV period.
With the exception of other structures which appear to exhibit a classical asymmetry, none
of the components of structures nor total structures show a statistically significant response
to energy price shocks. These results are the same across all three specifications.
One drawback of the evidence in Tables 2b and 2d is that the reduction in sample size
associated with sample-splitting may render some results statistically insignificant merely
because of lower power. There is also a greater chance of obtaining an apparent asymmetric
pattern merely by chance. Table 2e therefore revisits the full-sample analysis with 1986
dummies.
The results are stronger than for the second half of the sample in that there is no evidence
of asymmetries in total structures. The results in Tables 2b, 2d, and 2e also agree in
that there is no significant asymmetry in total nonresidential structures excluding mining.
Unlike in Table 2b, there is no evidence of asymmetry in the response of mining structures
11Data limitations prevent us from disentangling commerical and office space from health care structures.
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in Table 2e. Unlike in Table 2d there is evidence of a symmetric response of mining
structures. The classical asymmetry in other structures in Table 2e is not statistically
significant. No evidence at all remains of the perverse asymmetries that plagued the earlier
analysis, which raises our confidence in the results. This result illustrates the importance
of controlling for exogenous shifts in nonresidential investment in 1986.
We conclude that nonresidential investment in structures does not respond asymmetri-
cally to energy price shocks. That result is robust to alternative specifications of energy
price shocks. There is no statistically significant evidence of the asymmetric patterns sug-
gested by various economic models of the transmission of energy price shocks (or of any
other asymmetric patterns).
4.3.1.2 Asymmetries in Nonresidential Investment in Equipment
Having found no compelling statistical evidence of asymmetries in structures investment,
we now turn to the evidence for nonresidential investment in equipment. The results
for equipment are shown in the bottom panels of Tables 2a-2e. We distinguish between
mining and oil field machinery, equipment for information processing, industrial equipment,
transportation equipment, and all other equipment.
Table 2a shows that in the full sample, there is no evidence of perverse asymmetries in
equipment, but a robust pattern of classical asymmetries with the exception of information
processing. Only after excluding mining and oil field machinery is that pattern marginally
statistically significant, and even in that case the rejection occurs only under one of three
specifications. If we focus on the results for 1988.I-2006.IV only (Table 2b), much of the
evidence of classical asymmetries vanishes. An exception is mining and oil field machinery.
There is also some evidence of a perverse, but statistically insignificant asymmetry in the
response of industrial equipment.
In contrast, the results for 1970.II-1987.IV in Table 2c are closer to those for the full
sample; the only difference being some evidence of perverse asymmetries in the response
of mining and oil field machinery. That evidence weakens considerably in Table 2d, once
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we include the 1986 dummies. The 1986 Tax Reform Act sharply raised the effective tax
rate for many corporations by severely curtailing deductions for capital expenditures and
by eliminating the investment tax credit. For most types of equipment, the repeal of the
investment tax credit, which became effective in the first quarter of 1986, amounted to
the elimination of a 10% subsidy on investment. This fact helps explain the sharp drop
in nonresidential fixed investment expenditures on equipment in 1986.12 After controlling
for these effects, all of the perverse responses for mining equipment become statistically
insignificant. There is now a clear pattern of classical asymmetries in most components of
equipment, but none that are statistically significant.
Moving to the full-sample results for the model with 1986 dummies in Table 2e, all
of the perverse responses vanish and a very clear picture emerges. With the exception
of information processing all forms of nonresidential investment in equipment appear to
exhibit classical asymmetries. The strongest evidence against symmetry is obtained for the
LC specification, including a 10% rejection of symmetry for total equipment. In contrast,
under the NC specification, symmetry is never rejected, and under the C specification
symmetry is rejected only for two disaggregates.
While it is difficult to compare formally the NC specification with the other two, we can
test the support for the LC specification against the C specification, since one specification
is nested in the other. This fact allows us to test formally the hypothesis that firms only re-
spond to large percent changes in energy prices as opposed to all percent changes in energy
prices. Wald tests for the equality of the impulse responses to large percent changes and
to all percent changes in energy prices generate p -values of 0.63 for total equipment and of
0.67 for total equipment excluding mining and oil field machinery. Thus, there is no reason
to reject the C specification which makes efficient use of all data on energy price changes
in favor of the more limited LC specification. Whereas we cannot reject symmetry for the
response of total nonresidential equipment or for mining and oil field machinery under the
12For details of the timing of the 1986 Tax Reform Act see Wakefield (1987).
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C specification, we marginally reject symmetry at the 10% level for total nonresidential
equipment excluding mining and oil field machinery. The latter rejection appears to be
driven by industrial equipment. Thus, there is weak evidence for classical asymmetries in
some forms of equipment investment under the C specification, but none under the NC
specification. There is no evidence against symmetry in total investment in equipment for
either specification, suggesting that there is not enough evidence to abandon the standard
linear VAR model framework for investment.
4.3.1.3 Revisiting the Specification of the Energy Price Series
The results in Tables 2a-2e illustrate the importance of distinguishing investment in
mining-related structures and equipment from other nonresidential investment. This dis-
tinction is all the more important, as the rationale for using intermediate energy prices
for expenditures related to mining activities is questionable. A case can be made that in-
vestment expenditures on mining structures and on mining and oil field machinery should
depend on the output price of primary energy goods more than on the input price of refined
energy goods. We therefore computed an alternative set of results for mining structures
and equipment based on the producer price index for crude oil (as a proxy for all primary
energy goods). The results are similar to those in Table 2a in that for 1970.II-2006.IV there
is statistically significant evidence of classical asymmetries in mining structures. Qualita-
tively similar results are obtained for the subsamples, but the statistical significance is lost
in all cases. As in Table 2d, once we control for the 1986 dummies, the evidence for asym-
metries in the first half of the sample weakens. For the full sample with 1986 dummies,
we find impulse response patterns consistent with classical asymmetries, but none that are
statistically significant.
For mining and oil field machinery, the results are more sensitive to the choice of the
energy price series and more erratic under the crude oil price specification than the inter-
mediate energy goods specification. There is weak evidence of asymmetries under the LC
specification for the second part of the sample, but the C specification cannot be statisti-
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cally rejected in favor of the LC specification. Likewise, the qualitative results for the full
sample with 1986 dummies remain unchanged in that there is no evidence of statistically
significant asymmetries. Thus, the choice of the energy price series does not affect our
conclusions.
4.4 Quantifying the Effect of Energy Price Shocks on Real Nonresidential
Fixed Investment
Given the lack of evidence for asymmetries in the responses of structures as well as
equipment to energy price shocks, in this section our objective is to quantify these responses
based on models that impose symmetry. Apart from the imposition of symmetry, our
estimation methodology is the same as in the previous section. A positive one standard
deviation shock amounts to a 3.9% quarterly increase in energy prices. We present results
only for percent changes in energy prices. The estimated responses to large price changes
and net price changes are qualitatively similar. We focus on the results for 1970.II-2006.IV
(including 1986 dummies), 1970.II-1987.IV (including 1986 dummies) and 1988.I-2006.IV,
so that we can assess the extent to which the estimates have declined over time. The
95% bootstrap confidence intervals are again based on the bias-corrected method of Kilian
(1998).
4.4.1 The Response of Nonresidential Investment in Structures to Energy Price Shocks
Figure 4a focuses on the results for nonresidential investment in structures. The re-
sponse of total structures is flat, if not positive, and never statistically significant, whether
in the full sample or in the subsamples. Investment in mining structures increases by
5.1% after six quarters. The response is highly statistically significant. Interestingly, the
response estimate for the second half of the sample is even more statistically significant,
but that for the first half is statistically insignificant. Excluding mining structures does
not alter the response of total structures investment much; they remain statistically in-
significant and close to zero. The same is true for the disaggregates. With the exception of
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other structures, the disaggregates tend to have flat responses. The response of manufac-
turing structures is associated with noticeably larger sampling uncertainty than the other
responses.
4.4.2 The Response of Nonresidential Investment in Equipment to Energy Price Shocks
Figure 4b shows an insignificant decline in total equipment investment. In the full
sample, a one-standard deviation shock lowers total equipment investment by -1.61%. The
point estimate is dominated by the data for the first half of the sample. In the second half,
the estimated response is virtually flat. In contrast, mining and oil field machinery shows
a highly statistically significant increase in the full sample. The point estimate is 7.4%
after six quarters and quite similar to the split-sample results, except that the split-sample
results are not statistically significant. Excluding mining and oil field machinery from
total investment in equipment makes little difference for the response estimates or their
statistical significance.
Of the remaining forms of equipment investment, only the responses of transportation
and of other equipment excluding mining are statistically significant. They also show
the largest responses. Investment in transportation equipment drops by -3.7% after six
quarters. The point estimate for 1970.II-1987.IV is -5.8% (yet only partially significant),
whereas the point estimate for 1988.I-2006.IV is only -1.7% (and statistically insignifi-
cant). These results indicate that the response of investment in transportation equipment
(unlike that of total equipment excluding mining and oil field machinery) has become less
responsive to energy price shocks, a result that mirrors similar findings for motor vehicle
consumption in Edelstein and Kilian (2007). Other equipment excluding mining drops by
-3.1% in the full sample, and by -5.8% and -0.9% in the respective subsamples.
4.4.3 Quantifying Historical Fluctuations in Nonresidential Fixed Investment due to Energy
Price Shocks
It is useful to put the impulse response estimates in perspective. The magnitude of a
one standard deviation shock to energy prices is 3.9%. The biggest shock in our sample
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occurred in 2003.I and amounted to a 15.7% increase in energy prices. A shock of this
size would leave total nonresidential investment in structures virtually unchanged after six
quarters. It would raise investment in mining structures by 20.5% and lower all other non-
residential investment in structures by -0.7%. If the same shock were applied to investment
in equipment, we would observe a decline of -6.5% in total equipment excluding mining and
oil field machinery, but a sharp increase in investment in mining and oil field machinery of
29.7%, resulting in a -6.5% decline in total nonresidential equipment investment. Of course,
such large shocks are rare and this prediction presumes that no other shocks occurred sub-
sequently, whereas in reality positive shocks are often followed by negative shocks, as was
indeed the case after the 2003 spike (see Figure 2).
While the estimated impulse response functions provide a measure of the response of real
business fixed investment to a hypothetical permanent shock to energy prices, an equally
insightful question is how important energy prices have been overall in driving fluctuations
in nonresidential fixed investment during the 1970.II-2006.IV period. The answer to this
question may be obtained from historical decompositions of the data on the basis of the
full-sample estimates of the bivariate VAR model of the previous section (including the
1986 dummies).
The uppermost panel of Figure 5 shows the actual (demeaned) growth rates for total real
structures investment excluding mining structures. It also shows the growth rates predicted
based on the cumulative effect of the energy price shocks alone. The difference between
the two series measures the extent to which investment growth is not explained by energy
price shocks. The panel below shows the corresponding results for mining structures.
It is evident that only a small part of the fluctuations in non-mining structures in-
vestment is accounted for by the cumulative effect of energy price shocks. There is some
evidence of a decline in investment growth in non-mining structures in the second half of
the 1970s and in the early 1980s, for example, that is driven by energy prices. There is
also some evidence of increased investment in the mid- and late 1980s and the late 1990s,
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but all these effects are dwarfed by the large positive spikes in investment in non-mining
structures in 1971-1973, 1976-1979, 1984-85, and the large negative spikes in 1975, 1980,
and 1982/83. This evidence is important because it supports the view that not only the
booms in investment of the 1970s and 1980s, but also the major declines in investment in
1975, 1980 and 1982-83, were not primarily driven by energy price shocks (see, e.g., Barsky
and Kilian 2002, 2004).
Energy price shocks do a somewhat better job at tracking the growth in investment
dedicated to mining structures, but there remain important exceptions. For example, the
sharp increase in domestic investment in mining structures in 1978/79 (during the time of
the Iranian Revolution) is not explained by the cumulative energy price shocks. Similarly,
the drop in investment in 1985 and in 1986 (after the collapse of OPEC) far exceeds what
the model predicts.
The remaining two panels deal with mining and oil field machinery and with non-mining
equipment investment. The results for the latter aggregate are very similar to those for non-
mining structures. Energy price shocks do a somewhat better job at explaining fluctuations
in investment in mining and oil field machinery than in non-mining equipment investment.
Interestingly, the decline in investment in mining and oil field machinery in 1986 is much
less pronounced than for mining structures and to some extent is explained by energy
prices. On the other hand, there are some major spikes in 1992/93 (and to a lesser extent
in 2002/2003) that are not explained by energy price shocks.
We conclude that, at least outside the mining sector, energy prices historically have had
only a negligible effect on the growth rate of real nonresidential fixed investment. Only for
mining structures and to a lesser extent for mining and oil field machinery, have energy
prices played a somewhat more important role.
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4.5 Conclusion
This paper investigated one of the two main channels for the transmission of energy
prices to the U.S. economy that have been discussed in the literature on oil and the
macroeconomy (see, e.g., Hamilton 2005). There is a widespread perception that nonres-
idential expenditures on structures and equipment are sensitive to energy price shocks.
Little is known about how sensitive these expenditures are and whether the responses are
symmetric or not.
The absence of an economic expansion in 1986 following the rapid fall in energy prices
as a result of the OPEC collapse in 1985, has led a number of researchers to incorporate
asymmetries into models of the transmission of energy price shocks to the economy such
as the uncertainty effect on irreversible investment decisions described in Bernanke (1983)
and Pindyck (1991). A common view is that positive energy price shocks will lower non-
residential fixed investment, while negative energy price shocks of the same magnitude
will not increase investment to the same extent. We referred to this pattern as a classical
asymmetry. In contrast, a more conventional symmetric response would involve a nega-
tive response to positive shocks and a positive response to negative shocks of the same
magnitude that sum to zero. We referred to this pattern as symmetry.
Despite the prominence of classical asymmetries in policy discussions and in economic
modeling, it remains an unresolved empirical question whether nonresidential fixed invest-
ment responds asymmetrically to energy price shocks. Clearly, the absence of the expected
asymmetric pattern in the data would have immediate implications for the credibility of
economic models of the transmission of energy price shocks that appeal to classical asym-
metries. Our analysis addressed this question by comparing the responses of nonresidential
fixed investment to positive and to negative energy price shocks of the same magnitude
under the assumption that energy price shocks may be treated as predetermined with re-
spect to nonresidential investment at the quarterly frequency. We showed that uncritical
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application of the VAR methodology will result in spurious evidence of asymmetries in
the responses of nonresidential fixed investment and in particular, in evidence of perverse
asymmetries, in the sense that these asymmetries are at odds with predictions of commonly
used economic models of the transmission of energy price shocks.
We traced this evidence to two problems in particular. One problem is that the aggre-
gation of mining-related investment by domestic producers of coal, natural gas and crude
oil with other forms of investment expenditures may generate perverse asymmetries (in
the sense that the observed asymmetries are seemingly at odds with the predictions of
economic models). We showed that this problem can be quantitatively important. The
other problem is that impulse response estimates tend to be highly sensitive in small sam-
ples to an exogenous shift in nonresidential investment that occurred in 1986 during a
major decline in energy prices. This shift was related in large part to the 1986 Tax Re-
form Act. We controlled for this shift by introducing quarterly intercept dummies for
1986 and/or by splitting the sample in 1987.IV. Excluding investment in mining-related
activities and including the 1986 dummies removed much of the evidence of asymmetries
in the 1970.II-1987.IV and 1988.I-2006.IV subsamples. The little evidence that remained
became statistically insignificant.
In addition, we illustrated the importance of relying on long samples when estimating
the effect of energy price shocks on real nonresidential investment. We showed that using
the full 1970.II-2006.IV period in conjunction with the 1986 dummies helps eliminate all
evidence of asymmetries that are economically implausible. Results for this final spec-
ification are free of all perverse asymmetries and in general quite robust to alternative
specifications of energy price shocks.
We concluded that there is no compelling evidence of asymmetries in the responses of
aggregate nonresidential investment in structures and no compelling evidence of asymme-
tries in the response of aggregate nonresidential equipment investment. Only in two cases
did we find a marginal rejection of symmetry at the 10% level for components of equip-
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ment investment. There is no significant rejection of symmetry at all for the components
of structures investment. These results are qualitatively consistent with recent findings by
Edelstein and Kilian (2007) for the response of consumer durables and residential fixed
investment. Our results are robust to weighting energy price changes by the share of en-
ergy in value added (the evolution of which we documented in the paper) and robust to
alternative specifications of the energy price series.
Theoretical models that incorporate asymmetric effects of energy price changes have
played an important role in the recent literature. While there are several potential sources
of asymmetry in the responses of nonresidential investment, our evidence casts doubt, in
particular, on the view that investment is subject to an uncertainty effect of the type
described in Bernanke (1983) and Pindyck (1991). If there is such an effect, it seems too
small or too imprecisely estimated to be detected by our statistical tools. Similarly, our
results are inconsistent with the existence of a reallocation effect of the type emphasized
in Hamilton (1988).
Thus, there is no compelling reason to abandon the assumption of symmetric responses
to energy price shocks. Our analysis in the remainder of the paper quantified the effect
of energy price shocks on nonresidential investment based on linear models that impose
symmetry. We showed that, in response to a one percent increase in energy prices, real
nonresidential investment in equipment falls by a statistically insignificant -0.41% after six
quarters, whether or not mining and oil field machinery is included. The largest responses
are found in transportation equipment with a statistically significant -0.95% decline, and in
mining and oil field machinery which rises by a statistically significant 1.90%. Other forms
of real equipment investment are largely unresponsive to energy price shocks. Real invest-
ment in total nonresidential structures increases by a statistically insignificant 0.03%, while
real investment in mining structures (used for petroleum, coal and natural gas exploration
and extraction) increases by a statistically significant 1.31%. Other forms of real struc-
tures investment are unresponsive to energy price shocks. Excluding mining structures,
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the response of nonresidential structures is -0.04%, but remains statistically insignificant.
We found no compelling evidence that nonresidential fixed investment in structures
has become less responsive to energy price shocks since the mid-1980s with the exception
of other structures (including religious, educational, transportation, and farm structures,
among others). We found some evidence of a decline in the responsiveness of nonresi-
dential fixed investment in equipment, mainly in transportation equipment and in other
equipment. The declining response of investment in transportation equipment is consistent
with evidence of a decline in the response of real consumption of vehicles in Edelstein and
Kilian (2007).
We also addressed the closely related question of how important energy price shocks
have been overall for U.S. nonresidential fixed investment. Historical decompositions show
only a negligible cumulative effect on investment in equipment and structures. A partial
exception is investment in mining structures and to a lesser extent investment in mining
and oil field machinery.
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Component Percent Share 
Liquefied petroleum gas 2.40 
Electric power 40.32 
Natural gas 14.50 
Unleaded gasoline 13.98 
Aviation gasoline 0.57 
Kerosene 0.16 
Jet Fuel 9.73 
Home heating oil 2.06 
#2 diesel fuel 11.36 
Residual Fuels 2.42 
Lubricating grease 0.14 
Lubricating and similar oils 1.29 
Petroleum and coal products, n.e.c. 1.10 



































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































   
   















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































   
   


















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































   
   


























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































   
   































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































   
   






















































Figure 4.1: Intermediate Energy Prices and Energy Share in Value Added 








































Figure 4.2: Alternative Measures of Energy Price Shocks: 1970.II-2006.IV
 



































Figure 4.3: Illustration of the Composition Effect 
 
Symmetry 


































































































Figure 4.4a: Response of Real Structures Investment to Energy Price Shock 






















































































































































Figure 4.4b: Response of Real Equipment Investment to Energy Price Shock 





























































































































































































Figure 4.5: Contribution of Energy Price Shocks to Quarterly Change in Real Investment: 1970.II -
2006.IV
 

















































The following results are summarized in Tables 4.2a-4.2e. Tables 4.A.1, 4.A.2, and 4.A.3
of this appendix include the p-values for tests of symmetry in the response of real invest-
ment to positive and negative energy price shocks under the percent changes, large percent
changes, and net percent changes specifications. Figures 4.A.1a-4.A.1e show the impulse
response estimates (with 95% confidence bands) for real structures investment to positive
and negative energy price shocks under the three specifications. Figures 4.A.2a-4.A.2e
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This thesis demonstrates that, contrary to findings in the existing literature, commodity
prices help predict inflation even in more recent years. In fact, commodity prices contain
information about future inflation not captured by the leading principle components of
a broader set of macroeconomic and financial data. These improved inflation forecasts,
however, do not provide professional economists with a better understanding of monetary
policy.
The sharp rise in gasoline prices in recent years has renewed interest in the question
of how much higher energy prices affect consumer expenditures. Our analysis allows us
to assess the overall effect of such a price increase on household consumption. Suppose,
for example, that gasoline prices unexpectedly and permanently increase by 25 cents per
gallon (which translates into a 6.85% increase in the overall price of energy, assuming all
other energy prices remain unchanged). If a typical household spends $200 a month on
gasoline at the January 2007 price of $2.29 per gallon, this would raise the household’s
gasoline bill by almost $22 a month, if the household continued to consume the same
amount of gasoline. In response to such a shock, a typical household with about $4000 to
spend per month will have cut back its expenditures one year later by $35 based on the
full-sample estimates (or by $17 based on the post-1987 estimates). Most of the adjustment
will take place in the first six months following the gasoline price increase. Given a share
of consumption in GDP of about 72%, this implies that, all else equal, real GDP will have
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fallen by 0.63% one year after the shock. This example illustrates that it takes repeated
surprise increases in gasoline prices to generate large effects on household consumption.
This thesis also suggests that it is necessary to revise our thinking about the transmission
of energy price shocks to the economy. Researchers typically believe that frictions associ-
ated with sectoral reallocations are important channels through which energy price shocks
are transmitted to the economy. These frictions in turn imply that real consumption, real
investment, and aggregate unemployment will respond asymmetrically to energy price in-
creases and decreases. We find no compelling evidence for asymmetries in the response
of these variables, suggesting that sectoral reallocations are not a significant transmission
mechanism. This does not mean, however, that the effects of energy price shocks are
necessarily small. In addition to a discretionary income effect, we find that energy price
shocks result in a sizeable precautionary savings effect and a sizeable operating cost effect
on energy-using durable goods. The extent to which each of these channels is important
depends on the type of expenditure in question. Besides mining-related investment in
structures and equipment, the types of expenditure that matter most for the transmission
of energy price shocks to the economy include consumer and firm expenditures on motor
vehicles and residential fixed investment in housing.
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